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Between April 29, 1946 and November 12, 1948 the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East convened 
in Tokyo to try twenty-eight Japanese prewar and wartime 
leaders accused of war crimes. Eleven Allied countries 
formed the Tribunal. The International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East sentenced seven Japanese to death, sixteen 
to life imprisonment terms and two to terms of seven and 
sixteen years imprisonment. 
The primary problem with the Tokyo War Crimes Trial 
was the nature of the charges against the Japanese accused. 
Some of the defendants were certainly guilty of the alleged 
violations of the laws of war. The accused, however, 
were tried not only on conventional war crimes charges, 
as recognized by international law, but on ex post facto 
counts which were unnecessary to attain convictions. The 
charges of Crimes against Peace and Crimes against Humanity 
had no basis in international law. The outcome and 
historical judgment of the trial would appear far different 
had the Japanese been tried only on conventional war crimes 
charges. 
Whether one believes the defendants innocent or 
guilty of war crimes, the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East proceedings were hardly a model of 
impartiality. The rules of trial procedure, the nature 
of the evidence and the court's bias in favor of the 
prosecution precluded a fair trial by American standards. 
The Tokyo Tribunal, for example, admitted hearsay evidence, 
permitted leading questions and required testimony by 
affidavit which prevented cross-examination of the witnesses. 
If defeated American war leaders had faced trial on the 
Tokyo standard, the outcry would have been enormous. 
To Cynthia Neal 
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CHAPTER ONE 
WORLD WAR II AND JAPANESE WAR CRIMES 
(1941-1945) 
We should string them up and cut little pieces off 
them--one piece at a time. 
Put them in a tank and suffocate them. 
Torture them to a slow and awful death. 
-Typical American responses on the postwar 
punishment of Japanese leaders (Gallup poll, 
December 1944). 
The actions of Japanese troops during World War II 
offended the moral sensibilities of the American people. 
The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the Bataan "death march, 11 
the execution of American aviators, banzai charges, Kamikaze 
attacks and the seemingly suicidal nature of Japanese resis-
tance made a lasting impression on Americans. Indeed, even 
after the horrors of the Nazi concentration camp system were 
revealed, the American public considered the Japanese "more 
cruel at heart" than the Germans. The lengthy list of 
Japanese wartime atrocities and the corresponding negative 
American public opinion did not augur well for Japanese await-
1 ing trial on war crimes charges. 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the quick 
1George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll (New York, 1972), 
volume one, p. 509. Dr. Gallup noted that the majority of 
Americans, of all educational levels, regarded the Japanese 
people as "considerably less civilized than the German people." 
1 
conquest of large areas of the Pacific and Asia badly shook 
the confidence of the American people. The Pearl Harbor 
2 
raid, without formal warning, upset the American concept of 
"fair play. 11 Early in 1942, weeks after the Hawaii surprise 
attack, six out of ten Americans surveyed favored concentrating 
our main military thrust against the Japanese. The fall of 
Bataan on April 8, 1942, and the May 6 American surrender 
at Corregidor marked the low point of the Pacific War. Except 
for General James H. Doolittle's daring April 18 daylight 
bombing raid on Tokyo, Americans had little to cheer about. 
During 1942, the image of the "sneaky Jap" gained wide 
credence in the United States. A July poll indicated that 
most Americans characterized Japanese as "treacherous, sly, 
cruel [or] warlike." Wartime Hollywood movies portrayed 
Japanese soldiers as brutal savages. An Office of War Informa-
tion (OWI} study on wartime movies confirmed this negative 
image. Hollywood movies depicted Japanese troops who routinely 
violated rules of warfare and who delighted in cruelty. The 
German soldier received a more favorable image. The OWI 
report failed to find a single Hollywood film where Germans 
relished barbaric actions. 2 
2For early 1942 poll, see Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in 
the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign 
Policy (New York, 1948), pp. 142-143. By June, however, most 
Americans considered Germany to be the chief U.S. enemy. See 
The Gallup Poll, volume one, pp. 338-339. For Doolittle B-25 
raid, see, for example, Los Angeles Times , April 18, 1942, 
pp. 1, 3; New York Times, April 18, 1942, pp. 1, 3; and 
Washington Post, April 18, 1942, p. 1. For July poll, see Hadley 
3 
Beginning in late 1941, President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt and other Allied World leaders made both unilateral 
and joint pronouncements on Axis war crimes and postwar 
punishment for war criminals. Almost all declarations dealt 
with Nazi rather than Japanese war crimes. On October 25, 
1941, Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
issued a joint statement protesting the Nazi executions of 
countless innocent hostages. The following January, nine 
European governments in exile signed a declaration in London 
at St. James Palace. Norway, Luxemburg, Yugoslavia, Nether-
lands, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Greece and the French 
National Committee pledged themselves to punish "through the 
channels of organized justice" those found quilty of war 
crimes "whatever their nationality. 113 
On August 21, 1942,Roosevelt released a war crimes 
statement to the press. After citing the January St. James 
Cantril!, ed., Public Opinion, 1935-1946 (Princeton, 1951), 
p. 501. For OWI study, see Gregory D. Black and Clayton 
R. Kappes, "OWI Goes to the Movies, 11 Foreign Service 
Journal 51 (August 1 974): 44-59. For more on American 
opinion, see Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps USA : 
Japanese-Americans and World War II (New York, 1972), 
pp. 26-41 and Shelia K. Johnson, American Attitudes Towards 
Japan, 1941-1975 (Washington, D.C., 1975), pp. 14-31. 
3For October 1941 declaration, see U.S. Dept. of State, 
Bulletin, volume 5, No. 122 (October 25, 1941), p. 317. 
For January 13 St. James Declaration, see New York Times, 
January 14, 1942, p. 6 and Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1942, 
p. 3. The United States, Britain, china, Russia, India, 
the Union of South Africa, New Zealand, Canada and Australia 
sent observers to the London meeting. 
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Palace Declaration, the Chief :Executive promised that Asian 
and European invaders who have committed war crimes would 
eventually "have to stand in courts of law" for their actions. 
On October 7, Roosevelt called for the establishment of a 
United Nations War Crimes Commission {UNWCC) which would 
determine responsibility for those guilty of war crimes "through 
the collection and assessment of all available evidence." 
The President vowed that just and swift punishment awaited 
the "ring leaders" who had committed those horrible acts 
which had "violated every tenet of the Christian faith." 
That same day British Lord Chancellor Viscount Simon commented 
in the House of Lords that the Allies did not intend to punish 
the Germans as a nation, but only their leaders. 4 
Throughout 1942, the U.S. Department of State made 
extensive diplomatic protests to the Japanese government 
through the Swiss Minister in Tokyo regarding treatment of 
American nationals in Japanese custody. Although Japan had 
signed the 1929 Geneva International Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Japan did not ratify it. 
On February 4, 1942, however, the Japanese government agreed 
to apply the "mutatis mutandis" provision of the Geneva 
Convention to American prisoners of war under its control. 
4For the FDR August 1942 statement, see New York Times, 
August 22, 1942, pp. 1, 4 and Bulletin, vol. 7, No. 165 
(Aug. 22, 1942), pp. 709-710. For UNWCC plans, see New York 
Times, October 8, 1942, pp. 1, 11 and Bulletin, vol. 7, No. 
172 (October 10, 1942), p. 797. For Simon's remarks, see 
New York Times, October 8, 1942, p. 11. 
5 
Japan still refused to permit International Red Cross visits 
to most American camps, spurned U.S. requests for the nar:i.es 
of the sick, wounded and dead, and turned down American 
petitions for repatriation of the seriously ill and wounded 
prisoners of war. 
By late 1942, State Department representatives began 
lodging protests against specific cases of gross mistreatment 
of American prisoners under Japanese control. The first U.S. 
protest of Japanese atrocities came on November 17. On 
December 12, Secretary of State Cordell Hull lodged "a most 
emphatic protest" with the Japanese Government regarding the 
"inhumane and uncivilized treatment accorded American nationals" 
interned by the Empire of Japan. Hulls' extended note cited 
cases of torture, neglect, physical violence and solitary 
confinement resulting in the deaths of American citizens. 5 
The year 1943 was a hopeful year for the Allied 
cause. As the military situation improved, the level of 
planning for the postwar trial of Axis war criminals grew. 
On January 24, during the Casablanca Conference, Churchill 
and Roosevelt called for the Unconditional Surrender of Japan. 
On February 19, Viscount Simon elaborated on postwar punishment 
5 For the text of the Geneva POW agreement, see U.S. Dept. 
of State, Diplomatic Papers, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1929, volume I (Wash., D.C., 1943), pp. 336-367. For 
"mutatis mutandis" agreement, see FRUS, 1942, volume one (Wash., 
D.C., 1960), p. 796 and Osaka MainichI, January 12, 1947, p. 1. 
For 1942 diplomatic protests, see FRUS, 1942, volume I, pp. 
792-857 and Bulletin, volume 10, N~41 (Feb. 5, 1944), pp. 
146-148. For 1942 Hull protest, see FRUS, 1942, vol. I, 
pp. 832-839 and Bulletin, vol. 10, No-:--Nl, pp. 147-148. 
6 
of Axis war criminals. The British Lord Chancellor vowed 
that enemy countries would surrender their war criminals for 
trials by military tribunal. Simon reminded England of the 
"fiasco" after World War I when Kaiser Wilhelm II fled to 
Belgium and escaped trial. "Nobody is likely to repeat this 
mistake," he concluded. In March Congress passed a joint 
resolution which amounted to a warning to Nazi war criminals. 
Citing the mass murder of European Jews and Poles, Congress 
condemned those "brutal and indefensible outrages." Senate 
Joint Resolution #9 vowed that those guilty either "directly 
or indirectly," would be held responsible and "punished 
in a matter commensurate" with the crimes committed. 6 
Throughout the course of the war, a small but 
strident group of Americans, backed. by followers in Congress, 
urged that the United States direct its main military effort 
against Japan rather than Germany. The strength of this 
"Asia first" or "get Hirohito first" group seemed to grow 
and recede in proportion to the revelations of Japanese 
atrocities. A February 1942 poll noted that 42 percent 
of Americans favored aiming their armed forces towards 
defeating Japan while 26 percent advocated concentrating our 
6For Simon, see New York Times, February 19, 1943, 
p. 10; for Senate Joint Resolution #9, passed by the Senate 
on March 9 and ratified by the House of Representative on 
March 11, see the Congressional Record, 78th congress, 
first session, volume 89, part 2, p. 1723. 
military power towards defeating Germany. Sixteen percent 
of Americans wanted the United States to steer all its 
military power against Japan alone. That group recommended 
blasting those "little yellow devils" out of the Pacific 
Ocean and "the hell with what happens in Europe." World 
7 
War I hero Sergeant Alvin c. York reportedly urged that the 
United States first destroy the "Japs ,r and then finish off the 
Germans. A March poll asked the American people where they 
would position a large number of airplanes to do the most 
military good. The top two answers were Australia and the 
Philippines. A February 1943 poll indicated that 53 percent 
of Americans considered Japan to be the United States' 
chief enemy versus a figure of 25 percent back in June 1942. 
Congressional members such as John M. Costello of California, 
John E. Rankin of Mississippi and Kentucky Senator A. B. 
"Happy" Chandler pressed for a stronger American military 
front in the Pacific. Rankin termed the Japanese "savage 
apes" who are "our permanent enemy in the world. 117 
The April 1943 disclosure of the Japanese executions 
of three captured American aviators caused a sensation in 
the United States. In October of the previous year, the U.S. 
government had learned from Japanese radio broadcasts of the 
7 For February 1942 poll, see "The Fortune Survey," 
Fortune, February 1942, pp. 97-98. For Sgt. York, see Bailey, 
The Man in the Street, p. 142. For March 1942 poll, see 
Cantril, Public Opinion, 1935-1946, p. 1068. For February 
1943 poll, see The Gallup Poll, vol. one, p. 370. June 1942 
poll is on p. 338. And for Congressional comment, see Congres-
sional Record, 78th Congress, first session, vol. 89, part 
one, pp. 429-431. 
"capture, trial and severe punishment" of downed American 
fliers. On October 29 and November 28, the State Department, 
through the Swiss Ministry, asked the Japanese Government 
for official verification and details of the trial of American 
airmen. On February 23 the United States received a reply 
from Masayuki Tani, the Japanese Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. The Japanese Government admitted to the capture 
and trial of two bombadier crews from the Doolittle Tokyo 
raid. The Tani answer alleged that those B-25 fliers 
confessed to intentionally bombing civilian targets such as 
schools and hospitals. The Tani note contended that those 
U.S. airmen machine-gunned helpless school children, "delib-
erately mowing them down although recognizing them as such." 
A Japanese court sentenced eight of the aviators to death 
but commuted five of those sentences. 
On April 12, Cordell Hull sent a reply to the Tani 
dispatch. After cataloguing numerous examples of Japanese 
brutalities and repeated violations of the Geneva Convention, 
the American secretary of state warned the Japanese Govern-
ment that the United States would hold 11 personally and 
officially responsible" those Japanese officials who have 
descended "to such acts of barbarity and manifestations of 
depravity as to murder in cold blood" American fliers. He 
gave notice that America would punish all future Japanese 
cruelties. On April 21, Roosevelt made public the shocking 
news of the Doolittle flier executions. The chief executive 
promised that those Japanese Government officers who had 
9 
committed those "diabolical crimes" would be held "personally 
and officially responsible" by the U.S. Government. Japanese 
radio broadcasts replied to Roosevelt's message with the 
promise of a "one-way ticket to hell" for all American 
aviators captured in the future. 
The Japanese killings of American airmen stunned the 
U.S. public. For many, Japan had reached a new moral low. 
An April poll indicated that 8 percent of Americans felt 
that Japan would be easier than Germany to get along with 
after the war, while 67 percent felt it would be easier to 
exist with Germany. One correspondent summarized popular 
feelings best when he commented that the Japanese slaying 
placed them "on par with the Mongols." The Japanese 
atrocities aroused the American people to new patriotic 
heights. In Washington, D.C., for example, the city reported 
8 its biggest war bond selling day since Pearl Harbor. 
Members of Congress lashed out against the Japanese 
executions. In late April, several congressmen recommended 
that the United States, perhaps in retaliation for the 
8For Tani note and Hull response, see FRUS, 1943, volume 
III (Washington, D.C., 1963), pp. 956-966, 980-982 and Bulletin, 
Volume 8, number 200 (April 24, 1943), pp. 337-339. For FDR 
speech and American reaction to flier executions, see Bulletin, 
p. 337; Washington Star, April 21, 1943, pp. 1,5; L.A. Times, 
April 22, 1943, pp. 1,4; N.Y. Times, April 22, 1943, pp. 1,3 
and Washington Post, April 22, 1943, pp. 1,3. For Japanese 
radio broadcasts, see L.A. Times, April 22, p. 5 and Washington 
Star, April 22, pp. 1,16. For April 1943 poll, see The Gallup 
Poll, volume one, pp. 388-389; for Mongol quote, see L.A. 
TTmes, April 23, 1943, p. 2; and for record bond sales;-s"ee 
Washington Post, April 23, 1943, pp. 1, 3, 4. 
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Doolittle deaths, direct its military power principally 
against Japan. The "Asia-first" movement gained new strength 
from the publication of the murder of the airmen. Florida 
Congressman Robert L. F. Sikes demanded "swift, sure retribu-
tion" for those "inhuman monsters." Claiming there was 
"no place for mad dogs, 11 he recommended that the Allies 
deny world trade and commerce to Japan after the cessation 
of hostilities. Massachusetts Congresswoman Edith Nourse 
Rogers urged that "Japan as a nation should be annihilated." 
Representative Rankin argued that the United States must act 
now and not wait until Australia was captured and 11 her white 
women and children murdered by these ruthless barbarians. 11 
He called Japan the gravest threat to white civilization "in 
any quarter of the globe." 
During the summer of 1943, Britain and the United 
States made formal appointments to the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission (UNWCC}. On June 29, Roosevelt appointed 
Herbert C. Pell as American representative to the UNWCC. 
Pell had served as U.S. Minister to Portugal from 1937-1941 
and briefly as U.S. Minister to Hungary. In July the English 
Government named Sir Cecil Hurst as the British delegate. 
Hurst had served as judge of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice since 1929. Altogether, fifteen countries 
sent delegates. The Soviet Union refused to nominate an 
envoy after their proposal for voting representatives from 
each Soviet Socialist Republic met with Allied disfavor. 9 
9For Congressional comments on Doolittle execution, 
Throughout 1943, State Department protests against 
improper treatment of prisoners of war continued unabated. 
The Japanese government still refused either to permit Red 
Cross visits to all prison camps or to forward the names of 
American civilians and soldiers held in their camps. When 
Japan persisted in denying 
American prisoners of war, 
proper medical treatment for 
some 
the State Department repeated its 
earlier protests for adequate shelter, proper clothing, 
sufficient food and mail privileges for those incarcerated 
in Japanese camps. 
11 
On July 30, Roosevelt warned neutral countries against 
harboring Axis war criminals. The president repeated his 
earlier pledges to prosecute enemy war criminals, reminding 
neutral nations that one day "Hitler and his gang and Tojo 
and his gang" would attempt asylum abroad. The chief 
executive cautioned any neutral state against granting refuge 
to war criminals in their attempt "to escape their just 
deserts." 
see Cong ressional Record, 78th Congress, first session, volume 
89, part 3, pp. 3701-3702, 3704, 3712, 3775; volume 89, part 
10, p. A2024; volume 89, part 11, p. A4171; second session, 
volume 90, part 1, p. 874; Washington Post, April 22, 1943, 
p. 3; and L.A. Times, April 22, 1943, p. 4. For "Asia-first" 
pressure, see Washington Post, April 22, 1943, pp. 1, 3. For 
UNWCC appointments, see N.Y. Times, June 30, 1943, p. 16 and 
July 10, p. 6. For activities of the UNWCC, see United 
Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission (London, 1948) and FRUS, 1943, volume I, 
pp. 422-423. The following states sent representatives to the 
UNWCC: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, 
Greece, India, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, 
Union of South Africa, united Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, U.S.A., Yugoslavia and the French Committee 
of National Liberation. 
In late October Allied foreign ministers gathered for 
a Tripartite Conference in Moscow. On November 1, Britain, 
the United States and Russia issued a "Declaration of German 
Atrocities." England, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. 
vowed to punish the "Hitlerite forces" for war crimes and 
12 
mass executions. Lists of Nazi war criminals would be 
compiled ''in all possible detail." The three power declaration 
stated that their proclamation would not "prejudice" the case 
of other war criminals "whose offenses have no particular 
geographical localisation." 
Late in November, Chiang Kai-shek, Churchill and 
Roosevelt conferred in Cairo, Egypt. On December 1, the 
three world leaders released a press communique on Allied 
postwar plans for Japan. Declaring it their intention to 
"restrain and punish the aggression of Japan," Britain, 
China, and the United States listed the territory Japan 
would relinquish after the war. Japan would forfeit all 
Pacific islands seized since 1914 and all the territory it 
had "stolen from China," such as Formosa and Manchuria. 
The Cairo Declaration ended by pledging again to secure the 
unconditional surrender of Japan. 1943 ended with no specific 
Allied statement on the punishment of Japanese war criminals. 10 
10 For State Department protests, see FRUS, 1943, volume 
I, pp. 953-1012 and Bulletin, volume 10, number 241, pp. 
148-150. For Roosevelt address, see N.Y. Times, July 31, 
1943, pp. 1, 3 and Bulletin, volume 9, number 214 (July 31, 
1943), p. 62. For Declaration of German atrocities and 
Tripartite Conference, see FRUS, 1943, volume I, pp. 768-769; 
Bulletin, volume 9, number 228, pp. 310-311; N.Y. Times, 
November 2, 1943, p. 14; L.A. Times, November 2, 1943, pp. 1,4; 
The United Nations War Crimes Commission produced 
little tangible results. On January 18, 1944, the commis-
sion held its first official London Meeting. The UNWCC had 
congregated the previous October for an unofficial meeting 
at the British Foreign Office, but the late arrival of U.S. 
delegate Herbert Pell delayed the commencement of official 
sessions. For the remainder of the war, the UNWCC became 
a case center of information on Axis war criminals. The 
commission had no power to prosecute or try war criminals. 
Furthermore, diversity of opinion plagued the UNWCC and the 
meager results of the much-touted organization drew public 
censure. U.S. representative Pell and British delegate 
Sir Cecil Hurst resigned in frustration. 11 
The year 1944 brought yet more details of Japanese 
atrocities. In April 1943, three Americans escaped from 
Japanese prison camps in the Southern Philippines. In 
July, Air Corps Captain William E. Dyess, Navy Lieutenant 
Commander Melvin H. McCoy and Artillery Corps Major Stephen 
M. Mellnik reached General Douglas MacArthur's Australian 
headquarters. In Brisbane, the three survivors revealed 
and Washington Post, November 2, 1943, pp. 1, 2. For Cairo 
Declaration, see FRUS, 1943, The Conferences at Cairo and 
Tehran (Washington, D.C., 1961), pp. 448-449; L.A. Times, 
December 2, 1943, pp. 1, 7; and Washington Post, December 2, 
1943, pp. 1, 2. 
11FRUS, 1943, volume I, pp. 420-424; UNWCC, History of 
the United Nations War· crimes· Commission, p. 120; FRUS, 1945, 
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta (Washington, o.c."":-1955), 
pp. 403-404; and N.Y. Times, January 27, 1945, pp. 1, 5. 
13 
first - hand details of the horrible conditions in Japanese 
prison camps and the unsettling details of the Bataan 
14 
"death march." Captain Dyess had participated in the eighty-
five mile march from Balanga, the capital of Bataan, to 
Camp O'Donnell, a former Philippine Army post in central 
Luzon. Lt. commander McCoy and Major Mellnik had been 
captured on corregidor and spent over a year in Japanese 
prison camps. on January 27, 1944, the U.S. War Department 
released an atrocities report based on the testimony of the 
three escapees. The War Department had withheld the news 
for six months for fear of Japanese retaliations against 
the remaining American prisoners. 
on January 28, the American press gave the War Depart-
ment report banner headlines. Details of the Bataan "death 
march" shocked the American people even more than the execu-
tions of the Doolittle raiders. The report disclosed that 
in April 1942 Japanese forces had pushed sixty-five thousand 
American and Filipino prisoners on a nine-day horror trek, 
many without food, water or medical attention. Japanese 
soldiers stabbed or shot prisoners who collapsed under the 
blazing sun. At bayonet point, Japanese troops forced 
Americans and Filipinos to bury Filipinos alive who were too 
tired or ill to continue the journey. Some fifty-six hundred 
men perished. Stories of Japanese prison camps, where 
torture, starvation and mistreatment seemed routine, filled 
the pages of American newspapers. Many Americans agreed 
with New Hampshire Senator Styles Bridges when he remarked 
.L .'.) 
that "the Japs are savages and torture for enjoyment. 1112 
Congressional reaction to the "march of death" equalled 
public indignation. New Mexico Senator Carl A. Hatch termed 
the "death march" a tale of brutality "unequalled in the annals 
of history of civilized men." Chairman Andrew J. May of the 
House Military Affairs Committee suggested that the U.S. 
fleet be immediately dispatched to Japan and "blow it into 
hades. 11 Missouri Senator Bennett Champ Clark demanded that 
the United States "bomb Japan out of existence" and "hang 
the Mikado." Alabama Senator Lister Hill proposed that 
America "gut the heart of Japan with fire." Senate Majority 
Leader Alben w. Barkley, referring to that "pagan outfit which 
calls itself the government in Japan," pleaded for harsh 
postwar punishment for those "brutes and beasts in the forms 
of men." The Kentucky Senator pointed out that the United 
States had heard a great deal about punishing Nazi war 
criminals, and wondered why America had failed to act on 
Japanese war criminals. Georgia Senator Richard B. Russell 
declared that the United States must exact retribution for 
12 For background on three survivors, see W. Post, January 
28, 1944, pp. 1,4 and Stanley K. Falk, Bataan: The March of 
Death {N.Y., 1962), pp. 205-206. For press and popular reac-
tion, see L.A. Times, January 28, 1944, pp. 1,2, January 29, 
pp. 1-5; N.Y. Times, January 28, 1944, pp. 1,6; W. Post, Jan-
uary 28, 1944, pp. 1,4, January 29, pp. 1,2; Falk, Bataan : The 
March of Death, pp. 143-200, 203-211; and John Frederick Hanson, 
11 The Trial of Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma" {Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Mississippi State University, August 1977}. The 
director of the Rivers, Arizona relocation center, where many 
Japanese had sons serving in the Pacific, declared that if the 
Japanese soldiers who committed those atrocities fell into 
the hands of Japanese-Americans, "they will be treated worse" 
than if the Americans caught them. See Falk, p. 208. 
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"every drop of blood from the veins of American prisoners." 
He remarked that the American Indian, with his "scalping 
knife" and "fiery stake" was a "chivalrous cavalier" compared 
to the "bestial Japs." 
As with the news of the Doolittle executions, Americans 
responded with a new determination to pursue the unconditional 
surrender of Japan. The grim details united Americans in 
a firm resolve to eradicate Japanese militarism forever. 
Record war bond sales occurred all over the United States. 
Ohio Senator Harold H. Burton affirmed that the atrocity news 
made Americans more determined than ever to win the war 
like "nothing else could have done.·• Senator Russell 
commented that those war crimes had only increased the fighting 
spirit of American troops. Other congressmen renewed their 
demands for more U.S. forces in the Pacific. New Mexico 
Senator Dennis Chavez concluded that even now it was not 
too late for American military strategists to "get busy in 
the Pacific." Representative Claire E. Hoffman of Michigan 
pointed out that those crimes should cause us now, without 
any further delay, "to provide MacArthur with more supplies 
and troops." 
On January 31, the State Department released a detailed 
atrocities report to the press. The report contained a record 
of all official U.S. protests to Japan regarding treatment 
of American prisoners of war dating back to January 1942. 
The State Department again reminded Japan of its Fe bruary 
1942 commitment to uphold the Geneva Convention "as far as 
adaptable" to American prisoners and civilian internees. 
The Department of State repeated its pledge that the United 
States would hold "personally and officially responsible" 
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the Japanese who perpetrated those uncivilized and inhumane 
acts. On February 11, the State Department made public two 
notes of protest sent to Japan on January 27. Those 
dispatches, written by Cordell Hull, emphasized the long 
overdue need of the Japanese Government to bring its treatment 
of prisoners of war "into conformity with the standards 
recognized by civilized nations." The secretary of state 
denounced Japan's "callous failure 11 to provide minimum life 
necessities and catalogued numerous violations of the Geneva 
C t . 13 onven ion. 
On March 24, Roosevelt issued another warning to Axis 
war criminals. The President's comments dealt chiefly 
with the systematic German executions of European Jews. 
He also discussed the tortur~ and murder of civilian popula-
tions by the Nazis and Japanese. The chief executive 
reflected on the cruel Japanese killing "of our gallant 
American soldiers and fliers. 11 Roosevelt promised that the 
United Nations would apprehend the guilty and prosecute them 
13 . 1 . . 1 R d For Congressiona reaction, see Congressiona ecor, 
78th Congress, second session, volume 90, part one, pp. 860, 
869-875; volume 90, part 8, pp. A509, A551-A552; and W. Post, 
January 29, 1944, pp. 1,2. For war bond sales, see W. Post, 
January 29, 1944, pp. 1,3 and Falk, Bataan: The March of Death, 
p. 210. For January 31 report, see Bulletin, volume 10, no. 
241 (February 5, 1944), pp. 145-151. For Hull notes, see 
Bulletin, volume 10, number 242 (February 12, 1944), pp. 168-
175. For 1944 State Dept. protests, see FRUS, 1944, volume V 
(Washington, D.C., 1965), pp. 917-1014. --
"in order that justice be done." 
In May the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
established a Far Eastern and Pacific Subcommission to con-
centrate on Japanese war crimes. Eleven Allied nations sent 
representatives to the Pacific subcommission which met in 
Chungking, China. On November 29 the commission held its 
first meeting. Like the UNWCC, the Chungking subcornmission 
lacked the power to prosecute or try war crimes suspects 
but only gathered evidence of war crimes. The subcommission 
then drew up lists of war criminals to be submitted to the 
Allied governments after the conclusion of hostilities. 
The continued 1944 revelations of Japanese atrocities 
kept American public opinion in a vengeful mood. A June 
survey revealed that 62 percent of Americans polled believed 
that the Japanese people would always want to go to war. 
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An August survey showed that most Americans favored compelling 
Japan to pay for the cost of the war. A December 20 poll 
revealed that while 33 percent of Americans advocated 
destroying Japan as a political entity, 13 percent favored 
killing all the Japanese people. A December 23 survey found 
that 88 percent of Americans favored postwar punishment of 
Japanese leaders. Very few Americans suggested that the 
United States "treat them fairly" or "handle them under 
international law." Typical comments were: "Take them to 
Pearl Harbor and sink them, kill them like rats, [and] kill 
them,but be sure to torture them first, the way they tortured 
our boys. 1114 
As late as 1945, American postwar planning for the 
punishment of Axis war criminals concentrated almost solely 
on Germans. On January 21, 1945 Green H. Hackworth, legal 
adviser to the Secretary of State, submitted a memorandum 
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to Roosevelt for the trial and punishment of Nazis. Hackworth's 
legal brief, later used at the Yalta Conference, outlined 
potential statutory difficulties for German war crime trials. 
Hackworth pointed out that the sheer number and unprecedented 
scale of Nazi war crimes created a situation "without parallel 
in the administration of criminal justice." In addition, 
many prewar German atrocities, despite their obvious immorality, 
constituted "neither 'war crimes' in the technical sense, nor 
offenses against international law. 11 He recommended a 
trial of the principal Nazi leaders by international military 
tribunal or court, for that "would require no enabling 
legislation or treaty." 
Britain proposed a different form of punishment for 
the Nazis. Where the United States advocated a trial by 
international military tribunal, England favored execution 
14 For FDR warning, see N.Y. Times, March 25, 1944, pp. 
1,4. For Pacific Subcommission, see UNWCC, History of the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission, pp. 129-131. Eleven 
nations accepted the UNWCC invitation to participate in the 
Chungking Subcommission: Australia, Belgium, China, Czecho-
slovakia, France, India, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland, 
Britain, and the United States. For June 1944 poll, see Public 
Opinion Quarterly, volume 8, number 4 (Winter 1944-1945), p. 
510; for August survey, seep. 536. For December surveys, 
see The Gallup Po·11, volume one, pp. 4 77-4 78 and Public Opinion 
Quarterly, p. 530. 
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without trial for Hitler and the top German leaders. British 
motives for this seemingly harsh recommendation centered on 
the fear of a protracted trial. British leaders feared that 
a lengthy trial would tire the public and result in a feeling 
of sympathy for the Germans. A public trial would draw 
criticism as a "put-up job" by the Allies "to justify a 
punishment they have already resolved on." 
In early February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin 
gathered in the Russia Crimea for the Yalta Conference. In 
December 1943, at the Tehran Conference, Stalin had promised 
to enter the Pacific War once Germany surrendered. On 
February 11, 1945, Stalin, in return for territorial con-
cessions, promised to enter the war against Japan "two or 
three months" after the defeat of Germany. On April 5, one 
week before the death of Franklin Roosevelt, Russia gave 
Japan official notice of the Soviet intention not to renew 
its 1941 15 Neutrality Pact with Japan. 
On May 2 President Harry S. Truman appointed Supreme 
Court Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson as U.S. Chief of 
Counsel for the prosecution of European Axis leaders indicted 
for war crimes. Truman ordered Jackson not only to prepare 
15 For Hackworth memo, see FRUS, 1945, the Conferences 
at Malta and Yalta, (Washington,75"":c., 1955), pp. 402-408. 
For 1945 British views, see U.S. Dept. of State, Report of 
Robert H. Jackson U.S. Representative to the International 
Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945 (Waslungton, 
D.C., 1949), pp. 18-20. For Stalin Yalta agreement, see FRUS, 
1945, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 984. For Russian--
April 1945 notification of intent not to renew Pact, see 
Bulletin, volume 12, number 305 (April 29, 1945), pp. 811-
812. For 1944 State Department planning on Japanese war 
criminals, see Diplomatic Branch, Record Group 59, Harley 
Notter file, Box no. 109, CAC-105 (March 24, 1944). For 1945 
State Department planning, see Record Group 59, Notter file 
Box no. 119, Records of the Policy and Planninc Committee, 
Document PR-20 (July 20, 1945). 
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legal counts but to prosecute war crimes charges against 
those individuals whom the United Nations agreed to try 
before an international military tribunal. The new president 
also instructed the chief prosecutor to include for trial 
the principal accomplices of the Nazis. When Germany 
surrendered on May 7, Jackson's immense task began in earnest. 
In June chief prosecutor Jackson issued a progress report 
to President Truman. On June 7, the chief executive released 
the Jackson Report to the American public. Allied governments 
accepted that report as the official U.S. position on pro-
secution of war criminals. Jackson, a former attorney 
general under Franklin D. Roosevelt, reiterated the 
American position of trial by military court. The U.S. 
chief of counsel branded the aefense argument that a head 
of state was immune from criminal culpability as an outdated 
doctrine, "a relic of the doctrine of divine right of Kings." 
He stated that the defense of following superior orders 
would also be rejected. The Supreme Court justice declared 
that the United States would consider the waging of aggres-
sive war a criminal offense. The former attorney general 
added that the American legal position would. not be "com-
plicated or obscured by sterile legalisms" evolved during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century "to make war 
respectable." On June 26 Jackson joined British, French 
and Soviet representatives in London for an international 
conference to draw up final details for a four power agree-
ment providing for a charter for the trial of Nazi war 
criminals. 
With the_ capitulation of Germany in May 1945, American 
attention centered on Japan. Public opinion continued to 
hold the Japanese in very low esteem. Even after the 
revelations of the German concentration camps, 82 percent 
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of Americans considered the Japanese "more cruel at heart" 
than the Germans. A June poll revealed that 33 percent, the 
largest percentage of the sample, advocated the death sentence 
for Japanese Emperor Hirohito. The same survey indicated 
that only 53 percent of the American people questioned 
knew the name of the Japanese Emperor while 5 percent of 
16 the respondees thought Hideki Tojo was the Emperor. 
In mid-July, leaders of the United States, the U.S.S.R. 
and England met at Potsdam, Germany. On July 26, British 
Prime Minister Clement Atlee and President Truman, with the 
assent of the Republic of China, issued a surrender ultimatum 
to Japan. That allied ultimatum, the Potsdam Declaration, 
listed surrender terms. If Japanese resistance continued, 
16 For Jackson's Report to Truman, see Report of Robert 
H. Jackson U.S. Representative to the International Conference 
on Military Trials, London, 1945, pp. 42-54; for the London 
Conference, see pp. 71-428. For June 10 poll on Japanese 
cruelty, see The Gallup Poll, volume one, p. 509. For June 
29 Hirohito survey, see pp. 511-512 of The Gallup Poll and 
p. 392 of Cantril, Public Opinion, 1935-1,46~ polls #17, 18. 
Twenty percent of .Americans favored exile or life imprisonment 
for Hirohito. Seventeen percent answered "let court decide 
his fate. 11 Other responses on the name of the Emperor: Hari-
Kari, Yokohama, Fujiyama, Chiang Kai-shek and Tito. In 1944, 
only half of American citizens polled could give a reasonable 
explanation of the policy of.unconditional surrender. See 
Bailey, The Man in the Street, p. 132. 
the alternative would be "prompt and utter destruction." 
The Potsdam Declaration promised that "stern justice" would 
be administered to all Japanese war criminals "including 
those who visited cruelties upon our prisoners." The 
Declaration noted that the Allied occupation of Japan would 
establish a government "in accordance with the freely 
established will of the Japanese people." The Potsdam terms 
made no mention of the Japanese Imperial Institution. 
U.S. diplomatic protests to Japan increased towards 
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the end of the war. From January 1942 to January 1944, the 
State Department had sent eighty-nine official protests to 
Japan. From February 1944 until August 1945, the Department 
transmitted 150 dispatches. The American recapture of large 
areas of the Pacific occasioned the release of Allied 
prisoners of war with new horror tales to confirm previous 
reports. Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and 
Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew lodged repeated 
protests with Japan for its utter neglect of the 1929 Geneva 
Convention. On August 1, 1945, the State Department confirmed 
the Japanese habit of locating prisoner of war and civilian 
17 
camps near aerial military targets. 
On the morning of August 6, the American B-29 bomber 
17For Potsdam Declaration, see FRUS, 1945, The Conference 
of Berlin (Washington, D.C., 1960), volume two, p. 1474 and 
Bulletin, volume 13, number 318 (July 29, 1945), pp. 137-138. 
For 1945 State Dept. protests, see FRUS, 1945, volume VI 
(Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 316-407 and Bulletin, voll.lIT'e 13, 
number 324 (September 9, 1945), pp. 343-357. For placing of 
camps near bombing targets, see Bu·11etin, volume 13, number 
319 (August 5, 1945), pp. 176-177. 
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Enola Gay dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Two 
days later, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Ignoring 
its Neutrality Pact with Japan, the U.S.S.R. invaded Manchuria 
and easily pushed back the once strong Kwangtung Army. 
Technically, the U.S.S.R. attack violated its Neutrality 
Pact with Japan, not due to expire until April 1946. 
On August 8, the London Conference on Military Trials 
for Nazi war criminals concluded. Britain, France, the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. issued a charter for the 
establishment of an International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (IMT) to try Germans accused of war crimes. The 
four Allies listed three types of war crimes: crimes 
against Peace, Crimes against Humanity, and conventional 
war crimes. The first two charges were new laws and had 
no legal basis in international law. Crimes against Peace 
charged a conspiracy for the planning, preparation and 
waging of aggressive war. The IMT Charter, however, failed 
to define aggressive war. Crimes against Humanity involved 
the murder or enslavement of civilian populations "before 
or during the war." 
The IMT charter outlined the rules of evidence and 
trial procedure. The Nuremberg charter disallowed the defense 
of superior orders and declared that individuals rather than 
nations would be criminally responsible for acts of state. 
The Nuremberg Tribunal could admit "any evidence which it 
deems to have probative value." U.S. Chief Prosecutor Jackson 
described the IMT Charter as a landmark code "defining crimes 
against the international community." He also termed the 
Charter a "transition in international law." 
Despite the August 8 Allied resolution, legal dis-
agreements marred the London International Conference on Military 
Trials. Britain, France, the United States and Russia 
frequently disagreed over the exact meaning of aggressive 
war, conspiracy and the precise definition of war crimes. 
Robert Jackson wrote that the four countries represented the 
"maximum divergence in legal concepts and tradition likely 
to be found among occidental nations." For example, Professor 
Andre Gros, UNWCC member and assistant to the French IMT 
delegate Judge Robert Falco, objected to the British and 
American position that a war of aggression was a crime and 
therefore the individuals who directed the war could be 
criminally liable for the acts of their government. Gros 
argued that if a country committed a crime by initiating a 
war of aggression, that does not transmit individual legal 
responsibility to the officers of the state. He concluded 
that though it would be morally and politically desirable 
to have such an act considered a crime, 11 it is not inter-
national law" but "ex post facto legislation." Soviet 
representative General I. T. Nikitchenko argued that the 
real task of the Nuremberg court should be to determine the 
individual guilt of each Nazi leader and deliver the com-
mensurate punishment. Nikitchenko, the vice president of 
the Soviet Supreme Court, alleged that the proof that Nazi 
leaders were war criminals "has already been established. 1118 
On August 9, the American B-29 bomber Back's Car 
dropped the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki. On August 10, 
the Japanese Government offered to accept the Potsdam 
Declaration with the proviso that it would not prejudice 
"the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." 
On August 11, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes repeated 
the U.S. position that the ultimate form of the Japanese 
Government would be decided by the Japanese people them-
selves. On August 14, World War II ended when Japan sur-
rendered to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The 
Pacific War had lasted five years, but the trial of Japanese 
. . d . f . 19 war criminals woul continue or six more years. 
xii. 
Gros' 
is on 
18 For Jackson's comments, see Jackson Report, pp. v-
For IMT Agreement and Charter, see pp. 420-428. For 
comments, see pp. 297, 335; Nikitachenko's comment 
p. 303. 
19For the sequence of surrender statements, see FRUS, 
1945, volume VI, pp. 627, 631-632, 662-663. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PREPARATIONS FOR TRIAL (AUGUST 14, 1945-APRIL 29, 1946) 
The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules 
of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest 
possible extent expeditious and non-technical pro-
cedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems 
to have probative value. All purported admissions 
or statements of the accused are admissible. 
-Article 13a of the Tokyo Charter, April 26, 1946. 
Nearly ten months passed before the Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial began. From August 14, 1945 to April 29, 1946, ten 
Allied countries undertook measures to bring Japanese war 
criminals to justice. During those months, the Allies 
apprehended war crimes suspects, prepared legal cases 
against them and created legal machinery for the trial. 
Those pretrial preparations placed the defense panel at a 
disadvantage with the prosecution section. The prosecution 
had more time to prepare its case, more lawyers and transla-
tors to assist it and more funds than the defense. 
American memories of Japanese atrocities remained 
strong after the war ended. The American people expected 
severe treatment for Japan and its war crimes suspects. When 
an August 1945 poll asked Americans how the Japanese people 
should be treated after the war, 67 percent of those sur-
veyed felt the United States should "control strictly, 
punish war criminals" or "treat with extreme harshness." 
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Another survey indicated that 85 percent of Americans 
approved the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. 
Even after the war, the volume and scope of Japanese 
atrocities continued to be well-publicized. In the weeks 
after the war, Allied newspapers carried daily headlines 
of yet more brutalities. Stories of torture, starvation, 
medical mistreatment, sexual mutilation and cannibalism 
peppered the Allied press. On September 18, Senator 
Richard B. Russell introduced Senate Joint Resolution 94, 
declaring it to be American policy that Emperor Hirohito 
be indicted as a war criminal. A September 19 poll showed 
that 61 percent of Americans felt that U.S. treatment of 
Japan was "not tough enough." An October 3 survey revealed 
that 64 percent of Americans considered it necessary "to 
police the Japanese people many years." A November follow-
up poll on the atomic bomb showed that 24 percent of 
Americans would have tried to "wipe out" as many Japanese 
cities as possible "before they had a chance to surrender." 1 
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1 For the August polls, see George H. Gallup, The Gallup 
Poll (New York, 1972), volume one, pp. 521-522. For a sample 
of atrocity stories, see Los Angeles Times, August 25, 1945, 
p. 1, August 30, p. 2 and August 31, pp. 1,2; New York Times, 
September 1, 1945, pp. 1,3; L.A. Times, September 3, 1945, 
pp. 1,5,6; Washington Star, September 4, 1945, p. 4, September 
5, pp. 1,5 and September 10, pp. 1,5; and London Times, 
September 12, 1945, p. 4 and September 14, p. 4. For Senate 
Joint Resolution 94, see Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 
first session, volume 91, part 7, p. 8680. For September and 
October surveys, see Hadley Cantril, ed., Public Opinion, 1935-
1946 (Princeton, 1951), p. 457. For the November survey, 
see Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in t he Street: The Impact of 
American Public Opinion· on Foreign· Pol icy (New York, 1948), 
p. 194 and "The Fortune Survey," Fort une, December 1945, p. 305. 
29 
On August 14, 1945, President Harry s. Truman appointed 
General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers (SCAP). Britain, China, the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. had agreed to the American designation of 
a supreme commander to govern occupied Japan. Truman told 
MacArthur that the authority of the Japanese emperor and 
government would be subject to the rule of SCAP. The chief 
executive ordered MacArthur to carry out the surrender 
terms. Truman ordered SCAP to require Hirohito to issue 
an Imperial Rescript authorizing official Japanese represen-
tatives to sign the peace terms. On September 2, former 
Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and former Gen'eral 
Yoshijiro Umezu signed the Instrument of Surrender in Tokyo 
Bay aboard the U.S. battleship Missouri. 
General MacArthur established basic rules for the 
apprehension of Japanese war crimes suspects. The Supreme 
Commander instructed SCAP legal personnel to give all 
suspects a "thorough screening" before ordering their 
arrest in order to reduce the possibility of acquittals 
once trials began. Some suspects such as Prince Konoye 
Fumimaro, leader of the three different Japanese Cabinets 
from 1937-1941, committed suicide rather than face war 
crimes charges. By mid-December, SCAP had arrested some 
two thousand suspects on war crimes charges. 2 
2 For Truman's SCAP order, see U.S. Department of State, 
Diplomatic Papers, Foreign Rel·ation·s of the United States, 
1945, volume VI (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 647-650. For 
surrender terms, see SCAP, Government Section, Political 
On September 11, SCAP officially began a four month 
"round-up" of Japanese war crimes suspects. Former Prime 
Minister Hideki Tojo headed the Allied roster. MacArthur's 
headquarters ordered Major Paul Kraus and his contingent 
to seize the most prominent war criminal on their list. 
At 4:00 p.m., a group of American jeeps halted outside a 
simple, single-story home about eight miles from the center 
of Tokyo. As numerous newsmen congregated outside, Hideki 
Tojo, the wartime leader of Japan, was "skillfully con-
cealed'' inside his terra-cotta home. Brushing aside four 
blue-coated Japanese policemen assigned to protect Tojo 
from possible assassination, the P..merican soldiers entered 
the ex-Premier's home. 
Inside, the "would-be Napoleon of the Orient" awaited 
his fate. Through the aid of an interpreter, Major Kraus 
asked a house servant to produce Tojo immediately. The 
servant bowed and departed to converse with Tojo's con-
fidential secretary, a former secret police member. The 
secretary promised to inform Japan's wartime leader. At 
4:10 p.m: 1 thE house servant reappeared to ask the American 
Reorientation of Japan, September 1945-September 1948 
(Washington, D.C., 1949), volume two, pp. 419-420; Imperial 
Rescript is on p. 416. For apprehension of war crimes 
suspects, see New York Times,September 12, 1945, pp. 1,2,3; 
Osaka Mainichi, September 15, 1945, p. 1, September 16, 
p. l; Nippon Times (Tokyo) November 7, 1945, p. 1, November 
10, p. 1, November 20, p. l; November 23, p. 1, November 24, 
p. 1, November 25, p. l; U.S. Army Pacific Stars and Stripes 
(Tokyo), December 4, 1945, p. 1, December 5, p. 1, December 
7, p. 1, December 17, p. l; and N.Y. Times, December 6, 1945, 
p. 3. 
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major "what the fuss was all about" and whether Kraus had 
the proper authority. "Tell the yellow b------ we've waited 
long enough. Bring him out," demanded Kraus. Thoroughly 
angry, the San Francisco major ordered Tojo's immediate 
arrest. At 4:12 p.m. Tojo suddenly opened his sitting room 
window. His black eyes "snapped" as he surveyed the situa-
tion. When a photographer's bulb popped, the former general 
slammed the window. "Tell him to quit fooling around," 
Kraus reminded the house servant. Again, the "shaven-headed 
one-time terror of Asia" appeared at the window. Tojo 
repeated his request: did the American major have the proper 
authority? Kraus informed Tojo that they were taking him 
to Yokohama. Tojo nodded and closed the window. One 
reporter quipped that it was "beginning to look like a 
Romeo and Juliet balcony scene." 
Suddenly a pistol shot broke the silence. Major 
Kraus and New York Times reporter George E. Jones stormed 
' into Tojo's study and found him holding an American .32 
caliber Colt automatic in his right hand, smoke still curling 
from the revolver's muzzle which was aimed in the direction of 
the American intruders. "Don't shoot," shouted Kraus as 
Tojo buckled and fell to the floor, clutching his chest with 
his left hand. Reporters led the stampede to the door. 
Flashbulbs twinkled in the plainly furnished room Tojo had 
selected for the "inexpert denouement." Even "Heinrich 
Himmler had done it better," joked the New York Times. 
Despite careful preparations, the war leader's 
suicide attempt had failed. Weeks earlier, a doctor had 
made a charcoal mark over Tojo's heart, but despite all 
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this, the bullet missed the vital spot. At 5:15 p.m., a 
Japanese doctor arrived and "against the former Premier's 
protest" placed bandages over his wound. At 6:24 p.m., U.S. 
Army doctor Captain James B. Johnson, Jr., arrived to save 
Tojo's life with American blood plasma. Ironically, Tojo had 
taken the American Colt revolver from a captured U.S. flier. 3 
On September 22, MacArthur received an important U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directive regarding punishment 
of war criminals. This order outlined the types of war 
crimes to be prosecuted and authorized SCAP to establish 
special international military courts. The definition of 
war crimes closely followed the Nuremburg precedent. In 
addition to conventional war crimes, Japanese could be held 
liable for crimes against Peace and Crimes against Humanity. 
The memorandum directed SCAP to establish a prosecuting 
agency under M.acArthur' s command to effectuate the trial and 
punishment of war criminals. Finally, the JCS ordered 
MacArthur to withhold action against Hirohito "pending receipt 
3For lively descriptions of Tojo suicide attempt, see 
N.Y. Times, September 11, 1945, pp. 1, 2 and September 12, 
pp. 1, 2; London Times, September 12, 1945, p. 4; Clark Gould 
Lee, One Last Look Around (New York, 1947), pp. 92-113; and 
Robert J. C. Bu tow, ToJ o ·and the Corning of the War (Stanford, 
1969), pp. 449-469. 
of a special directive concerning his treatment." 
In November SCAP began plans for the Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial. On the tenth, Supreme Commander MacArthur appointed 
Joseph Berry Keenan to advise his legal staff for the forth-
coming trial. Joseph Keenan had served from 1933-1939 as an 
assistant to the U.S. Attorney General. He was best known 
as the "gang-busting" attorney who convicted George R. 
"Machine Gun" Kelly and other notorious 1930'scriminals. 
Keenan wrote the Lindbergh kidnapping law while in charge of 
the U.S. Department of Justice's Criminal Division. On 
November 14, the War Department notified SCAP that Keenan 
would have jurisdiction over Japanese suspects who had 
committed war crimes against more than one Allied country. 
On the following day Keenan, after conferring with Truman, 
promised "swift action" against all suspects. A few days 
later, Truman formally appointed Joseph Keenan as U.S. Chief 
of Counsel for the prosecution of Japanese war crimes sus-
pects.4 
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In December, Chief Prosecutor Keenan undertook his 
duties. At a Washington, D.C. press conference on December 1, 
4 For JCS order, see FRUS, 1945, volume VI, pp. 932-936. 
For Keenan appointments, see N.Y. Times, November 10, 1945, 
p. 7, November 16, p. 5, November 25, p. 3; and U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Bulletin, volume 13, number 336 (December 2, 
1945), pp. 898-899. For Keenan background, see Robert M. 
Donihi interview at Andrew's Air Force Base, camp Springs, 
Maryland, October 14, 1978; Washington Post, December 9, 
1954, p. 22; and FRUS, 1946, volume VIII (Washington, D.C., 
1971), p. 389. Donihi served as a war crimes prosecutor at 
both Tokyo and Nurernburg. 
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Keenan promised that approximately one hundred Japanese 
would be tried for war crimes before an international court 
at Tokyo. He indicated that the prosecution would follow 
the Nuremburg pattern, but he would not comment on whether 
Hirohito would be tried as a war criminal. On December 8, 
SCAP established the International Prosecution Section {IPS) 
to prosecute legal charges against Japanese suspects. Keenan 
became Chief of Section and Chief of Counsel for the Inter-
national Prosecution Section. A few days later IPS Chief 
of Counsel Keenan arrived in Tokyo. 
Joseph Keenan's investigative staff contained many 
Federal Bureau of Investigation {FBI) agents and former 
agents. Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Sackett, former head 
of the New York FBI office, headed the investigation section. 
The chief and the executive officer of the prosecution's 
research division were both FBI veterans. Other high-level 
FBI assistants included Harold "Pop" Nathan and Roy Morgan, 
the man who helped track down John Dillinger. Morgan, a 
ten year FBI veteran, had arrived in Japan in the fall of 
1945 to begin the collection of evidence to be used against 
Japanese war crimes suspects. The IPS investigative staff 
adopted FBI methods of interrogation and examination. The 
prosecution section equated Japanese leaders with 1930 
American gangsters. Very few members of the prosecution 
spoke Japanese. Most had no knowledge of Japan, Japanese 
1 . . 5 po 1t1cs, or Japanese culture. 
5For Keenan press conference, see N.Y. Times, December 1, 
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On January 19, 1946, Supreme Commander MacArthur 
issued General Order il, establishing the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). MacArthur 
created the Tokyo Tribunal for the "just and prompt" prosecu-
tion of the major Japanese war criminals. MacArthur, as 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, possessed the 
power to form the special court. Unlike the Nuremburg 
War Crimes Trial, which was established by international 
agreement in London on August 8, 1945, the Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial derived its authority from one individual. General 
Order #1 contained the IMTFE charter. The seventeen-article 
charter closely resembled the Nuremburg Charter. The 
Tokyo Charter provided for a nine member court to be drawn 
from the nine signatory powers of the September 1945 Instru-
ment of Surrender. MacArthur would select judges from 
candidates submitted by Australia, Canada, China, France, 
Great Britain, the Netherlands, the United States, the u.s.s.R. 
and New Zealand. Chief Prosecutor Keenan retained sole 
charge of the IPS case,but any United Nation with which 
Japan had been at war could designate an associate prosecutor 
to assist him. 
1945, p. 2 and Pacific Stars and Stripes,December 2, 1945, 
p. 1. For Keenan's staff, see S'tar s and Stripes, January 10, 
1946, p. 1, April 11, p. 1 and November 14, 1948, p. 14; 
David N. Sutton, Jr. , ''The Trial of Tojo: The Most Important 
Trial in All History? 11 Americ•an Bar Association· Journal 36 
(February 1950): 95;. Solis Horowitz, "The Tokyo Trial," 
International Conciliation 465:(November 1950) 494; and 
Saburo Shiroyama, War crimina·l: The Life and Death of Hirota 
Koki (New York, 1977), pp. 229-230. 
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The IMTFE Charter outlined the jurisdiction and 
powers of the court, defined the types of war crimes to be 
prosecuted and established defense provisions for the 
accused. The three types of war crimes followed the 
Nuremburg precedent. Article 5 described the offenses "for 
which there shall be individual responsibility." The 
Tribunal claimed jurisdiction over Conventional War Crimes, 
Crimes against Peace,and Crimes against Humanity. Article 6 
stated that the official governmental position of the accused 
or the claim of following superior orders would not exempt 
a defendant from criminal culpability. Article 9 stated 
that the indictment should contain a "plain, concise and 
adequate statement of each offense charged." The trial 
proceedings would be conducted in English and Japanese. 
Each accused would be represented by a lawyer of his choice, 
but if one had no counsel, the Court would appoint an 
attorney for him. Each defendant had the right to examine 
. b h t· 6 any witness called y t e prosecu ion. 
6supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East Established at Tokyo, 
January 19, 1946 (Washington, D.C., 1947), pp. 3-10. Crimes 
against Peace were defined as the "planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international law, 
treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation in 
a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
of the foregoing." Crimes against Humanity was defined as 
"murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other 
inhumane acts committed before or during the war, or persecu-
tion on political or racial grounds ... whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpe-
trated ..• " Conventional War Crimes were defined as "viola·· 
tions of the laws or customs of war." 
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The Charter also established rules for the conduct of 
the trial. Article 12a instructed the Tribunal to confine 
itself to ''an expeditious hearing of the issues." Article 12b 
advised the court to take "strict measures" to prohibit any 
procedure that would result in "any unreasonable delay" and 
to exclude "irrelevant issues and statements of any kind 
whatsoever." Article 13 described the nature of court 
evidence. The Tribunal would not be restricted by "technical 
rules of evidence" and could admit any evidence "which it 
deems to have probative value." Decisions on the admis-
sibility of evidence depended upon the daily composition 
of the Court. A majority vote of all judges present deter-
mined Tribunal decisions. The court president's vote 
settled a tie. Article 17 provided for a final review by 
SCAP of the Tribunal's judgment and sentence. 7 
The possibility of criminal sanctions against Emperor 
Hirohito remained uncertain. Virtually every Allied power, 
including the United States, demanded his trial as a war 
criminal. On January 25, MacArthur expressed his views 
on the Imperial Institution to U.S. Army Chief of Staff 
General Dwight David Eisenhower. MacArthur could find 
no "specific and tangible evidence" to link Hirohito with 
the political decisions leading to World War II. He pointed 
out to Eisenhower that all Japanese revered the emperor as 
the symbol of the nation.. SCAP strongly recommended that 
Hirohito be retained in order to effectuate a smooth American 
7Ibid. 
occupation. He warned that the emperor's indictment would 
cause a violent upheaval, "the repercussions of which 
cannot be overestimated." MacArthur predicted a Japanese 
"vendetta for revenge" which would require at least one 
million troops to be stationed in Japan "for an indefinite 
number of years. 118 
In mid-February, more trial details became public. 
The prosecuting nations planned to present a single, unified 
case against Tojo and other leading suspects. That pro-
cedure differed from Nuremburg where each Allied nation 
presented its case individually. SCAP also reduced the 
number of trial defendants to expedite the court proceedings. 
Twenty to thirty defendants, instead of the one hundred 
originally promised by Chief Prosecutor Keenan, would be 
tried before the Tokyo Tribunal. On February 19, MacArthur 
released the names of the nine member Court bench. He 
appointed Sir William Flood Webb, the chief justice of the 
8For SCAP memo to Eisenhower, see FRUS, 1946, volume 
VIII, pp. 395-397. For a sample of Allied opinion on 
Hirohito as a war criminal, see the following: 
1) Australia - Cantril, ed., Public Opinion , 1935-1946, 
p. 392; Portland Oregonian, August 13, 1945, p. 2; and 
Washington Post, August 15, 1945, p. 5. 
2) Canada - Cantril, p. 1022. 
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3) China - N.Y. Times, August 12, 1945, p. 26; Baltimore 
Evening Sun, August 13, 1945, p. 2; and st. Louis Post-
oispatch, August 14, 1945, p. 31. 
4) England - Cantril, p. 392 and Washington Star, August 12, 
1945, p. 2. 
5) The Philippines - Atlanta Constitution, August 11, 1945, 
p. 2; N.Y. Times, August 12, 1945, p. 6; and U.S. Army Stars 
and Stripes (Tokyo), .December 23, 1945, p. 1. 
6) Korea - N.Y. Times, August 11, 1945, p. 7 and L.A . 
Times, August 11, 1945, p. 7. 
7) New Zealand - Stars and Stripes, January 18, 1946, p. 1. 
Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia, as the Tribunal 
president. Webb had served for two years during the war 
as Australian commissioner for the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission. During this time he investigated 
Japanese atrocities in New Guinea and Papua. 
Eight other judges joined Webb on the bench. 
MacArthur designed John P. Higgins of the Massachusetts 
Superior Judicial Court as the American judge. SCAP 
named Edward Stuart McDougall of the Court of the King's 
Bench in Montreal, Quebec, as the Canadian justice. The 
Chinese judge was Ju-Ao Mei, the acting chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Legislative Yuan. Erima Harvey 
Northcraft of the New Zealand Supreme Court served as the 
New Zealand jurist. MacArthur also picked Lord Patrick, 
the Judge of Court of Session in Edinburgh, Scotland, as 
the member from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. Bernard Victor A. Roling, Judge in 
Utrecht Court and Law Professor at Utrecht University, 
served as the bench representative from the Netherlands. 
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The Russian judge was Major General Ivan Micheyevich zaryanov 
of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Soviet 
Union. French judge M. Henri Reimburger, the former Legal 
Advisor to the Overseas Ministry, rounded out the nine 
member court. 9 
9Pacific Stars and Stripes, February 15, 1946, . p. l; 
Horowitz, "The Tokyo Trial," International conciliation, 
pp. 495-497; Nippon Times (Tokyo), February 20, 1946, p. l; 
40 
SCAP confined virtually all suspects in Tokyo's 
Sugamo Prison which the Japanese referred to as "the Nest 
of the Wild Duck." During World War II the series of three 
story concrete buildings held nearly four thousand captives, 
twelve inmates packed into each 15 by 15 foot cell. By 
American standards, Sugamo housed a maximum of eighteen 
hundred prisoners with only three inmates in each cell. 
In Sugamo Prison, members of the International Prosecution 
Section conducted their interrogations of Japanese defendants. 
During February and March, the Sugamo war crime sus-
pects engaged Japanese defense counsel. The major or class 
"A" war criminals chose some of Japan's leading attorneys 
to represent them. For example, Marquis Koichi Kido, 
Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal from 1940-1945, selected 
Shigetaka Hozumi, the English-speaking son of Japan's 
eminent constitutional lawyer Yatsuka Hozumi. General 
Iwane Matsui, former president of the Greater East Asia 
Development Society and commander at the "rape of Nanking," 
picked seventy-five year old Dr. Somei Uzawa, president of 
Meiji University and one of Japan's premier lawyers. Hideki 
Tojo selected Dr. Ichiro Kiyose, eight time member of the 
House of Representatives. Dr. Kiyose, past president of 
Stars and Stripes, February 20, 1946, p. l; and Osaka Mainichi, 
February 21, 1946, p. 1. George F. Blewett, Tojo's American 
defense counsel, claimed in 1950 that the Tokyo bench con-
sisted of judges from "second-grade courts." see Blewett, 
"Victor's Injustice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial," American 
Perspective 4 (Summer 1950):282. For more information on 
the Tokyo Judges, see Appendix E of this thesis. 
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the Tokyo Bar Association, had defended Japanese naval officers 
in the May 15, 1932 Young Officer's incident. Mamoru 
Shigemitsu ,the wooden-legged former foreign minister and 
career diplomat, chose Dr. Kenzo Takayanagi, English 
speaking professor of Anglo-American Law at Tokyo Imperial 
University. Despite having designated counsel of their 
choice, class "A" war crimes suspects could not meet with 
their attorneys. Only Allied prosecutors and IPS legal 
10 personnel had access to Sugamo. 
Japanese and western legal traditions differed. 
In Japanese courts the judge conducted the trial,and defense 
attorneys were heard only in a final plea. Japanese law-
yers knew little of Anglo-American law or western courtroom 
techniques. Accordingly, Saburo Ohta of the Japanese 
Government's Central Liaison office, acting on behalf of 
leading Japanese suspects, petitioned the Tokyo Tribunal 
to provide British and American attorneys to assist Japanese 
defense counsel. The court judges approved Ohta's request. 
New Zealand justice Erima Harvey Northcroft sent General 
lO · · . T 0 N b 24 For Sugamo descriptions, see Nippon imes, ovem er , 
1945, p. l; L.A. Times, November 13, 1948, p. 2; and Yoshio 
Kodama, Sugamo Diary (Tokyo, 1960). For IPS Sugamo interroga-
tions, see International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East, War Crimes, Interrogations of Japanese Prisoners, Tokyo, 
1946-1947, 4 reels, Microform Reading Room, Library of Con-
gress, Washington, D.C. For Japanese defense counsel, see 
Pacific Stars and Stripes, February 15, 1946, p. 1; Nippon 
Times, February 24, 1946, p. 1, March 10, p. 2; and the 
Oriental Economist, Tokyo War Crimes Trial: International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo, 1946), volume 
I, pp. 75-82. 
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MacArthur a request to provide "at least one American 
lawyer" for each defendant. On February 21, SCAP requested 
the U.S. Judge Advocate General's Department in Washington, 
D.C. to furnish "fifteen to twenty" attorneys to act as 
a panel "from which might be drawn by selection or by 
Court appointment counsel for defendants charged." Still, 
some of the accused lacked any counsel whatsoever. In 
early March the Tokyo Tribunal filed a request with the 
Japan Lawyer's Association to recommend suitable attorneys 
for the forthcoming trial. In nominating candidates for 
the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, the association stressed 
criminal law experience, personality and physical strength 
rather than "linguistic ability or knowledge of American, 
British and international laws." On March 19, SCAP 
agreed to the IMTFE's request to increase to twenty-five 
11 
the number of American counsel who would go to Tokyo. 
On April 5, the IMTFE General Secretary established 
the International Defense Panel (IDP). The Tribunal 
secretary envisioned this panel as the counterpart to the 
International Prosecution Section (IPS) established in 
December 1945. Unfortunately, the IDP failed to receive 
11For Ohta, Northcraft and MacArthur, see Records of 
Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II 
(Record Group 331) (SCAP), Box 411, File 000.5-2, letters 
of Judge Northcraft to Douglas MacArthur and SCAP reply, 
Washington National Record Center, Suitland, Maryland. 
For Japan Lawyer's Association, see Nippon Times, March 16, 
1946, p. 2. For an April 9, 1946 dispatch to the Secretary 
of State, see FRUS, 1946, volume VIII, p. 429. See also 
April 3, 1946, Thomas L. Blakemore memo on defense counsel 
preparations in RG 59, Document 740.00119 control (Japan) 4-946. 
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the logistical support that SCAP provided the prosecution. 
The IPS had more personnel, lawyers, translators and funds 
than the IDP. On April 22, the general secretary announced 
the appointment of Beverly Mosby Coleman as chief of defense 
counsel and head of IDP. For the previous four months, 
Navy Captain Coleman had served as president of a U.S. 
Army war crimes court in Yokohama. 
On April 25, Tribunal president Webb released the 
Rules of Procedure for the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. The 
Australian chief judge promulgated court rules in accordance 
with Article 7 of the IMTFE charter, which stated 
that the Tribunal could "draft and amend" courtroom rules 
of procedure consistent with the charter. Article 9 of 
the Tokyo Trial Rules of Procedure, however, permitted 
the Court to modify, amend or depart "at any time 11 from 
these rules "in the interest of a fair and expeditious 
trial. 1112 
12 1 . 1 . t For IPS advantage, see Va entine B. Dea e, in er-
view at his office, Washington, D.C., February 5, 1979; 
Beverly M. Coleman, interview at the Metropolitan Club, 
Washington, D.C., May 22, 1979; Coleman telephone conversa-
tion, July 31, 1979; and Deale letter to the N.Y. Times, 
December 19, 1948, p. SE. An abbreviated version of the 
Deale letter to the editor appeared in thew. Post, December 
23, 1948, p. 17. For IDP and Coleman, see Nippon Times, 
March 5, 1946, p. l; N.Y. Times, April 11, 1946, p. 12; 
Pacific Stars and Stripes, April 22, 1946, p. l; and Solis 
Horowitz, "The Tokyo Trial," International Conciliation, 
pp. 491-493. For April 25 Rules of Procedure, see Paul 
Chung-tseng, "Judicial Administration of the Laws of War: 
Procedures in War Crimes Trials" (Ph.D. dissertation, Law, 
Yale University, 1955), volume two, Appendix 9, pp. 37-41. 
44 
On April 26, SCAP amended the IMTFE charter first 
promulgated on January 19. The slightly revised court 
charter incorporated recommendations of the Far Eastern 
Commission and provision for the addition of two court 
justices. The new charter expanded the bench from nine to 
eleven members, and thereby provided ~epresentation for 
India and the Philippines. The United States had originally 
opposed the addition of judges from these two countries 
but fear of a "virtually all-white" tribunal led the State 
D t . d d h dd. t . 13 epar ment to recons1 er an approve t e two a 1 ions. 
The Tokyo War Crimes Trial began in the War Ministry 
Building where Premier Hideki Tojo and his Cabinet had 
once drawn up their war plans. The black painted granite 
building stood on Ichigaya Hill behind the Emperor's palace. 
Nearly five hundred Japanese laborers had worked twenty-
four hours a day for three months to refurnish the three 
story structure chosen by Chief Prosecutor Keenan. Japanese 
workers dug enormous parking lots behind the 
building to accommodate a large number of automobiles and 
motorcycles. The entire interior of the building was rewired, 
scrubbed, painted and redecorated. SCAP installed telephone 
13For the amended Charter, see SCAP, IMTFE Established 
at Tokyo, January 19, 1946, pp. 11-16. For the U.S. and 
the addition of two justices, see FRUS, 1946, volume VIII, 
pp. 383, 390, 393·-394, 418-420. For April 3, 1946, FEC 
recommendations, see Far Eastern Commissions, Activities 
of the Far Eastern Commission, Report by the Secretary 
General February 26, 1946-July 10, 1947 {Washington, D.C., 
1947), pp. 27-29, 97-100 and George Blakeslee, Far Eastern 
Commission: A Study in International Cooper·ation, 1945-1952 
{Washington, D.C., 1953), p. 196. 
lines and a new heating system, "the militarists" having 
removed the radiators as part of a wartime measure to 
provide scrap iron. 
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The courtroom was located in a poorly ventilated 
auditorium where students of the Imperial Japanese Army 
War ~ollege had once studied training films. A long, 
polished bench for the eleven judges dominated the 90 by 
115 foot room. The bench was elevated so high that it 
appeared "overpowering." Colorful maps hung from the wall 
near the bench. When a special handle was turned, various 
world maps would appear marking the wartime advances of 
Japanese forces. Behind the bench stood the eleven flags 
of the Allied nations "symbolizing the judgment of the 
world." Twenty feet away, facing the court bench, stood 
the prisoner's dock, an ordinary, three-tiered compartment. 
Members of the defense and prosecution sat at separate 
tables between the accused and the Tribunal podium. The 
witness box, elevated slightly and nearly level with the 
judges' bench, stood to the left of the Tribunal podium 
facing the court and the defendants. The speaker's lectern 
was near the defense and prosecution tables. Official 
court reporters worked directly in front of the bench. 
Seats for Allied dignitaries and special visitors were 
located on a stage at the south end of the auditorium. 
Official observers sat in comfortable theater seats while 
the Japanese spectators were limited to the two hundred 
seats in a "cramped" balcony overlooking the defendants 1 
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box. Seats for two hundred reporters were situated at 
the north end of the auditorium. In addition, court officials 
set up two press rooms for the convenience of the media. 
The remodeled courtroom carried the latest innova-
tions. The Special Allied Construction Corps installed 
sound absorbent tiles in the curved ceiling, hung heavy 
drapes from the two-story high windows and completely 
carpeted the main floor. Engineers erected six large 
four-lamp sets of Klieg lights from the ceiling, fifty 
feet above the courtroom. The Klieg lighting system, 
"which puts daylight to shame,:. obviated the need for 
camera flash bulbs. Three daises for press and motion 
picture cameramen were located on the courtroom floor. 
The balcony contained two booths for radio broadcast and 
motion picture or newsreel technicians. 
By the fifth week of the trial, the courtroom con-
tained special language translation equipment. All seats 
had earphones and switches for simultaneous translation. 
Allied personnel, prisoners and spectators could follow 
the proceedings in English, Japanese or Russian. Court 
translators, "looking like aquarium inhabitants," sat inside 
glass-enclosed booths. Court engineers mounted three red 
lights at strategic locations to warn a speaker if he spoke 
faster than the court interpreters could translate. Engineers 
mounted these warning lights on the speaker's box, the witness 
box and near the seat of Tribunal president Webb. 
The Tokyo Tribunal took elaborate courtroom security 
47 
precautions. The court appointed Lieutenant Colonel Aubrey 
S. Kenworthy as provost marshal in charge of all trial 
security measures. Kenworthy, a Nebraska native, instructed 
special court personnel to search all visitors, Allied or 
Japanese, before entering the courtroom. Kenworthy 
instructed Lieutenant Charles Hughes, the attendance control 
officer, to insure that all visitors were seated five minutes 
prior to court convening. All visitors had to remain in 
the courtroom while the Tribunal was in session. Kenworthy 
forbade all smoking and unofficial picture taking. 
Brigadier General C. S. Ferring assigned 190 military 
police to Kenworthy as Tokyo trial guards. Ferring, 
Tokyo provost marshal, "handpicked" the special detail 
on the basis of intelligence and physical appearance. 
All guards had to be over 5 feet 10 inches tall to qualify. 
The second floor of the renovated War Ministry 
Building contained the Allied judges' chambers. The jurists' 
offices were located on either side of the former office 
of Premier Tojo. The court selected Tojo's office with 
its bright red carpet as the Tribunal conference room. The 
justices gathered there before entering the courtroom. The 
third floor housed the offices of the International Prosecution 
Section. Japanese defense counsel had rooms on the first 
14 floor while American counsel had offices on the second floor. 
14 . · · For courtroom descriptions and M.P. selection, see 
Pacific Stars and Stripes, February 17, 1946, p. 1, May 4, p. 1 
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On April 29, more than eight months after the end of 
the Pacific War, Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan lodged 
the Allied indictment against twenty-eight class "A" 
Japanese war crimes suspects. At 11:00 a.m., the Inter-
national Military Tribunal for the Far East held its first 
session, this one in private, in Tojo's former office. The 
fifty-five count indictment, covering the years 1928-1945, 
charged the Japanese military and political leaders with 
Crimes against Peace, Crimes against Humanity and Conven-
tional War Crimes. The indictment described a Japan 
"dominated and directed by a criminal militaristic clique" 
bent on the "domination and exploitation" of East Asia, 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific using methods similar "to 
those established by Hitler and the Nazi Party in Germany." 
The IPS indictment made no mention or reference to the 
1 b . . h" t 15 cu pa 1lity of Emperor Hiro 1 o. 
The first thirty-six counts of the indictment dealt 
with crimes against Peace. Counts 1 to 4 charged the 
Japanese with conspiring to secure the military, political 
and November 14, 1948, p. 10; Nipeon Times, March 20, 1946, 
p. 1 and March 23, p. 3; Osaka Mainichi,March 24, 1946, p. 1 
and April 18, p. 1; William Sebald with Russel Brines, With 
MacArthur In Japan (New York, 1965), pp. 152-153; and G~ 
SCAP, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), 
Press Translations and summaries, November 1945-August 1949, 
75 reels, reel 13, Press Translations and Summary No. 14-26, 
Political and Editorial Series and Reel 14, No. 27-43. 
15International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
Jud ment of the International Mili tar Tribunal for the 
Far East (Tokyo: The Tribunal, 1948 , Annex #A-6, pp. 29-32 
and Pacific Stars and Stripes, April 30, 1946, pp. 1, 4. 
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and economic control of Asia by waging "wars of aggression." 
Count 5 charged the accused with conspiring with Germany 
and Italy for the purpose of gaining "complete domination 
of the entire world." Counts 6 to 17 charged that these 
twenty-eight defendants "planned and prepared aggressive 
war" against the eleven prosecuting Allied countries. 
Counts 18 to 26 charged the accused with 
initiating aggressive war against eight Allied states. 
Counts 27 to 36 charged the defendants with waging aggres-
sive war against nine Allied powers. 
Counts 37 to 52 charged the accused with murder and 
conspiring to murder members of the Allied armed forces, 
civilians and prisoners of war. Count 39 charged the accused 
with murder at Pearl Harbor. Count 44 charged the defendants 
with "conspiring to murder on a wholesale scale" Allied 
prisoners and civilian internees. Counts 45 to 52 charged 
the accused with the murder of disarmed Allied soldiers 
and civilians in China, Mongolia and the Soviet Union. 
Counts 53, 54 and 55 dealt with Conventional War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. Counts 53 and 54 
charged the accused with "having conspired to order, author-
ize or permit" Japanese regional commanders or local camp 
officials to "frequently and habitually" commit breaches 
of the laws and customs of war. Count 55 charged the 
defendants with "having recklessly disregarded their 
legal duty" to insure the observance of the laws and customs 
of 16 war. 
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The IPS Indictment listed twenty-eight individual 
Japanese as being criminally responsible for leading Japan 
into World War II. The Indictment charged eighteen military 
men and ten civilians with war crimes. Ten of the twenty-
eight defendants were over sixty-five years of age. The 
oldest defendant, Kiichiro Hiranuma, was eighty-one,and 
the youngest defendant, Akira Muto, was fifty-three. 
Twenty-seven of the twenty-eight defendants had held a 
government office or military position. Shumei Okawa, 
member of the East Asia Institute of the South Manchuria 
Railway and accomplice in the 1932 murder of Prime Minister 
Inukai, held no official position. Some of the accused 
such as Hideki Tojo and Shigenori Togo had served in more 
than three different government posts. 
The Japanese defendants h~p. served in a wide range 
of government positions. The Allied indictment named five 
war ministers: Generals Jiro Minami, Sadao Araki, Seishiro 
Itagaki, Shunroku Hata and Hideki Tojo; four prime 
ministers: Koki Hirota, Kiichiro Hiranuma, General Hideki 
Tojo and General Kuniaki Koiso; four foreign ministers: 
Koki Hirota, Yosuke Matsuoka, Shigenori Togo and Mamoru 
16 IMTFE, Judgment of the IMTFE, pp. 7-12. For the 
reasons behind the IPS selection of these particular 28 men, 
see Solis Horowitz, "The Tokyo Trial," International Concilia-
tion, pp. 495-501. Horowitz, a prosecution member, wrote 
that "no person was to be included as a defendant unless the 
evidence against him was so strong as to render negligible 
the chances for acquittal." 
Shigemitsu; four ambassadors: Hiroshi Oshima, Toshio 
Shiratori, Mamoru Shigemitsu and Shigenori Togo; three 
ministers without portfolio: Kiichiro Hiranuma, Naoki 
Hoshino and Teiichi Suzuki; three home ministers: Kiichiro 
Hiranuma, Marquis Koichi Kido and Hideki Tojo; two navy 
ministers: Admirals Osami Nagano and Shigetaro Shimada; 
Education Ministers Sadao Araki and Koichi Kido; Army 
chiefs of staff Generals Hideki Tojo and Yoshijiro Umezu; 
two presidents of the Planning Board, Naoki Hoshino and 
Teiichi Suzuki; two overseas ministers: Kuniaki Koiso and 
Shigenori Togo; and Greater East Asia ministers Mamoru 
Shigemitsu and Shigenori Togo. Finance Minister Okinori 
Kaya; "rape of Nanking" Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto; 
Vice War Minister Heitaro Kimura; Privy Council President 
Kiichiro Hiranuma; Army theatre commanders Kenji Dohihara, 
Kenryo Sato and Akina Muto; Vice Navy Minister Takasumi 
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Oka; and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Koichi Kido completed 
the Allied Indictment. 17 
On April 29, U.S. Chief of Defense Counsel Beverly M. 
Coleman filed a petition with the Tokyo Tribunal. Stressing 
that only then had the names of the accused become known 
to the defense panel, Captain Coleman requested a temporary 
postponement of the trial. Coleman's plea emphasized 
17Modern Military Branch, World War II war crimes, 
IMTFE, Record Group 238, Court Papers, Box No. 88, paper #1, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C. or IMTFE, Judgment, 
Annex #A-6, pp. 29-130. For complete biographical informa-
tion on the twenty-eight defendants, see Appendix B of this 
thesis. 
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that the defense panel lacked proper logistical support 
and needed more time to prepare its case in order to insure 
a proper defense. Coleman stated that many of the defendants 
still lacked American counsel and argued that the defense 
case should not be prejudiced by court decisions "made 
under hurried circumstances previous to the appointment" 
of individual counsel. 
The Coleman petition detailed defense handicaps 
that required additional time to rectify. It pointed out 
that the defense team was seriously understaffed since 
only six of a projected thirty American defense lawyers 
had arrived in Tokyo. Only three of a planned fifteen 
legal secretaries were then serving. Secondly, he cited 
Sugamo Prison regulations which had "severely restricted" 
communication between the accused and their counsel. For 
example, Japanese and American attorneys had not yet been 
permitted to interview their clients. 
After reading the petition into the trial record, 
President Webb summoned Coleman before the Tribunal. Before 
ruling on the defense motion, the chief judge refused to 
acknowledge Coleman's standing as Chief of Defense Counsel. 
Seven days earlier, the court Secretariat had officially 
appointed Coleman. President Webb reasoned, however, that 
the Tribunal could not recognize Coleman's standing unless 
he spoke "for an individual Japanese with his concurrence." 
Coleman tried to point out, to no avail, that he technically 
represented no accused that day because the prosecution had 
-
just then lodged the official indictment. After Coleman 
left the room, Webb scheduled the courtroom arraignment of 
the twenty-eight defendants for May 3. 18 
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On May 1, Japanese defendants conferred with their 
counsel for the first time. At 10:45 a.m., Yutaka Sugawara 
entered Sugamo Prison to become the first defense attorney 
to visit his client. Sugawara met 69 year old Baron Sadao 
Araki in the family reception room. There defense lawyers 
met with their clients for thirty to sixty minutes. Tadayoshi 
Tsukazaki, counsel for Kenji Dohihara, complained that he 
had insufficient time to fully confer with his 63 year old 
client. 
The defense rushed to prepare for the May 3 Tribunal 
opening. The indictment, which took the prosecutors eight 
months to prepare, had just become public. While the 
prosecution had months to prepare its case, the defense had 
only a matter of days. The prosecution had interrogated 
most of the defendants long before defense counsel represented 
them. For example, IPS interviewed Hideki Tojo fifty-one 
times before acting chief of American defense counsel Valentine 
B. Deale visited him. As of April 29, six defendants had 
no individual counsel. In addition, only six American lawyers 
represented the entire twenty-eight accused. Not until late 
No. 
the 
The 
pp. 
18 For Coleman petition, see RG238, Court Papers, Box 
88, Paper #5 and International Military Tribunal for 
Far East, Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Pro·c·eedings (Tokyo: 
Tribunal, May 3, 1946-April 16, 1948) (818 sessions), 
5-12. 
May would twenty more American defense attorneys arrive 
in Tokyo. The IDP lacked the planned coordination and 
administrative organization of the IPS. The defense panel 
badly needed more time to study the indictment, set 
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up an office structure capable of handling legal paperwork, 
seek out witnesses, and gather evidence. Language 
difficulties between American and Japanese counsel ex-
acerbated the situation. The New York Times aptly remarked 
that the defense section was ~still in the paper stage." 19 
19 f' S . 't . ' M 3 For irst ugamo visi s, see Nippon Times, ay , 
1946, p. l; Tokyo Shimbun, May 3, 1946 and Mainichi Shimbun. 
The last two papers are cited in ATIS, Press Translations 
and Summaries, Numbers 14-26, Reel 13, Political Series 
711, item 2 and Political Series 716, item 3. For IPS 
advantage over IDP, see Valentine B. Deale, interview at 
his office, Washington, D.C., February 5, 1979; Deale 
letter to N.Y. Times, December 19, 1948, p. SE; Beverly M. 
Coleman, interview at the Metropolitan Club, Washington, 
D.C., May 22, 1979; Coleman, telephone conversation, 
July 31, 1979; Nippon Times, March 16, 1946, p. 2; May 2, 
p. 3 and May 4, p. 1. For N.Y. Times comment see April 11, 
1946, p. 12. 
CHAPTER THREE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST: 
THE FIRST THREE MONTHS (MAY 3, 1946-JULY 31, 1946) 
Here we are to give the accused a fair trial and 
without waste of time--a fair trial. It does not 
follow that we have to take all those technicalities 
and take all those meticulously worked out things 
that apply in national courts. Why, the rules of 
evidence do not apply here. 
-Justice William Flood Webb, May 1946. 
The Tokyo War Crimes Trial lasted over two and one-
half years. Between June 3, 1946 and January 24, 1947, the 
prosecution presented its case. The first three months 
of the proceedings set the pace for the entire trial. 
Language disputes, technical bickering, clashes between 
defense counsel and the tribunal bench, and uncertainty 
over rules of trial procedure and court evidence plagued 
the international trial. Defense difficulties mounted due 
to inadequate SCAP support and an insufficient number of 
American attorneys. Not until September 9, 1946 was each 
Japanese defendant represented by his own American lawyer. 
Friday, May 3, 1946, was a cloudy day. At 7:55 a.m., a 
large, olive-drab bus, windows covered with blue shades, 
backed through the gates of Tokyo's Sugamo Prison. Moments 
later, twenty-six men accused of Crimes against Peace and 
Humanity paraded out, "their faces passive." They savored 
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brief moments of sunlight before entering the dark interior 
of the bus. At 8:05 a.m. the bus lumbered through the 
prison gates and sped past a silent crowd of three hundred 
Japanese, composed mainly of school children. Flanked 
by a fleet of white Military Police jeeps, the bus crept 
along the streets of Tokyo towards the War Ministry Building 
on Ichigaya Hill. 
At 8:20 a.m; ,the bus stopped at the War Ministry 
Building, site of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (IMTFE). Lieutenant Colonel Aubrey Kenworthy, 
provost marshal of the IMTFE, motioned the photographers 
to approach. Members of the press individually entered 
the bus to take pictures of the solemn passengers. 
Minutes later, the former leaders of Japan filed out slowly. 
Fifty-nine year old Mamoru Shigemitsu, career diplomat and 
signer of the surrender terms, stepped down without aid 
despite his wooden leg. Kenworthy had to help weak, 
sickly Yosuke Matsuoka, sixty-six year old graduate of 
Oregon University and foreign minister who concluded the 
April 1941 Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact with Stalin. 
Photographers crowded closer when ex-Prime Minister Hideki 
Tojo alighted. Tojo, however, did not notice the onrush. 
The sixty-two year old former premier did not betray his 
thoughts as he walked now as a prisoner in the building 
where his word once had been law. 
A crack detachment of heavily armed American M.P.s 
lined the accused up in three files. The tall, husky 
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American soldiers stood in stark contrast to the shrunken 
old men accused of being war criminals. The special M.P.s 
were proud of their unique role in the trial. One New 
Orleans private quipped that he would "trade the whole show" 
for a glimpse of his five year old daughter. Kenworthy 
gestured to his guards,and the twenty-six accused shuffled 
through the side door. By 9:00 a.m. a long line of anxious 
Japanese spectators had gathered for the 10:30 a.m. court 
opening. American M.P.s, one a woman, closely checked each 
court admission pass. 
By 10:00 a.m., the remodeled courtroom reached its 
seating capacity. The Klieg lights "suggested a Hollywood 
premier." Three hundred Allied spectators, mostly women, 
were seated on the eastern half of the balcony. On the 
western half, two hundred Japanese sat calmly. About sixty 
distinguished Allied leaders sat on the south side of the 
stage. Among the special dignataries was U.S. Lieutenant 
General Robert Eichelberger, Commanding General of the 
Eighth Army, and George Atcheson, General MacArthur's 
political advisor. Two hundred Allied and Japanese correspond-
ents waited anxiously to tell the whole world about the 
epochal event about to begin. The late arrival of two of 
the defendants delayed the court opening for forty-five 
minutes. Sixty-one year old General Seishiro Itagaki, the 
World War II Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese army in 
Korea, and fifty-eight year old General Heitaro Kimura, 
vice minister of War during the first two years of the war, 
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still had not reached Tokyo's Atsugi airdrome from Bangkok, 
Siam. Tribunal members decided to initiate the proceedings 
without them. 
At 11:13 a.m., a bell signalling the opening of the 
trial broke an oppressive silence that reigned over the 
courtroom. Two M.P.s closed the massive wooden doors to 
the courtroom entrance which they were guarding. Chief 
Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan, "his face a little strained," 
as described by Tokyo Shimbun, led the members of the pros·-
ecution through a door at the rear of the courtroom. The 
defendants entered next. Carrying ribboned copies of the 
indictment, they shuffled into court "like schoolboys 
carrying their primers to class." As the suspects filed 
into the prisoner's box, some found it difficult to believe 
that these were the wartime leaders who had once "fondled 
dreams of an empire for Japan." A few wore western dress 
but most appeared in Japanese high-collared blouses. "None 
were dapper," wrote one correspondent, "it's hard to attain 
any degree of sartorial elegance in a prison." 
Gallery members strained to view the men who had 
once held Japan's destiny in their hands. Bald and heavy-
set Lieutenant General Kenryo Sato, wearing a khaki military 
uniform without decorations, led the procession. Okinori 
Kaya, fifty-seven year old former minister of finance, 
surveyed the courtroom like a curious schoolboy. A surly 
General Teiichi Suzuki, minister without portfolio from 
1941-1943, bristled, his face revealing a sullen grimace. 
.......... 
Thin, bespectacled fifty-six year old Colonel Kingore 
Hashimoto, leader of a field artillery regiment at the 
"rape of Nanking" looked like a "harassed bank clerk" 
according to the Pacific Stars and Stripes. Former War 
Minister Baron Sadao Araki sported a walrus mustache. 
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Wearing gold-rimmed glasses, short and fat General Yoshijiro 
Umezu, the sixty-four year old, former commander of the Kwantang 
Army in Manchuria, looked, according to the Ashai Shimbun, 
like the "master of a flourishing shop." Lieutenant General 
Hiroshi Oshima, former ambassador to Nazi Germany, acted 
haughtily. The sixty year old diplomat looked more like 
a 11 dandy" with his white pocket handkerchief, flashy bow 
tie and black-ribboned pince-nez. Former War Minister 
Tojo picked his nose unconcernedly and flirted with an 
American stenographer. Four white-helmeted American 
M.P.s and a detail officer accompanied the defendants 
and guided them to their assigned seats in the prisoner's 
dock. After seating the twenty-six accused, the four 
M.P.s stood guard behind the prisoners' box. One soldier 
stood on each side of the booth. At 11:20 a.m., Captain 
Donalds. Van Meter, marshal of the Tribunal, ordered the 
court to rise. Nine black-robed Allied judges solemnly 
entered the courtroom. The flag of each Allied country 
was positioned in the order the jurists sat. At 11:22 a.m., 
Marshal Van Meter, in a voice that echoed throughout the 
courtroom, announced that the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East was now officially in session. 1 
Court President Sir William Flood Webb opened the 
proceedings with a special statement. Webb, a large, 
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florid man with the "bold nose of a Wellington," possessed, 
by mutual agreement of his colleagues, the only microphone 
on the bench. The chief judge announced in his fine 
Australian drawl that "there has been no more important 
criminal trial in all history." He went on to say that 
prior to gathering for the initial session, tribunal members 
had signed a "joint affirmation" to deliver justice "according 
to law, without fear, favor or affection." Sir William 
reminded his audience that it would be incumbent upon 
the prosecution "to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 
Webb's prefatory remarks dealt with the two official 
trial languages, English and Japanese. Noting that the 
use of two languages made it certain that the trial would 
be lengthy, he proposed to meet with the prosecution and 
defense sections to find ways to shorten the proceedings. 
He hoped to reduce the trial's length by the admission of 
documents and facts "as to which there can be no real contest." 
1 For descriptions of the May 3 session, see New York 
Times, May 3, 1946, pp. 1, 10; U.S. Army Pacific Stars and 
Stripes (Tokyo), May 4, 1946, pp. 1,4; Nippon Times (Tokyo), 
May 4, 1946, pp. 1,2; Osaka Mainichi, May 4, 1946, pp. 1,2; 
Newsweek, May 13, 1946, p. SO; Time,.May 20, 1946, p. 24; The 
Oriental Economist, Tokyo War Criines Trial: International 
Military Tribunal for the· Far East (Tokyo, 1946), volume one, 
pp. 43-48; Asahi Shirnbun, May 4, 1946; Tokyo Shi.mbun, May 4, 
1946; Mainichi Shimbun, May 6, 1946; and Yomimuri Shimbun, 
May 6, 1946. The last four newspapers are located in GHQ, 
SCAP, Allied Translator and Interpreter Serv·ic·e (ATIS), 
Press Translations and Summaries, Reel 13, Number 14-26. 
Promising "a fair and prompt trial," Webb concluded that 
the trial would be conducted with the "utmost expedition 
consistent with justice to the accused." Before noon 
2 recess, the Tribunal completed opening day matters. 
Also on the first day Chief Prosecutor Joseph Keenan 
introduced his associate counsels. Keenan, whom Time 
magazine described as resembling W. C. Fields, brought 
forward the ten associate prosecutors. Afterwards, Court 
Marshal Van Meter, with bright red hair, swore in the 
court's interpreters, translators and language arbiters 
in fluent Japanese. Eight Japanese interpreters anchored 
a fifteen member language section. Takani Oka, a twenty-
three year old second year student at Rikkyo University, 
was the youngest interpreter. Fifty-seven year old Toshio 
Shimauchi, described by the Tokyo Shimbun as able to "put 
an American to shame when it comes to correct English," 
topped off the list. Although English and Japanese were 
the official trial languages, the court called upon the 
language section to translate documents and statements 
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into English, Japanese, Chinese, Annamese, Dutch, French, 
German, Italian, Malayan, Russian, Spanish, Swedish, Burmese, 
Marshallese, Mongolian, Tho and Solomon Islands dialects. 
2For Webb descriptions, see Pacific Stars and Stripes, 
November 10, 1948, p. 10; Newsweek, May 13, 1946, p. 50; 
David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New York, 1971), 
pp. 176-177; and William Sebald with Russell Brines, With 
MacArthur in Japan (New York, 1965), p. 156. For Web~ 
opening comments, see International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East, Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Proceedings (Tokyo: The 
Tribunal, 3 May 1946-16 April 1948), pp. 21-22. 
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Despite competent interpreters and modern translation 
facilities, Japanese language translations consistently 
delayed the trial's pace. The nuances and formality levels 
of Japanese proved formidable even to the Japanese them-
selves. Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, the eighty-four year old 
former chief justice of Japan and eldest of the accused, 
spoke a classical Japanese which a native speaker could 
not readily understand. Literal translation was often 
impossible. The head of the prosecution language section 
estimated that it required at least eight hours to prepare 
a working translation of a single page of Japanese material. 
The courtroom examination of Japanese witnesses 
caused further delays in the proceedings. The vagueness 
of their responses irritated both prosecution and defense 
counsel. Major Moore, the IMTFE language arbiter, alleged 
that it was "an established fact" that an Oriental "when 
pressed will dodge the issue." Prosecution attorney David 
N. Sutton, Jr. insinuated that Orientals were "masters of 
evasion" on the witness stand. IPS attorney Solis Horowitz 
charged that a Japanese witness was "discursive" and would 
frequently evade questions. Horowitz further asserted that 
a Japanese witness gave a "monumental amount of unimportant 
detail" and often gave his responses "according to what he 
believes the examiner desires him to say." Indeed, during 
direct examination of Japanese witnesses, the speed of the 
trial slumped to one-fifth of its normal pace. 3 
3For Keenen as w. c. Fields, see Time, May 20, 1946,p. 24. 
To compound matters, two of the judges did not 
understand either of the official trial languages. Soviet 
Justice Major General I. M. Zaryanov understood neither 
Japanese nor English and had to bring his own translators 
and interpreters to Tokyo. French judge Henri Bernard, 
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who replaced French jurist M. Henri Reimburger on April 5, 
was equally deficient and also brought a translation staff. 4 
For title and description of ten Associate Counsel, see 
IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 23-25. For Captain Van Meter, see 
Nippon Times, May 4, 1946, p. 2. For court interpreters, see 
Tokyo Sh1mbun, May 16, 1946, ATIS, Reel 13, Political Series 
773, item 4. For wide variety of languages, see Pacific 
Stars and Stripes, November 14, 1948, p. 10. For Hiranuma 
and classical Japanese, see William Sebald with Russell 
Brines, With MacArthur in Japan, p. 160. For the impos-
sibility of literal translation, see International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo: The Tribunal, 
November 12, 1948), p. 17. For examination of Japanese 
witnesses, see IMTFE, Proceedings, p. 4300; David N. Sutton, 
"The Trial of Tojo: The Most Important in All History?" 
American Bar Association Journal 36 (February 1950) :95; 
and Solis Horowitz, "The Tokyo Trial," International Con-
ciliation 465 (November 1950) :492 (footnote 26), 538-539, 
4 
· h d' b . ' For Judges' language an 1cap, see account y TOJO s 
defense lawyer George F. Blewett, "Victor's Injustice: The 
Tokyo War Crimes Trial," American Perspective 3 (Summer 1950) 
282; and Catholic University Law Professor Gordon Ireland, 
"Uncommon Law in Martial Tokyo," Year Book of World Affairs 
(London,1950), pp. 59, 86-87 and "Ex Post Facto From Rome 
to Tokyo," Temple Law Quarterly 21 (July 1947): 49-50, 
footnote 91. Prosecution attorneys Solis Horowitz, David 
Nelson Sutton and H. A. Hauxhurst claim that only the 
Russian judge was handicapped by language ability. See 
Solis Horowitz, "The Tokyo Trial," International Conciliation, 
p. 488; D. N. Sutton, Jr., "The Trial of Tojo: The Most 
Important Trial in All History?" American Bar Association 
Journal, p. 96; and H. w. Hauzhurst, "Forum on War Crimes 
Trials," American Bar Association, Proceedings of the Sections 
of International and Comparative Law, Seattle Meeting, 
September 6-7, 1948 (Chicago, 1949), p. 31. See defense 
counsel George A. Furness version in Richard H. Minear, 
Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, 
1971), p. 82, footnote 18. James T. C. Liu, assistant to 
Chinese Associate Prosecutor Judge Che-Chen Hsiang, mistakenly 
After the noon recess, the twenty-eight defendants 
returned to the courtroom. Former War Minister Seishiro 
Itagaki and Vice War Minister Heitaro Kimura took their 
places in the prisoners' dock. The rest of the day's 
session revolved around the reading of the indictment. 
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At 2:45 p.m., Dr. Kenzo Takayanagi, Law Professor at Tokyo 
Imperial University and conversant in both English and 
Japanese, objected to the "obvious errors and inaccuracies 
of a substantial character" in the Japanese text of the 
indictment. Major Moore, the court language arbiter, 
admitted to "typographical errors" in the translation, but 
insisted that those mistakes would not essentially alter 
the meaning of the indictment. Webb agreed and, overruling 
Professor Takayanagi, directed Marshal Van Meter to continue 
reading. 
The erratic behavior of s ixty-one year old defendant 
Shumei Okawa highlighted the afternoon session. Dr. Okawa, 
friend of Colonel Komoto Daisaku, the man who had planned 
the murder of Chinese General Chang Tso-lin in 1928, 
"added color to an otherwise routine proceedings." Author 
during the 1930s of numerous books and articles advocating 
the expulsion of the white race from Asia, the cadaverous 
Okawa fidgeted nervously and wiggled and swayed in his 
chair "like a school boy." Finally the former Director 
claims that all eleven judges understood. English and 
Japanese, see Liu, "The Tokyo Trial: Source Materials," 
Far Eastern Survey 18 (July 28, 1948) :168. 
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of the East Asia Research Institute of the South Manchuria 
Railway removed his coat and unbuttoned his gray pajama 
top underneath. Lieutenant Colonel A. s. Kenworthy quickly 
reached around Okawa's neck and fastened his pajama top. 
Moments later "the self-appointed star performer of the 
proceedings," jumped from his seat and slapped the bald 
head of Tojo, who sat directly in front of Okawa. M.P.~s 
quickly restrained Okawa as Tojo smiled with obvious 
embarrassment. Okawa grinned heartily as President Webb 
called a recess at 3:35 p.m. 
During the recess Kenworthy permitted cameramen to 
photograph the prisoners. When one attempted to get a 
close-up of Okawa, the latter quickly rose up and slapped 
Tojo's "shining dome" yet another time. The chief judge 
called for order as the prisoners were removed from the 
courtroom. Okawa babbled as he was led out. When the 
trial resumed at 4:00 p.m., Kenworthy seated Okawa out of 
reach of Tojo. The former propagandist wept through most 
of the last forty minutes of the proceedings. 5 
During the next day's session, Captain Van Meter 
5For Takayanagi and Indictment errors, see IMTFE, 
Proceedin~s, pp. 30-31. For descriptions of Okawa's antics, 
see Pacific Stars and Stripes, May 4, 1946, pp. 1, 4; Los 
Angeles Times, May 4, 1946, pp. 1, 2; and Life, May 27-;-T946, 
pp. 47-50. Okawa told reporters that "I must kill Tojo." 
Okawa stated that he was in excellent health because he took 
"nourishment from air," adding "give me a cigarette." 
Okawa then eagerly reenacted his Tojo head slap for press 
photographers "while flashbulbs boomed." see Nippon Times, 
May 5, 1946, p. 2. 
completed reading aloud the fifty-five count indictment. 
Captain Coleman, chief of counsel for the defense, then 
asked permission to present "the situation relating to 
counsel for the defense." Coleman reported that only 
twenty-two of the twenty-eight defendants had individual 
Japanese counsel. President Webb halted Coleman's dis-
cussion and declared that Japanese defense counsel must 
introduce themselves to the Court. Dr. Ichiro Kiyose, 
Tojo's white-haired lawyer, presented them. The Tribunal 
president, however, refused Coleman's request to introduce 
the six American defense lawyers. Sir William claimed 
that the Americans had no standi ng until nornin~ted by an 
accused. Dr. Shumei Okawa was absent from the court, 
pending psychiatric examination. 
On May 6, the fourth day of court, the Tribunal 
entertained defense challenges and took the pleas of 
the defendants. The Monday session opened with each judge 
finding on his chair a pamphlet entitled "Japan's Record 
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and World Security." Webb stated that the presence of the 
anti-Japanese booklets was "most improper" and the Court 
would not be influenced "in the slightest" by that action. 
The defense section's first objection, dealing with language 
errors in the indictment, caused "much oral dueling'' on 
the courtroom floor. Kenzo Takayanagi, defense counsel 
for Mamoru Shigemitsu, and professor of Anglo-American law 
at Tokyo Imperial University, repeated his earlier objec-
tion regarding the substantial difference between the English 
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and Japanese texts of the indictment and argued that because 
it was a crucial document the mistakes should be "rectified 
beforehand." Chief Prosecutor Keenan objected to . these 
"dilatory proceedings" of the defense and remarked that the 
indictment translation was provided merely "for the con-
venience of the defendants." Lieutenant Colonel Franklin 
E. N. Warren, American counsel for Kenji Dohihara and Yosuke 
Matsuoka, objected to the IPS leader's statements. Warren, 
Executive Officer to the Pacific Theatre Air Judge Advocate 
General, pointed out that there were so many errors that 
some defendants could not understand the "legal import of 
the document presented to them." He added that the 
prosecution section had been on active organization for 
several months while the "defense is new." 
Dr. Ichiro Kiyose, counsel for Tojo, echoed Warren's 
concerns. Clutching a copy of the IMTFE Charter, Kiyose 
cited Article 9b which provided that the trial be conducted 
in English and Japanese. Challenging Keenan's statement 
that the indictment translation had been provided "for 
the convenience of the defendants," Kiyose asked the Tribunal 
to consider Japanese, along with English, as an official 
trial language. Although President Webb conceded Kiyose's 
point, he did not delay the proceedings to correct the 
indictment. Later in the day he ordered the court language 
arbiter to summarize statements rather than translate them. 
Sir William stated that if the Tribunal were to wait "until 
every word" was translated, the trial would "go on for 
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years. 116 
The second defense objection dealt with the propriety 
of Sir William Webb presiding over the Tribunal. When 
Dr. Kiyose challenged the chief judge,he created a minor 
sensation. The marshal of the court had to call the court 
to order because of the noise among the spectators. Kiyose, 
the deputy chief of counsel for the defense, contended that 
"from the standpoint of justice and fairness" it was 
improper for Webb to conduct the trial. Pounding the 
table, Kiyose argued that Sir William's wartime atrocities 
investigations would "influence the decisions taken here." 
After withdrawing to consider Kiyose's motion, acting court 
president Erima H. Northcroft announced that the Tribunal 
did not possess the authority to unseat anyone appointed 
by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). 
Webb took no part in the court decision and after the 
Tribunal finding he stated that prior to accepting his 
appointment as court president he had "seriously considered" 
what effects his World War II atrocities report might have 
on the trial proceedings. He concluded, however, that the 
"best legal opinion" in Australia had confirmed his eligibility. 
After the Kiyose challenge, the Tribunal heard the 
individual pleas from the defendants. Twenty-seven of the 
twenty-eight pleaded innocent to all charges. Only sickly 
6For May 4 comments, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 75-80. 
For May 6 discussion, see Proceedings, pp. 86-92, 109-110 and 
the Nippon Times, May 7, 1946, pp. 1, 3. 
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Yosuke Matsuoka, former Oregon houseboy and League of 
Nations delegate, made his plea in English. Some of the 
individual responses "were barked out like military commands." 
Shumei Okawa, the twenty-eighth defendant, was still absent 
from court, pending an examination by Dr. Yushi Uchimura, 
director of Matsuzawa Hospital, Japan's foremost mental 
. t"t t· 7 1.n s 1. u 1.on. 
The defense requested additional time to prepare its 
case. Noting that the "setting of the arraignment was ex-
ceedingly early," Dr. Kiyose asked for two months to examine 
the evidence. Captain Coleman pointed out that "numerous 
defendants, as well as their personal Japanese attorneys" 
were still awaiting the arrival of the American counsel. 
Lieutenant Colonel Warren argued that only on the previous 
afternoon were any individual American counsel officially 
selected by the Japanese defendants. Warren reiterated the 
marked advantage of the prosecution section which had "many 
months preparation with an adequate staff." Warren, who 
7 For Northcroft's dismissal of Kiyose petition, see 
Modern Military Branch, World War II War Crimes (IMTFE), 
Record Group 238, court Papers, Box No. 88, Item #43, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C.; IMTFE, Proceedings, 
pp. 92-98 and Nippon Times, May 7, 1946, pp. 1, 3. For 
Webb's comments on his eligibility, see Proceedings, p. 98 
and RG238, Proceedings in Chambers, Box No. 77, vofume I, 
p. 24. For individual pleas, sec IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 
100-104; Pacific Stars and Stripes, May 7, 1946, p. l; and 
Nippon Times, May 7, 1946, pp. 1, 3. Dr. Uchimura, a 
professor of psychiatry at Tokyo Imperial University, found 
Okawa suffering from a " ..• maniac state due to general 
paralysis, a syphilitic disease of the brain ... " For 
Uchimura's report on Okawa's mental condition, see RG238, 
Court Papers, Box No. 88, item #66 (12 pp.). 
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specialized in labor and criminal law, noted that newly 
arriving American defense counsel lacked even desks. Webb, 
however, insisted there was ample time to construct a suitable 
defense. The court then recessed until May 13 when the 
Tribunal would consider the defense motion regarding the 
jurisdiction of the IMTFE. President Webb set June 3 as 
the opening day of the prosecution's case. 
During the week-long recess, the International 
Defense Panel (IDP) attempted to coordinate its cases. 
At a May 9 meeting at the Gaimusho Building, the defense 
section established three divisions: general affairs, liaison, 
and investigation sections. The defense lawyers also created 
a research office with political, diplomatic, army and 
navy sections to prepare at least minimal cases for the 
accused. The IDP members appointed seventy-five year old 
Dr. Somei Uzawa as chief of the Japanese Defense counsel. 
To increase their meager trial funds, each counsel would 
contribute 1000 yen while each defendant had to give 10,000 
yen. The money would be used to hire translators and 
clerical staff. Despite this, an acute shortage of funds 
hampered the defense case throughout the long trial. 8 
8For Kiyose, Coleman, Warren and Webb remarks, see 
IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 112-117. For Coleman petition re-
questing additional time, see RG238, Court Papers, Box No. 
88, item #30. For IDP preparations, see Nippon Times, May 11, 
1946, p. 1. Japanese counsel petitioned their government for 
extra money but received only office space for some attorneys. 
See Nippon Ke·izai Shimbun, June 2, 1946, ATIS, Press Trans-
lations and Summaries, Numbers 27-43, Political Series 837, 
item 4. For IDP lack of sufficient money, see Pacific Stars 
and Stripes, June 30, 1946, p. l; Nippon Times, May 7, 1956, 
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On Monday, May 13, the Tribunal entertained defense 
motions regarding IMTFE's jurisdiction. Ichiro Kiyose, clad 
in military boots, delivered a trenchant ninety minute 
presentation. He argued that the Court had no authority 
to try the defendants for Crimes against Peace and Humanity 
because during the war the Allies had made no pronouncements 
concerning the postwar trial of Japanese war criminals on 
those two novel charges. Dr. Kiyose argued that inter-
national law contained "no mention of planning a war as 
a war crime," and that Crimes against Peace and Crimes 
against Humanity were ex post facto laws violating a 
fundamental principle of law. In other words, an individual 
could not be indicted for an offense that was not criminal 
at the time of its commission. Tojo's lawyer contended 
that Japan had surrendered, not unconditionally, but to the 
Potsdam terms, which contained no mention of Crimes against 
Peace and Humanity. Kiyose referred to Article 5 of the 
Potsdam Declaration: "Following are our terms. We will 
not deviate from them." 
On May 14, the defense continued to challenge the 
Tribunal. U.S. Army Captain George A. Furness, who had 
defended Japanese Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma before 
a war crimes trial in Manila, attacked the vindictive 
composition of the IMTFE. Furness, American counsel for 
Mamoru Shigemitsu, pointed out that the Tribunal contained 
p. 3; and Courtney Browne, Tojo: The· La·st Banzai (N. Y., 
1967), p. 226. 
only victor nations. Since no neutral country justice 
sat on the bench, he questioned the fairness of a court 
composed of "nations who are parties plaintiff, nations 
who are accusers. 119 
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Major Ben Bruce Blakeney, counsel for Yoshijiro Umezu, 
challenged the Tribunal's definition of war crimes. Blakeney, 
an Oklahoman who had been World War II Chief of the Japanese 
Section and POW Interrogation Division of the Air Intelligence 
School, argued that war, however abhorrent, could not of 
itself be considered a criminal offense. In his view the 
concept of war and indeed the "very existence of the entire 
body of international law on the subject of war" implied 
the legal right to use force,and no legal precedents 
existed to charge the defendants with planning, waging or 
initiating a war of aggression. Blakeney claimed that the 
accused must be charged with "crimes or offenses legally 
recognized." Blakeney's address also touched on the Allied 
use of the atomic bomb. Major Blakeney, one of three 
American defense lawyers who spoke Japanese fluently, 
addressed the court's attention to Article 39 of the indict-
ment, charging the defendants with murder at Pearl Harbor. 
Blakeney contended that if the December 7, 1941 killing of 
9For Kiyose motion, see IMTFE, Proceed·ings, pp. 120-190; 
Pacific Stars and· Str·ipes, May 14, 1946, p. l; Nippon Times, 
May 14, 1946, pp. 1, 2; L.A. · Times, May 14, 1946, p. 5, 
and Osaka Mainichi, May 15, 1946, p. 1. Other defense 
motions can be found in RG238, Proceedings ·in Chambers, Box 
No. 77, volume I, pp. 1-9 and Court Papers, Box No. 88, 
item #31. For Furness comments, see IMTFE, Proceedings, 
pp. 196-201. 
Admiral Kidd and four thousand other Americans 
Was murder 
"we know the name of the very man" who dropped the 
atomic 
bomb at Hiroshima and the identity of the chief of 
staff 
who planned it. 
Following Blakeney's remarks, a translation d" ispute 
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I 
erupted. Commenting on the translation and interpr t . 
e ation 
difficulties, Major Moore, the court language arbiter 
I 
stated that a literal translation of Blakeney's comments 
into Japanese would be impossible. The Arbiter reminded 
the Tribunal of the "inherent difficulties" of the Jap 
anese 
language which "speaks in an opposite way" from English. 
Naval Ensign o. P. Horstein, head of the court's Language 
Division, supported Arbiter Moore's position. Horstein 
argued that without a full and complete translation staff, 
"neither of which is available to the Tribunal or the 
defense," it would take several days to translate Blakeney's 
speech. President Webb then redirected Horstein and Moore 
to summarize the statements rather than translate them.lo 
George Yamaoka, a New York city attorney and the only 
Nisei defense attorney, who was American counsel for both 
Okinari Kaya and Shigenori Togo, also challenged the Tribunal's 
. , 
16For Blakeney remarks, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 
201-220; Stars and Stripes, May 15, 1946, p. l; L.A. Times 
May 15, 1946, p. 7; Asahi Shimbun, May 15, 1946, ATIS, 
May 17, 1946, Press Translations and Summaries, Nurnbers 14-26, 
Political Series 773, item #4. Language disputes became 
so routine that Webb established a Language Arbitration 
Board on November 5. See Proceedings, p. 10474 and RG238, 
Court Papers, Box No. 88, item #61. 
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interpretation of war crimes. Yamaoka, whose father 
Otataka Yamaoka had served as a member of the Japanese 
Parliament, attacked the wide scope of the indictment 
which covered the years 1928-1945. Yamaoka reemphasized 
that Crimes against Peace and Humanity were ex post facto 
laws and ridiculed the doctrine of conspiracy. Conspiracy, 
he insisted, was only a misdemeanor under common law and 
nonexistent as a felony in international law. 
Chief Prosecutor Keenan scoffed at the defense 
arguments. Keenan stated that the Tribunal was not making 
any new law but only enforcing "valid, existing and just 
precepts of law." He argued that it would be necessary to 
send a rocket ship to Mars to find neutral justices to sit 
on the Tokyo bench. According to Keenan, the real test 
of the impartiality of the court would be answered by 
history. Addressing Blakeney's earlier remarks on the 
atomic bomb, Keenan stated that "we make no more apology" 
for its use than does a "decent, innocent citizen" who 
employs force "to prevent his life from being taken by an 
outlaw. 1111 
On May 15, the Tribunal continued to hear defense 
motions. Captain Samuel J. Kleiman, American counsel for 
Kiichiro Hiranuma, issued a defense motion requesting the 
prosecution to provide the accused with a "plain, concise" 
indictment as provided by Article 9a of the IMTFE Charter. 
Kleiman, a New York city criminal lawyer, argued that the 
11IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 220A-240. 
indictment was vaguely worded and inexpertly drawn up. 
He pointed out that the indictment should be based not on 
allegations or opinion but on "facts, documents and legal 
evidence." Citing legal precepts dating back to the days 
of the Magna Charta, Kleiman asked the prosecution for a 
"bill of particulars concerning each offense alleged." 
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Two days later, President Webb announced the Tribunal's 
decisions on all defense motions. During a seven minute 
session, Webb rejected all defense motions for "reasons to 
be given later." The court president set aside defense 
petitions regarding Tribunal jurisdiction and types of 
war crimes alleged. He gave no ruling on the motion for 
a bill of particulars. Before adjourning until June 3, 
Webb introduced Judge Radha Binod Pal of India, the tenth 
member of the court. In 1937, Pal, then of the Calcutta 
High Court, had been joint president of the International 
Congress of Competitive Law held at Hague. Webb also 
announced that two of the Japanese defendants were still ill 
and absent from court. Shumei Okawa was suffering from 
paresis. Yosuke Matsuoka was terminally ill with tuberculosis 
and died on June 21. 12 
During the three week recess, the defense section 
filed six more petitions. On May 24, Captain Coleman 
12For Kleiman requests, see IMTFE, Pro·ceed·ings, pp. 307-
313; RG238, court Papers, Box No. 88, No. 54; -and Proceedings 
in Chambers, Box No. 77, "Motion for a Bill of Particulars," 
pp. 37-42,47,59--60. For Tribunal decision on defense motions, 
see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 318--319 and Nippon Times, May 18, 
1946, p. 1. 
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requested a continuance of the case. He catalogued the 
defense handicaps and asked for more time to enable counsel 
"to adequately prepare for trial." Charging tha.t the 
prosecution had six months to prepare its case and 
"hundreds of assistants, investigators and expert personnel" 
to assist it, Coleman asked for more time for newly-
arriving American defense attorneys. He pointed out that 
sixteen American lawyers had just arrived in Tokyo. They 
needed time to become "reasonably conversant" with the 
case, a "monumental" task. 
On June 3, the actual trial began. Following the 
introduction of twelve new American defense attorneys, 
the defense team filed more motions. Floyd J. Mattice, 
American counsel for Iwane Matsui, addressed the Court as 
spokesman for the newly arrived lawyers. Mattice, a former 
special assistapt U.S. Attorney-General, spoke in support 
of the earlier motion for additional time. Mattice argued 
that the offices for the newly-arrived counsel were not 
yet ready. He also noted that defense stenographers and 
secretaries had just been introduced. Captain Coleman 
reminded the Tribunal that five defendants still lacked 
American counsel. Major Blakeney, counsel for Yoshijiro 
Umezu ., filed a motion for specific findings of fact. Upon 
completion of the proceedings, Blakeney asked the court 
"to give not only its reasons for its ju~gment" but to 
state "the exact matters of fact" which led the Tribunal 
to reach its final verdict. Webb dismissed the Blakeney 
request as "almost contemptuous," but he did grant the 
defense a ten day continuance effective after June 4. 13 
On June 4, Chief Prosecutor Keenan delivered a four 
hour opening address. In his fifteen-thousand-word 
statement, Keenan averred that the purpose of the Tokyo 
trial was to "confirm the already recognized rule" that 
individual leaders who plan aggressive warfare are "common 
felons" and deserve only the punishment delivered to all 
"murderers,brigands,pirates and plunderers." Keenan 
alleged that the defendants had conspired with the accused 
at Nuremburg "to dominate the world." He claimed that 
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the Japanese leaders had followed the Nazi pattern in 
waging aggressive war, especially in their "habitual tactics 
of terrorism, ruthlessness and savage brutality." He 
went on to say that prisoner of war atrocities "were the 
planned results" of a national Japanese policy. Keenan, 
"his red cheeks even more flushed than usual," argued that 
the IMTFE Charter created no new law or novel war crimes 
charges and that conspiracy was an offense "well-recognized 
by most civilized nations." Prior to Keenan's address, 
13For defense motions, see RG238, Court Papers, Box 
No. 88, No. 79; Proceedings in Chambers, Box No. 77, volume I, 
May 25, 1946; and Nippon Times, May 30, 1946, p. 1. For a 
list of U.S. defense counsel, see Osaka Mainichi, June 2, 
1946, pp. 1,2 and Appendix C of this thesis. For June 3, 
see IMT.FE, ·Proceed·ings, pp. 325-326, 332-341; L.A. Times, 
June 3, 1946, p. 1; Pacific Stars and Stripes, June 4, 1946, 
pp. 1,2; To'kyo Shimbun, June 4, 1946, ATIS, June 6, 1946, 
Press Translations and Summaries, Numbers 27-43, Reel 14, 
Political Series 842, item #3; and The Oriental Economist, 
June 8, 1946, p. 366. 
Webb had ordered the two ill defendants, Matsuoka and 
Okawa, to be placed in Tokyo Imperial Hospital, but he 
denied defense motions to have their names stricken from 
the indictment. 
On June 5, Mac~rthur announced the name of the 
eleventh court justice. Delfin Jaranilla, member of the 
Philippine Supreme Court and former Philippine Attorney-
General, became the last judge to be formally appointed. 
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On June 11, David F. Smith, counsel for Hirota Koki, 
submitted a motion to the court requesting the disqualifica-
ation of the Philippine jurist. Smith, like Jaranilla, 
a graduate of Georgetown University Law School, stated 
that "personal bias and prejudice" would influence Jaranilla's 
judicial decisions at the trial. While President Webb 
had investigated Japanese atrocities in New Guinea and Papua, 
Jaranilla had witnessed them firsthand. The Philippine 
member had spent World war II in a Japanese POW camp after 
surviving the Bataan "death march." Webb, however, rejected 
Smith's motion to disqualifty Jaranilla. On June 13, 
14 Jaranilla joined his colleagues on the bench. 
14For Keenan address, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 383-
475; RG238, Court Papers, Box No. 89, No. 120; and Asahi 
Shimbun, June 5, 1946, ATIS, June 7, 1946, Reel 14, Political 
Series 849, item #3. For details on Matsuoka and Okawa, 
see Proceedin•gs, pp. 376-378;' Stars and Stripes, June 5, 1946, 
p. 1; and Nippon Times, June 5, 1946, p. 1. In reply to 
Keenan's address, Tojo told the press, through Dr. Kiyose, 
that the Pacific War was a defensive war for Japan. See 
Asahi Shimbun, June 26, 1946, ATSI, June 28, 1946, Press 
Translations and Summaries, No. 44-60, Reel 15, Political 
series 930, item #3. For Jaranilla disqualification motion, 
see RG238, Court ·papers, Box No. 89, No. 141; ·Proceedings 
The glare of Klieg lights and the summer heat soon 
began to make both spectators and trial participants 
visibly uncomfortable. Some of the judges wore dark 
glasses to block out the blinding white lights and Webb 
soon ordered court personnel to dim them. The court 
president remarked that one judge would refuse to sit on 
79 
the bench if the lighting maintained its present intensity. 
The poorly-ventilated courtroom granted no relief from 
the Tokyo summer, and participants fanned themselves in-
cessantly. Black-robed judges sweltered on the bench. Only 
Soviet judge I. M. Zaryanov looked cool in a summer uniform. 
On June 17, Captain Coleman, Lieutenant Valentine 
B. Deale, Norris H. Allen, John w. Guider, Joseph F. Hynes 
and C. Talbot Young resigned. They had already criticized 
the "detached" attitude of Supreme Commander MacArthur and 
the Tribunal's failure to ensure adequate logistical 
support for the defense. In a May 31 memorandum to SCAP, 
the six lawyers had argued that the defense section would 
be of "such a low order of competence, industry and propriety" 
as to "preclude" a fair trial for the accused. MacArthur 
took the position that SCAP was responsible only "to make 
attorneys available." President Webb thought the defense 
situation was not a court responsibility but an American 
concern. Only the U.S. judge John P. Higgins expressed 
in Chambers, Box No. 77, volume I, pp. 20-24; and Nippon 
Times, June 12, 1946, p. 1. For Webb on Tribunal composi-
tion, see IMTFE, Proceedings, p. 491. 
concern over the plight of the defense team. With the 
resignation of Chief of Counsel Coleman, the Tribunal 
ordered the IMTFE General Secretary to abolish IDP. The 
defense section now lacked Tribunal sanction or support. 
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The six resigning lawyers pointed out the immense 
difficulties for Japanese defense attorneys. They argued 
that the Japanese were "thoroughly unacquainted" with Anglo-
American legal procedure, and simply did not understand 
"what it meant to make a real defense for their clients." 
The Japanese idea of the role of a criminal defense counsel 
was "to put flowers gracefully on his client's grave." 
The six A..merican attorneys emphasized that the burden of 
the defense would lie with the American lawyers, most of 
whom had only recently arrived in Tokyo. 15 
Japanese newspapers echoed this concern for the 
courtroom responsibility of the Japanese lawyers. The 
Asahi Shimbun lamented the dismal trial performance of 
Japanese counsel. The Tokyo Shimbun remarked that Japanese 
15For heat and lights, see IMTFE, Proceedings, p. 1087; 
Christian Science Monitor (Boston), June 4, 1946, p. l; 
Osaka Mainichi, June 15, 1946, p. l; and Mainichi Shimbun, 
June 24, 1946, ATIS, June 25, 1946, Reel 15, Political 
Series 918, item #3. For more examples of Court complaints 
about heat and Klieg lights, see Proceedings, pp. 1172, 
1184, 1185, 1288, 2262-2263, 2287, 2365. For defense 
resignations, see Valentine B. Deale, letter to the N.-Y. Times, 
December 19, 1948, p. 8E; Valentine B. Deale, interview at 
his office, Washington, D.C., February 5, 1979; Beverly M. 
Coleman, interview at the Metropolitan Club, Washington, 
D.C., April 22, 1979; Beverly M. Coleman, telephone conversa-
tion, July 31, 1979;· Stars and Stripes, June 18, 1946, p. l; 
Nippon Times, June 18, 1946, p. 1, and" Solis Horowitz, "The 
Tokyo Trial," p. 526. 
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attorneys presented a "poor showing" in comparison to the 
prosecution. Tokyo Jiji pointed out that the shrewd 
, legal 
cross-examination techniques and tactics of American 
defense lawyers were "still foreign to Japanese counsel." 
The Tokyo Shirnbun noted that Japanese attorneys "lacked 
dignity" and made "irrelevant speeches. 1116 
Verbal clashes punctuated the Tuesday, June 18 
proceedings. President Webb chided the defense for its 
"wholly useless" cross-examination. The Australian justice 
reminded Lieutenant Colonel Franklin Warren, counsel for 
Kenji Dohihara, that the Court was not bound by the strict 
rules of evidence. He remarked that the court must rely 
on its "own sound judgment." Webb reminded Captain Samuel 
J. Kleiman, counsel for Kiichiro Hiranuma, that if the 
defense insisted on having "every 'i' dotted and every 't' 
crossed in this case," the trial would never end. 
During the Tuesday session, Australian Associate 
Prosecutor Alan James Mansfield requested the right to 
substitute signed affidavits for the direct testimony 
and cross-examination of witnesses. Mansfield argued 
that the actual courtroom examination of prosecution witnesses 
16Asahi Shimbun, May 15, 1946, ATIS, May 17, 1946, 
Press Translations and summaries, No. 14-26, Reel 13, 
Political Series 769, item #3; Tokyo Shimbun, June 4, 1946, 
ATIS, June 6, 1946, No. 27-43, Reel 14, Political Series 
847, item #2; Tokyo Jiji, June 20, 1946, ATIS, June 24, 
1946, No. 44-60, Reel 15, Political Series 907, item #2; 
and Tokyo Shimbun, July B, 1946, ATIS, _July 11, 1946, No. 
61-74, Reel 16, Political Series 980, item #2. 
-
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would be extremely protracted, possibly lasting until 1948. 
He estimated that it would require three hundred sixty 
more court sessions just to hear the courtroom testimony 
of all the prosecution witnesses. Court President Webb 
approved Mansfield's request but noted that the Tribunal 
was granting a "big concession here,perhaps not without 
grave misgivings." Webb pointed out that the prosecution 
deponents in most cases gave evidence in response to leading 
questions. 
The defense attorneys bitterly protested this 
decision. Captain Alfred W. Brooks, counsel for Kuniaki 
Koiso, reminded the Tribunal of the fundamental right to 
be confronted by one's accused. Brooks referred to the 
important courtroom observations of the witness. He 
cited the "elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness's 
deportment while testifying." Dr. Kiyose declared there 
would be a great gap between the testimony of a witness 
17 in court and on paper. 
On June 18, Chief Prosecutor Keenan held a press 
conference in Washington, D.C. Keenan announced that it 
would be a "distinct mistake" to indict Emperor Hirohito 
for World war II war crimes. Hirohito, he said, was just 
a "figurehead and a fraud" perpetrated on the Japanese 
people, and the imp(.rial institution had been "used as an 
17 
· . h d f rt d . . For Tribunal clashes wit e ense and cou a mission 
of affidavits, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 858, 884, 916-917, 
922-923, 925-928, 935~ .987, 1320-1322, 1400-1401, 1846-1853, 
4451-4455, 4549; Stars and Stripes, June 19, 1946, p. l; 
and Nippon Times, June 19, 1946, p. 1 and June 20, p. 1. 
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instrument of the warlords." Remarking on the "wrangle" 
among the American defense section, Keenan stated that the 
six resignations, which included the chief of counsel for 
defense, would not delay the case. He claimed that there 
was "not the slightest trace of friction" among the 
prosecuting nations and concluded that the trial would be 
over in three months. 
On June 20, President Webb permitted the prosecution 
to translate only excerpts, rather than entire documents 
to be admitted as evidence. Previously, the Tribunal 
had required that all publications tendered as prosecution 
evidence would be translated in their entirety and made 
available to the defense. The chief judge ruled that the 
defense must translate the parts which they intended to 
question. Prosecution attorney Valentine C. Hammack 
complained to the court that the translation situation 
was "impossible • ., Hammack, a former special assistant to 
the U.S. attorney-general, alleged that the problem was 
so serious that the prosecution could not translate "half 
the documents that we need." He stated that it was 
physically impossible for IPS to continue to translate 
entire documents for the defense as well. 
William Logan, Jr., counsel for Koichi Kido, vigorously 
protested Webb's ruling. Logan pointed out that to expect 
the defense to translate the entire document on its own 
would be unfair. Logan stated that the defense had almost 
twenty translators while the prosecution had over two hundred. 
He stressed that the defense lacked money with which to 
obtain additional translators. The court president turned 
a deaf ear to Logan's pleas. Prior to adjournment, the 
court clerk, in a reserved and official tone, announced 
that boxer Joe Louis had just defeated Billy Conn in the 
eighth round. 18 
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On June 28, prosecution attorney Navy Commander Bentley 
M. McMullin resigned. McMullin charged that prosecution 
of the Japanese war crimes suspects had succumbed to "mal-
administration, neglect and inefficiency." He alleged 
that Keenan and his principal aides had selected IPS 
personnel "on the run." He characterized prosecution 
efforts as a "series of spasmodic and frenzied efforts, 
first in one direction and then another." Keenan countered 
that McMullin had resigned because he had failed to receive 
a promotion. 
By the end of June, the Tokyo War crimes Trial, 
according to the Pacific Stars and Stripes, had slipped to 
a "second rate show." Japanese spectator interest waned 
as the slow pace of the boring proceedings failed to sustain 
their attention. Legal wranglings, technical disputes and 
18 · J 1 For Keenan press conference, see N.Y. Times, une 8, 
1946, pp. 1, 13; L.A. Times, June 18, 1946, p. 7; Stars and 
Stripes, June 19, 1946, p. 1; and Nippon Times, June 19, 
1946, pp. 1, 2. For admission of excerpts ana defense 
translation problems, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 1066-1072, 
2730, 2732, 2734; stars and Stripes, June 21, 1946, p. l; 
and Nippon Times, June 24, 1946, p. 1. As of December 30, 
1946, IPS had 150 translators to the defense's 50. See 
Proceedings, pp. 13886, 13888-13889. 
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the "monotonous introduction of unrevealing documents and 
affidavits" dominated the trial. Fifty percent of the 
Tribunal's time was spent haggling over rules of procedure. 
The Japanese press criticized the dullness of the proceedings. 
Few of the defendants showed enough courage "to stir up a 
good hate." Chief Prosecutor Keenan told the press that 
the Japanese people were "apathetic" towards the trial but 
had not shown any resentment. When a Tokyo Newsweek 
correspondent showed a picture of each trial defendant 
to twenty-two Japanese selected at random, most could 
identify only two of the accused. 19 
On July 3, three of the defendants, Kingore Hashimoto, 
Okinari Kaya and Hideki Tojo, still had no American lawyers. 
Three American attorneys each represented two defendants. 
For this reason, President Webb asked the defense team 
whether it desired additional American lawyers, and offered 
19 
· · t. . f. d For McMullin resigna ion, see Paci ic Stars an 
Stripes, June 29, 1946, p. 1. For Japanese interest in 
the trial, see London Times, April 30, 1946, p. 3; Nihon 
Keizai, May 4, 1946, ATIS, Press Translations and Summaries, 
No. 14-26, Reel 13, Editorial Ser ies 888, item #2, Mimpo, 
June 14, 1946, ATIS, No. 44-60, Reel 15, Political Series 
884, item #1; Osaka Mainichi, June 17, 1946, p. 2; Stars 
and Stripes, June 30, 1946, p. l; Newsweek, July 1, 1946, 
p. 38, Robert J. c. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War 
(Princeton, 1961), pp. 491-492; and Fred T. Rogers, "The 
Tokyo Trial of Hirota Koki" (M.A. Thesis, Stanford University, 
June 1953), pp. 114-115. For the 50% figure, see Lawrence 
W. Wadsworth, Jr., "A Short History of the Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial with Special Reference to Some Aspects of Procedures" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1955), p. 139. 
to inform MacArthur of the need. Several defense lawyers 
asked Webb to provide the full complement of thirty-one 
American defense attorneys. The Tribunal president agreed 
to forward a copy of the day's proceedings to SCAP. 
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On July 11, President Webb sent Supreme Commander 
MacArthur a letter requesting additional money for Japanese 
defense lawyers. Webb informed SCAP of the "miserable 
plight" of Japanese attorneys who received "no payment for 
their services. 11 On July 19, MacArthur promised more 
financial assistance. The Japanese government, he wrote, 
would underwrite some of the defense counsel's court 
expenses. Each principal Japanese counsel would receive 
eighteen hundred yen per month, while assistants would 
receive fifteen hundred yen per month. Defense counsel 
would also be given one hundred yen per day for travel 
and meal expenses if they resided outside of Tokyo. 20 
Trial rules of evidence and procedure continued to 
hamper the defen:se case. The IMTFE Charter permitted the 
court to receive any evidence that it considered to have 
"probative value." In addition to allowing prosecution 
evidence by deposition and excerpt, the Tribunal permitted 
leading questions, hearsay evidence and the testimony of 
2
°For July 3, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 1838-1841; 
Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, 
World War II (SCAP) Record Group 331, Box 411, File 000.5-2, 
June 30 letter of Colonel John B. Cooley to sir William, 
Washington National Record Center, Suitland, Maryland; 
and Osaka Mainichi, July 4, 1946, p. 1 For July 11, see 
RG331, SCAP, Box 411, File 000.s-2, July 19 letter of SCAP 
to Webb. 
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dead individuals. President Webb frequently reminded 
defense counsel that the court was not bound by the rules 
of evidence. Dr. Kiyose angrily complained that the court 
rules were consistently interpreted in favor of the prosecu-
tion. 
On July 12, the U.S. court member John P. Higgins 
resigned from the bench. Ostensibly, Higgins resigned 
because of an urgent need to return to his Massachusetts 
judicial duties. Chief Prosecutor Keenan had opposed the 
appointment of Higgins from the start. Keenan preferred 
other U.S. candidates and considered Higgins an inferior 
judge. Justice Higgins had learned of Keenan's adverse 
opinion only after he accepted the appointment to the Tokyo 
bench. Higgins, however, remained a gentleman and waited 
for the appropriate excuse to withdraw; the death of a 
Massachusetts judge and resulting state vacancy provided 
21 just such a pretext. 
During mid-July, SCAP installed air-conditioning 
equipment in the Tokyo courtroom. On July 10, Webb had 
21For questionable types of evidence, see IMTFE, 
Proceedings, pp. 1849-1850, 1854, 2002, 2018, 2032-2033, 
2324, 5685, 6441-6443, 11009 and Stars and stripes, July 4, 
1946, p. 1. For Higgins resignation, see IMTFE, Proceedings, 
p. 2286; N.Y. Times, June 21, 1946, p. 11; Stars and Stripes, 
June 23, 1946, p. l; N.Y. Times, June 26, 1946, p. 12, 
Osaka Mainichi, July 16, 1946, p. l; Robert M. Donihi letter 
to John Pritchard, November 16, 1977, copy given to author; 
Robert M. Donihi, interview at Andrew's Air Force Base, 
Camp Springs, Maryland, October 14, 1978. oonihi was a 
prosecutor at both Nuremburg and Tokyo. Keenan preferred 
Dean Ezra Pound of Harvard, Judge Tom Alred of Texas or 
Judge Gibson of California. 
adjourned the proceedings because of the excessive court-
room heat. The court resumed briefly on July 15 to reveal 
the resignation of Justice Higgins. Forty minutes later 
the Tribunal adjourned again when the air-conditioning 
equipment failed to operate. 
The proceedings resumed on the twenty-second with 
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an American replacement for Judge John Higgins. Major 
General Myron c. Cramer became the new U.S. representative. 
Cramer had formerly served as U.S. Army judge advocate 
general. Owen Cunningham, counsel for Hiroshi Oshima, 
challenged the eligibility of Justice Cramer. Cunningham, 
former president of the Des Moines College of Law, contended 
that there was no provision in the IMTFE Charter for an 
additional appointment. He pointed out that Myron C. 
Cramer's military position and rank was incompatible with 
an impartial hearing for Japanese accused of war crimes. The 
counsel for the former Japanese ambassador to Nazi Germany 
stressed that the new jurist had been absent when a 
"substantial part of the valid testimony was given." 
Cunningham moved that the Court declare a mistrial and 
appoint a new Tribunal. After withdrawing for one hour 
to consider Cunningham's motion, the Court upheld the 
22 
appointment of Judge Cramer. 
22 For air-conditioning mishap, see IMTFE, Proceedings, 
pp. 2262-2263, 2267, 2294 and Osaka Mainichi, July 11, 1946, 
p. 1, July 16, p. 1, and July 19, p. I. For Cramer seating, 
see Proceedings, pp. 2342-2346, 2351-2352, 2361; RG238, Court 
Papers, Box No. 90, Numbers 302, 304; Osaka Mainichi, July 24, 
1946, p. 1; and U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Papers, 
On July 30, President Webb clarified the Tribunal 
ruling on the probative value of evidence. The defense 
team had objected to the introduction of a prosecution 
document on the grounds that it had no probative value 
because the date of the document was uncertain. In over-
ruling the objections, the chief judge declared that the 
question of whether any evidence had probative value would 
be ultimately decided by the Tribunal "when we come to 
review the whole of the evidence." 
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As the trial progressed, Tribunal clashes with defense 
counsel became more frequent. In June, for example, Webb 
had objected to the defense counsel's "prolixity in stating 
objections." Later, on July 9, Major George Furness, 
counsel for Mamoru Shigemitsu, protested Webb's inter-
pretation of aggressive warfare. The court president 
reproached Furness for being "very impertinent." He 
warned Furness that "we will deal with you if necessary." 
On July 15, Lawrence J. McManus, counsel for Sadao Araki, 
disapproved of the prosecution's use of the term "massacre 
at Naha." McManus, formerly of the Justice Department's 
Criminal Division, stated that no massacre had yet been 
proved. Webb chided McManus for being "unduly sensitive," 
and also rebuked Captain Alfred W. Brooks, counsel for 
Koichi Kido, for "simply wasting time" with his objections. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, volume 
VIII (Washington, D.c., 1971), pp. 440-441, 442-444. 
an appointment, Cramer replacing Higgins, would have 
in a mistrial in the United States. 
Such 
resulted 
Webb told Brooks that his attitude was so "utterly 
unreasonable that it is difficult to control in the 
ordinary way." Abuse became so regular that several 
d f . d 23 e ense attorneys resigne. 
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23 For Webb on value of evidence, see IMTFE, Proceedings, 
p. 2700. For clashes with counsel, see Proceedings, pp. 
1401, 2155, 2289-2290, 2512. For the resignation of counsel 
due to abuse, see John Alan Appleman, Military Tribunals 
and International Crimes (Indianapolis, 1954), p. 244. 
For 1946 Webb clashes with defense, see Proceedings, pp. 
3414, 3509, 3688, 3700, 3895, 3913, 3914, 4044, 4219, 
4473-4474, 4480-4490, 4495, 4590-4592, 4608, 7822-7825, 
7835-7837, 7936, 8693, 11081-11084, 12345-12348. For 1947 
examples, see pp. 17548, 18062-18063, 18408-18409, 19927-
19929, 20480-20484, 21326, 22508-22509, 25419. For 1948 
examples, see pp. 37367-37369, 38480, 38730, 39937-38939, 
43459-43463, 43471. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST: 
THE CASE FOR THE DEFENSE 
We are not bound by the rules of evidence, by any 
rules of procedure, but we do get the best evidence 
that we can in all circumstances. 
-Justice William Flood Webb, September 1947. 
In January 1947 the prosecution completed its case. 
On January 3, the Japanese defense counsel, foreseeing the 
conclusion of prosecution evidence, broadcast a radio 
appeal. Citing a "lack of funds, communications, lodging 
and food," the Japanese attorneys requested help from their 
government and people. The radio plea, which was also 
printed in one Tokyo newspaper, referred to the small 
defense staff that was causing "the greatest difficulties." 
Dr. Somei Uzawa, seventy-six year old chief of Japanese 
counsel, stated that Japanese lawyers needed aid in order 
to prove that circumstances forced Japan to go to war. 
On January 5, another trial defendant died. Sixty-seven 
year old Admiral Osami Nagano, former Commander-in-Chief 
of the Japanese Combined Fleet, succumbed to pneumonia at 
American Field Hospital Number 361. 1 
1 For radio request, see U.S. Army 
Stripes (Tokyo), January 4, 1947, p. 1. 
issued the appeal without the knowledge 
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Pacific Stars and 
The Japanese attorneys 
of American defense 
On January 24, 1947, the International Prosecution 
Section (IPS) finished presenting its evidence. Prosecu-
tion evidence stressed that the defendants had illegally 
seized control of the Japanese government to further their 
plans or conspiracy to wage wars of aggression against 
various Allied countries. The IPS alleged the accused 
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had not only violated existing international law but also 
customary or nonstatutory law which had long ago declared 
the criminality of aggressive war. The prosecution, for 
example, pointed out that the 1928 Pact of Paris banned 
aggressive warfare as illegal. IPS evidence catalogued 
the numerous treaties and international agreements Japan 
had violated. Evidence of atrocities formed a large part 
of the prosecution case. IPS alleged that the large number 
of crimes proved a common plan to mistreat and abuse Allied 
prisoners of war and civilian internees. A parade of 
prosecution eyewitnesses graphically recounted devious and 
despicable Japanese atrocities. 2 
counsel. For Nagano's death, see International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Pro-
ceedings (Tokyo: The Tribunal, 3 May 1946-16 April 1948), 
p. 14304; Modern Military Branch, World War II War Crimes 
(IMTFE), Record Group 238, Court Papers, Box No. 93, item 
#634, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; and Stars and 
Stripes, January 7, 1947, p. 1 and January 8, p. 1. 
2For a summary of IPS evidence and case in chief, see 
IMTFE Proceedings, pp. 383-475, 38948-42076; Solis Horowitz, 
"The Tokyo Trial," International Conciliation 465 (November 
1950): 503-525; and Joseph B. Keenan and Brendan F. Brown, 
Crimes Against International Law (Washington, D.C., 1950). 
... 
On January 27, the defense section opened its case. 
°While 
Prosecution attorneys had taken 160 trial days to 
subznit 
testimony, the defense required 190 court days to 
tender 
its evidence. The defense team divided its case 
into Si . . 
x divisions: General Problems, Manchuria and Man-
Chuku 
o, China, The Soviet Union, The Pacific War, and 
rndivid 
Ual Cases. The defense section began its case by 
filin 
g a series of motions. The first defense petition 
dealt With 
the jurisdiction of Supreme Commander Douglas 
~c.Arthur. 
David F. Smith, counsel for Hirota Koki, Unsu 
ccessfu11y 
motion. 
Court 
to b 
attempted to introduce the MacArthur 
President Webb refused to permit the document 
e entered as evidence or even copied into the trial 
record. 
. Be decreed that it was "not necessary in the 
.J.nterests 
of justice" to 
diszn· 
challenge the authority of SCAP, 
and 
issed the motion as "political harangue." 
On January 27 and 28, the defense introduced individual 
motions 
to dismiss the indictment charges. Lawrence McManus, 
for Sadao Araki, introduced the first individual 
Inotion. McManus, former attorney for the Anti-Trust 
and . 
Criznina1 . Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Challen 
ged the theory of conspiracy. He stated that the 
Prosecut· 
ion had failed to actually establish proof of any 
consp· 
iracy b' t Q ' ana pointed out that fifteen different ca ine s 
aa ruled 
Japan from 1928-1945. McManus argued that those fr 
equent 
Op.Posed 
to a . 1 common plan or conspiracy to usurp nationa 
cabinet changes proved a lack of consensus, as 
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power. He also noted that the Allies had declared Crimes 
Against Peace and Humanity after the cessation of hostilities. 
McManus stressed that those two war crimes "were not in 
existence at the time of their alleged commission. 113 
On January 29, David Smith read the defense motion 
on behalf of all the accused to dismiss the charges in the 
IPS Indictment. The General Motion to Dismiss contended 
that prosecution evidence had failed to offer "even a 
scintilla of proof" that any of the defendants had engaged 
a conspiracy to plan, wage or initiate aggressive war. 
The petition stated that the April 1946 Tribunal Charter 
embodied ex post facto legislation. Smith pointed out that 
retroactive legislation was contrary to the practice of all 
civilized nations "since time immemorial." He argued that 
individual government officials could not be held criminally 
liable for acts of the Japanese State. Finally, he empha-
sized that the indictment was so vaguely worded "as to 
amount to a mere dragnet and snare." 
On February 3, President Webb a nnounced the Tribunal 
decision. After "due and mature consideration," the Tokyo 
Court rejected all defense motions to dismiss because said 
petitions were not "well-founded. 11 The Tribunal, however, 
3 For court statistics, see Osaka Mainichi, January 26, 
1947, p. 1. For Smith and McManus motions, see IMTFE, 
Proceedings, pp. 16262-16272, 16275, 16300; Pacific Stars 
and Stripes, January 28, 1947, p. l; and Osaka Mainichi, 
January 28, 1947, p. 1. For 25 individual motions to 
dismiss, see Record Group 238, Court Papers, Box No. 93, 
Numbers 651, 655, 661, 664, 668-671, 673, 675, 678-679, 683-
698, 701, 703. 
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granted the defense a three week recess to further prepare 
its case. The defense also received additional logistical 
support. IPS agreed to share some of its document processing 
facilities with the defense. 4 
Throughout the proceedings, Webb had taken exception 
to the trial coverage by two Tokyo newspapers. The Nippon 
Times on June 24, 1946 had questioned the court president's 
attitude towards the defense counsel, and had cited the 
Australian justice's "asperity." The U.S. Army Pacific 
Stars and Stripes had also aggravated the tribunal president. 
Webb charged that the trial coverage by the U.S. Army paper 
had belittled the tribunal in Japanese eyes, and he accused 
it of ''gross misrepresentations," "lying misrepresentations," 
"serious inaccuracies," and "gross contempt of this court. 11 
Finally, in February 1947, Webb summoned Arthur Brackman of 
the United Press and editor Captain Taylor of the Stars and 
Stripes before the bench to explain the paper's conduct. 
Webb ultimately appealed to MacArthur for protection from 
that "wretched publication." After March 24, the court 
president stopped issuing a daily complimentary copy of 
the Tribunal proceedings to the press. 5 
4 . . d. For General Motion to Dismiss, see IMTFE, Procee ings, 
pp. 16662-16712, 16997-16998; RG238, Court Papers, Box No. 
94, Number 700, and Osaka Mainichi, February 4, 1947, p. 1. 
The defense had originally requested a thirty-day recess on 
December 30, 1946. See Proceedings, pp. 13878-13893. For 
February 3, 1947, IPS sharing agreement, see RG238, Proceedings 
in Chambers, Box No. 78, volume IV, February 3, 1947, pp. 4-9. 
5For Webb on Nippon Times, see IMTFE, Proceedings, PP· 
1287-1288, 2365, 8773, 40707. For his remarks on Stars and 
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On February 24, the defense presented its opening 
statement. Dr. Ichiro Kiyose, Tojo's counsel and deputy 
chief of the defense, delivered part one of the opening 
address. Kiyose argued that some Allied countries had 
violated international law during the war. He mentioned 
that Russia had attacked Finland in 1939 without a formal 
declaration of hostilities, and claimed that the August 1945 
Soviet invasion of Manchuria was "clearly in violation" of 
the 1941 Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Dr. Kiyose 
reiterated the defense contention that the tenet of con-
spiracy had no basis in international law. He asserted 
that the doctrine of conspiracy existed only in Anglo-
American jurisprudence. Kiyose further declared that war 
was an act of countries, not of individuals. He averred 
that international law "imparts no responsibility to 
individuals in official positions for the act of the state." 
Kiyose added that even the United Nations," the latest 
pronouncement of international law," made no mention of 
such a doctrine. He went on to stress the wartime differences 
between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Challenging the 
prosecution contention that Japanese atrocities were 
similar to those committed by Germany, he claimed there 
Stripes, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 10579-10580, 1700-17003, 
20573-20574, 21282, 21933, 25392; RG238, Court Papers, Box 
No. 93, Number 704; San Francisco Chronicle, February 24, 
1947, p. 4; Pacific Stars and Stripes, February 24, 1947, 
p. l; Osaka Mainichi, February 25, 1947, pp. 1, 2; Stars 
and Stripes, March 25, 1947, p. 4; and New York Times, 
May 14, 1947, p. 20. 
existed "no taint of racial superiority" • in Japan as in 
Germany. There existed no Hitler, Nazi organization, or 
master race plan in Japan. 
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Dr. Kiyose claimed that Japan fought a war of self-
defense. He catalogued prewar U.S. economic pressure on 
Japan, such as the July 1939 American abrogation of the 1911 
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the July 1940 American 
embargo on scrap iron, and the August embargo on aviation 
gasoline. He also mentioned the U.S. economic assistance 
to Chiang Kai-shek from 1937-1941, and referred to the 
American volunteer P-40 fighter pilots who fought in China 
against the Japanese before the official outbreak of World 
War II. Kiyose argued that even the prosecution evidence 
admitted that the United States had aided China "to a degree 
unprecedented between nonbelligerent powers." 
The defense section scheduled Professor Kenzo Takayanagi, 
counsel for Teiichi Suzuki, to deliver part two of its 
opening statement. President Webb refused, however, to 
permit the Tokyo University Professor of English Law to 
read his thirty-five page address. Webb conceded its 
possible value,but argued that it was not the proper time 
to deliver the speech and that there was no provision in 
the charter for an additional opening oration. 6 
6For Kiyose speech, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 17012-
17028, 17032-17103. For Takayanagi incident, see pp. 17108-
17111, 17114-17115 and Osaka Mainichi, February 26, 1947, 
p. 1. For text of Takayanagi address, see International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East, Re~ected Defense Documents, 
1946-1948, (six reels), Law Library, Library of Congress 
Decisions on the admission of evidence depended upon 
the daily composition of the Tribunal. A majority vote of 
all judges present determined the court's decision with 
six members constituting a quorum. The president's vote 
settled ties. Tribunal absenteeism increased markedly 
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as the trial dragged on. Several judges were absent for 
months at a time. Understandably, the defense protested 
their long absences. Defense lawvers arqued that Tribunal 
findinqs, favorable or unfavorable to the defense, rested 
entirely upon who was present on a given day. Even President 
Webb admitted to Major Ben Bruce Blakeney that " ... I would 
be deceiving you if I said decisions did not turn on how 
the Court was constituted from time to time." The Tokyo 
charter, unlike the Nuremburg one, failed to provide for 
alternate justices. 
Throughout the trial the defense team contended that 
the court rejected too much of its evidence while allowing 
liberal admission of prosecution testimony. On March 3, 
Major Blakeney, counsel for both Shigenori Togo and Yoshij iro 
Umezu, tried to introduce documentary evidence that Japan 
was not the only country to violate international treaties. 
Referring primarily to the United States and the Soviet 
Union, Blakeney attempted to show that five victorious 
Allied countries had also committed breaches of international 
law. He cited the 1939-1941 Russian domination of Finland, 
(Washington, D.C.), reel 3, defense document #514. 
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Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Rumania, and alleged 
that American lend-lease to Britain, especially the September 
1940 fifty World War I destroyer deal, clearly violated 
neutrality under international law. He also pointed out the 
American negotiations with Denmark in 1939-1941 over control 
of Greenland and Iceland. Webb ruled Blakeney's evidence 
inadmissible. The court president considered the documentary 
data "cumulative and irrelevant issues.'' He then refused 
Blakeney's submission of the United Nations Charter as defense 
evidence. On March 4, Webb rejected a Nippon Times newspaper 
article which discussed the military decision to use the atomic 
bomb. He also excluded a defense document discussing the 
effects of the atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as 
well as excerpts from the diary of Joseph C. Grew, the American 
ambassador to Japan during the 1930s. Webb argued that Grew 
could testify in person. Major Blakeney pointed out, to no 
avail, that the defense was unable to bring the former acting 
secretary of state to Tokyo to testify. Six months later, 
the Tribunal disallowed Grew's affidavit in defense of Koki 
and Shigemitsu for the defense. The court president 
also discounted the defense's evidence relating to 
the American "flying Tigers" fighting squadron, the 1941 
7 Atlantic Charter, and the 1945 Yalta Agreement. 
7For Tribunal absenteeism, see Appendix F of this 
thesis. For Webb's comment on bench composition, see RG238, 
Proceedings in Chambers, Box No. 78, volume V, June 29, 1947, 
p. 25. Also see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 24816-24817, 25190-
25191. For Blakeney evidence and Webb rejection, see 
Proceedings, pp. 17606-17616, 17662, 17682 and Osaka Mainichi, 
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On March 5, President Webb expelled an American lawyer 
from the trial. David Smith, counsel for Hirota Koki, 
protested the "undue interference of the Tribunal" with the 
"ordinary examination of the witnesses." Webb demanded 
that Smith use "respectful terms" and withdraw "that offen-
sive expression." When Smith declined to rescind the 
remark, the chief judge called an adjournment. Upon 
resumption, Webb announced that Smith was excluded from 
the trial until he withdrew his comment and tendered a 
full apology. Meanwhile, said Webb, Hirota Koki would still 
be "ably defended" by his Japanese attorneys. 
The defense lawyers continued to protest the repeated 
rejections of substantial portions of their evidence. 
Dr. Somei Uzawa, head of the Japanese defense counsel, 
contended that the Court placed more restrictions on them 
than on the prosecution. He pointed out that while the 
Tribunal permitted the prosecution to enter Allied wartime 
press releases as evidence, it refused to allow the defense 
to introduce Japanese wartime press releases into evidence. 
William Logan, Jr., American counsel for Koichi Kido, stated 
that the defense section was very alarmed by these adverse 
March 4, 1947, p. 1, March 5, p. 1. For rejected defense 
evidence, see IMTFE, Rejected Defense Documents, Reel 1, 
documents #184, 475-B, 1500-I-3, 1500 B-5; Reel 2, documents 
#2790-B, 2790-D; Reel 3, document #1624; Osaka Mainichi, 
May 30, 1947, p. 1 and November 7, 1947, p. 2. For Grew 
affidavit, see Rejected oe·fense Documents, Reel 6, document 
#2467; London Times, September 26, 1947, p. 3; Pacific 
Stars and Stripes, September 26, 1947, p. 2; and Osaka 
Mainichi, October 1, 1947, p. 2. 
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rulings. Logan claimed that Webb permitted IPS to file 
"their own synopsis of what they considered was evidence." 
President Webb answered that it was a "matter of sheer 
indifference to me what attitude you take or anybody takes," 
and that the Tribunal would not be "intimidated 11 by any 
defense counse1. 8 
On March 20, the defense section requested its third 
court recess. During this private session in judges' 
chambers, Major Blakeney asked for a week to organize the 
defense case. He cited an "imminent breakdown" in the 
case because of a lack of translators and clerical help. 
During the public proceedings on March 24, Blakeney made 
a formal application for a recess. Webb agreed and granted 
a one week adjournment. The tribunal president, however, 
attached one condition to the recess: all future defense 
witnesses would testify by affidavit rather than by direct 
courtroom examination. He cited the protracted defense 
proceedings which consumed 25 percent more time than the 
prosecution did in presenting its case and noted that 
"much time was being wasted" by "discursive" Japanese 
witnesses. 
On March 25, the defense challenged this unfair 
8For Smith vs. Webb, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 17774-
17782; Pacific Stars and Stripes, March 6, 1947, p. l; and 
Osaka Mainichi, March 7, 1947, p. 1. For admission of Allied 
press releases, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 9438, 9463-
9464, 9476, 9556, 9667, 10,047. For rejection of Japanese 
press releases, see pp. 20508, 20511, 20549, 20606, 20608, 
20801, 20807, 20809, 20815, 20825. For Logan vs. Webb, 
see pp. 18407-18410 and Osaka Mainichi, March 16, 1947, p. 2. 
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ruling. Lieutenant Colonel Franklin E. N. Warren, counsel 
for both Kenj i Dohihara and Takasurni Oka, stated that the 
ruling would overburden "our already overtaxed language 
section." Warren claimed that the decision would prejudice 
the right of the defendants to a just and unbiased trial. 
Webb answered that the use of affidavits would give an 
advantage to the accused, and stood by his ruling. 9 
During the week recess, a Japanese physician submitted 
an unusual plea to Dr. Kiyose. Dr. Shichiro Ishikawa, 
a Keio University brain surgeon, made a written application 
to Hideki Tojo for permission to conduct an autopsy on 
the ex-premier's brain. He wanted Tojo to grant this 
request "as a last service to Japanese medical science." 
Kiyose, however, rejected Ishikawa's overtures. 
Tojo became the butt of many American jokes. While 
at Sugamo Prison, the former premier underwent dental 
surgery and two U.S. Navy dentists fitted him with special 
bridgework. The American dentists carved a miniature 
"Remember Pearl Harbor" on the head of Tojo's bridgework. 
Tokyo courtroom guard Private William Smith, a bored nine-
teen year old from Eureka Springs, Arkansas, plugged the 
9For Blakeney recess request, see RG238, Proceedings 
in Chambers, Box No. 78, volume IV, March 20, 1947, pp. 
21-25 and IMTFE, Proceedin1s, pp. 18956-18958. For Webb comment and affidavit cond tion, see Osaka Mainichi, March 25, 
1947, p. 2 and IMTFE, Proc·e·ed'ings, pp. 19045-19046. For 
Warren protest and Webb remark, see Proceedings, pp. 19091-
19093 and Osaka Mainichi, March 27, 1947, p. 2. 
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former 
war minister's earphones with used chewing gum. 
The strange 
vernacular of Tojo's American guards baffled 
him. 
Tojo Was surprised to learn that "hubba, hubba" 
meant 
not "Remember Pearl Harbor" but "hurry up." 
On April 9, Webb announced a decision on Shumei Okawa. 
'l'he J 
apanese defendant had been under medical observation 
since th 
e May 1946 Tojo head-slapping incident. The chief 
judg 
e revealed that the Allied case against the 
forme 
r Propaqandist would be dropped because 
expert medical advice indicated that Dr. Okawa, suffering 
from 
Paresis, lacked the proper intellectual judgment to 
stand tria1_10 
Tribunal clashes with defense counsel continued. The 
court 
President labeled many defense objections as "enemy 
Prop 
aganaa." on April 15, Webb accused Captain Alfred W. 
Brook 
s, counsel for both Kuniaki Koiso and Jiro Minami, of 
Usin 9 the Tokyo Tribunal for "propaganda purposes." Brooks 
assu 
red the · i court that he was only trying to guarantee J ro 
kinam· 1 
a fair trial. The Kansas City lawyer and war veteran 
asJcea 
the chief judge for an explanation of that propaganda 
lo 
1947 For Ishikawa request, see Osaka Mainichi, March 28, 
Dec~ p • l. For bridgework, see Pacific Stars and Striaes , . 
lli._in~:r 28, 1947, p. 7. For chewing gum, see Stars an 
''hu~' April 4, 1948, p. land April 10, p. 4. For 
the wa, hubba," see Robert J. c. Butow, Tojo and Coming of ~ (Stanford, 1969), p. 475. For Okawa decision, see 
~U9ust R_roceedin2s, pp. 19637-19638, 19681; Osaka Mainichi, 
~ipp~25, 1946, p. 2, April 10, 1947, p. l; and St ars and 
~, April 10, 1947, p. 1. 
' . 
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charge. Webb told Brooks his attitude "was preventing a 
fair trial." The Australian jurist reminded the defense 
team that the Tribunal would not be "browbeaten by American 
counsel." On April 22, the court president told American 
defense attorneys not to iridulge in "enemy propaganda." 
During an acrimonious debate, Webb rebuked U.S. Marine 
lieutenant Aristides G. Lazarus for attacking Britain, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union. He contended that 
Lazarus, the counsel for Shunroku Hata, took "sheer delight 
in insulting Allied countries." Lazarus had attempted to 
introduce defense evidence of Russian violation of inter-
national treaties and the spread of world Communism. He 
cited the soviet-Finnish war, the partition of Poland in 
conjunction with Hitler and the "disappearance" of Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia. Lazarus also tried to enter President 
Harry S. Truman's March 1947 congressional remarks on the 
worldwide threat of communism. On April 25, Webb upheld 
the prosecution's contention that defense evidence, in the 
form of Japanese wartime press releases, was "self-serving" 
and a form of propaganda. 
On April 29, Webb announced the Court decision to rule 
inadmissible evidence relating to the existence of 
Communism in China or the soviet Union. The chief judge 
stated that the "existence or spread" of Communism was not 
"relevant." The Tribunal upheld the objection of Associate 
Prosecutor A. S. Comyns Carr to defense evidence designed 
to show the effect of Chinese Communist actions on Japanese 
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wartime policy in China. Carr contended that such evidence 
had no probative value. 11 
On May 8, President Webb announced that the Tribunal 
"views with much concern" the defense section's "waste of 
material and time" in attempting to introduce "statements 
in the nature of propaganda." He stated that many defense 
exhibits such as Japanese newspaper excerpts or Foreign 
Office statements were inadmissible and lamented that 
Japanese affidavit witnesses tended "to express themselves 
at length." He claimed that this prolixity caused a "devas-
tating effect" on the Tribunal's paper and ink supply. Webb 
pointed out that one hundred tons of mimeograph paper and a 
large amount of ink had been consumed already and declared 
a one day recess because of the acute paper shortage. 
Count 17 of the indictment charged the accused with 
planning and waging a war of aggression against the Soviet 
Union in violation of international law and treaties. The 
Soviet violation of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact 
therefore became a central part of the case for the defense. 
In October 1946, Russian Associate Prosecutors. A. Golunsky 
offered an explanation for the Soviet invasion of Manchuria 
11 a· For Webb vs. Brooks, see IMTFE, Procee ings, pp. 
19927-19929; Stars and Stripes, April 16, 1947, p. 4; and 
Osaka Mainichi, April 17, 1947, p. 2. For Webb vs. Lazarus, 
see Proceedings, pp. 20478-20484; Stars and Stripes, April 23, 
1947, pp. 1, 4; and Osaka Mainichi, April 24, 1947, pp. 1, 2. 
For rulings on Communism, see Proceedings, pp. 21081, 21106; 
Stars and Stripes, April 26, 1947, p. 4; Osaka Mainichi, 
April 30, 1947, p. 2, May 2, p. 2; and Stars and Stripes, 
May 13, 1947, p. 1. 
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in August 1945. Golunsky, the Director of Juridical 
Sciences for the U.S.S.R., declared that the Soviet Union 
declared war on Japan because of her solemn duty as a loyal 
ally. 
On June 4, Major Blakeney, counsel for Togo and Umezu, 
attempted to introduce evidence to refute Count 17. 
Blakeney argued that Russia, not Japan, had planned and 
waged aggressive war. After withdrawing to consider 
Blakeney's evidence, the Tribunal rejected the defense 
assertion. Webb announced that evidence of the Soviet 
Union's entry into the Pacific War was irrelevant. On 
June 5, however, the court accepted the defense affidavit 
of M1jor General John R. Deane. The Tribunal admitted his 
affidavit after three hours of deliberation. Deane, former 
chief of the U.S. military mission in Moscow, testified in 
his affidavit about Russian military preparations against 
Japan "beginning in 1943. 1112 
On June 6, owen Cunningham, counsel for Hiroshi 
Oshima, offered as defense evidence a speech of former 
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Cunningham, the 
former President of the Des Moines College of Law, tried to 
enter Churchill's March 1946 "Iron Curtain" speech, delivered 
at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. Cunningham 
12For May 8, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 21646, 21720-
21722, 21745-21746, 21826-21827 and Osaka Mainichi, May 9, 
1947, p. 1. For Count 17 and S~v~et entry, see Proceedings, 
pp. 7282-7284, 23569-23575; Pacific Stars and Stripes, 
June 5, 1947, p. l; and Osaka Mainichi, June 6, 1947, pp. 1,4. 
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contended that the defense exhibit would prove that the 
"threat of the spread of Communism in Europe" was a reality. 
British Associate Prosecutor A. S. Comyns Carr objected to 
Cunningham's "harangue." The Tribunal sustained Carr's 
objection and overruled admittance of excerpts from Churchill's 
"Iron Curtain" speech. 
On June 9, the defense charged that Russia was 
detaining twelve defense witnesses. Major Blakeney claimed 
that they had been waiting thirteen months for an opportunity 
to cross-examine the Soviet prosecution witnesses who had 
testified by affidavit. The American attorney contended 
that the Russian witness affidavits contained "flagrantly 
leading questions, hearsay compounded upon hearsay, self-
contradictions11 and a "hodge-podge of opinion." He pleaded 
for the Court to produce the witnesses "imprisoned behind 
the Iron Curtain." Blakeney concluded that it would be 
impossible to rely on the affidavits, and contended that 
favorable defense testimony could hardly be extracted "from 
a man with a gun in his back." General Vasilev, the Russian 
assistant to s. A. Golunsky, protested Blakeney's blistering 
attacks on the Soviet Union. Webb politely reminded Blakeney 
not to be insolent. Earlier in the day the chief judge 
threatened to suspend Owen Cunningham and George Furness for 
attempting "to introduce political discussion" at the Tokyo 
trial. 
On June 10, defense attorney William Logan, Jr., 
requested another six week recess for additional time to 
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prepare the Pacific War phase of the defense. Logan claimed 
that the large number of court rejections of defense docu-
ments necessitated a regroupinq of deien~e evidence, and 
added that the defcns~•s working conditions were poor 
because its offices lacked heat in the winter and air-
conditioning in the summer. On June 11, the Tribunal granted 
the defense a six week adjournment to begin on June 19. 
Webb remarked that the Court was satisfied that the defense 
team was not merely trying "to avoid working in such [hot] 
weather. 1113 
During the break, the Tribunal held a special 
in-chambers session. Members of both the prosecution and 
the defense were present. The court convened the private 
meeting to seek ways of expediting the tedious trial. It 
hoped to end proceedings by 1947. Major Blakeney summarized 
the defense position. He explained that the uncertain character 
of the prevailing rules of evidence had restricted presenta-
tion of the defense case and that different rules of evidence 
were being applied to the defense than were applied a year 
ago. He also argued that the liberal court reception of 
dubious prosecution evidence compounded the defense's 
difficulties. Blakeney pointed out that during 1946 defense 
13 For June 6, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 23759-23761 
and IMTFE, Rejected Defense Documents, 1946-1948, Reel 2, 
document #1669. For June 9, see Proceedings, pp. 23768-23784, 
23788-23793, 24563 and Osaka Mainichi, June 10, 1947, p. 1. 
For June 10 and recess, see Proceedings, pp. 23874-23883,23968-
23969, 24758; RG238, court Papers, Box No. 97, number 1039, 
and Osaka Mainichi, June 12, 1947, p. 1, June 13, p. 2 and 
June 22, p. 2. 
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attorneys had objected "ad nauseam" to prosecution affidavits 
contai · 
ning hearsay and witness speculation. He alleged 
that th . 
e Tribunal had accepted such prosecution testimony 
"f 
or Whatever probative value it might" contain and had 
never rejected a single prosecution witness or affidavit. 
Be argued further that the exact proportion of how much 
Probative 
value each prosecution exhibit contained could 
not be known unt1.·1 the court delivered its final judgment. 
Blak 
eney concluded that the acceptance of prosecution evidence, 
on th b 
e asis of whatever probative value it contained, 
created 
a situation whereby "we don't know to this day just 
\\That is . 
.1.n evidence against us and what isn't." 
Webb lent a sympathetic ear to Blakeney's complaints, 
but 
answered by listing the difficulties of a prosecution 
invo1v · 
l.ng eleven different Allied countries. The court 
President 
argued that it would be impossible to agree upon 
one set 
of rules of evidence because of varying ideas of 
judici 
al Practice on the bench. Moreover, Webb added, the 
chart 
er forbade the adoption of technical rules of evidence. 
1Ie 
concluded that the Tribunal had "the fullest appreciation" 
of the d 
efense's difficulties but insisted that the defense 
tealll 
\\7ould just "have to make the best of it. 1114 
On August 4, the defense section opened the Pacific 
~a:r 
Phase of i' ts case. Yoshitsugu Takahashi, counsel for 
14 
uune 2 RG238, Pr·oceedings in Chambers, Box No. 78, volume V, 4 , 1947 ::--~...,;.:~~-~~-----
, pp. 16-27. 
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Shigetaro Shimada, delivered the opening statement. In 
the final part of its case, the defense team contended that 
Japan had fought a war of self-defense "which jeopardized 
national existence." Takahashi, two-time member of the 
Japanese House of Representatives, outlined the economic 
side of the defense case. He countered the prosecution's 
contentions that Japan's economic development during the 
1930s was designed for aggressive war. The Japanese lawyer 
elaborated on the reasons for Japan's industrial development 
by citing increasing population, the limited area of arable 
land and the lack of natural resources as motives for 
industrialization. Japan existed by importing raw materials 
and by exporting the finished, manufactured product. 
Takahashi claimed that after 1931 his country's access to 
the world market declined sharply. Furthermore, worldwide 
depression, rising tariffs and import restrictions caused 
economic suffering in Japan during the 1930s. 
Count 53 of the indictment charged the defendants 
with a conspiracy to permit local Japanese military leaders 
to commit prisoner of war atrocities. Yoshisugu Takahashi 
claimed that there was no national plan or government 
regulation to terrorize and torture Allied internees. He 
alleged that Allied aerial bombing and unrestricted sub-
marine warfare had prevented supplies from reaching prison 
camps, and argued that this was the "primary cause" for 
the suffering of Allied prisoners of war and civilian 
captives. 
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William Logan, Jr., continued the defense economic 
arguments. He claimed that western economic trade restric-
tions forced Japan "to fight for her very existence." 
Only a small percentage of Japan's land was arable, said 
Logan, and that minute area could not feed the rapidly 
increasing population of the most densely populated country 
per arable square mile in the world. He pointed out that 
Japan's economic growth was not geared towards aggressive 
war. Logan, citing 1941 Japanese iron and steel production 
figures, asserted that the entire annual production of the 
iron and steel industry amounted to less than the total 
monthly production of the United States. 15 
The Tribunal rejected all evidence purporting to show 
Japanese population growth. The court denied the admission 
of an exhibit listing population increases from 1920-1940. 
The Tribunal also refused a defense document comparing 
Japan's population growth and national density with other 
Allied States. When Logan appealed to the bench for a 
reconsideration, President Webb answered that the Tokyo 
Tribunal allowed only for "normal industrialization" and 
that Japan's economic growth was "abnormal." Noting that 
only six judges were present, Logan pointed out that the 
present composition of the court could have accounted for 
the bench decision on the inadmissibility of Japanese 
population statistics. Webb agreed but reminded Logan that 
lSIMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 24763-24795. 
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the defense case must be continued regardless of the 
T . b l' . . t' th t. 16 ri una s composition a e ime. 
On September 5, David Smith, former American counsel 
for Hirota Koki, reappeared before the Tribunal. The 
expelled lawyer stood at the lectern and expressed "profound 
regret" over the March 1947 incident. President Webb 
proposed that Smith return on Monday, September 8 to present 
his plea when he hoped to have the entire bench present. 
A dejected Smith resigned rather than suffer further 
humiliation. The Washington, D.C. attorney told reporters 
that the Australian jurist had "backtracked" on an earlier 
agreement that Webb would reinstate him if he apologized 
before the bench. On September 25, George Yamaoka became 
the temporary American counsel for Hirota Koki. 
The court president disagreed with both the defense 
and prosecution on the emperor's role in World War II. On 
August 5, William Logan claimed that Emperor Hirohito was 
16 IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 24803-24817 and IMTFE, Rejected 
Defense Documents, 1946-1948, documents #1694, 1702. On 
July 25, 1946, President Webb ruled that economic developments 
in other countries, such as American or British activity in 
China, could not be considered as evidence. On August 16, 
1946, Webb ruled that economic aggression is a crime "if it 
is an adjunct of aggressive war." See Osaka Mainichi, July 26, 
1946, p. 2 and August 17, p. 2. Webb later modified his 
trial views on prewar, anti-Japanese Allied trade restric-
tions. He wrote in 1971 that the United states and Britain 
in a situation "like Japan in 1941 might well have had 
recourse to war." See William Flood Webb's introduction to 
David Bergamini's Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New York, 
1971), p. xii. 
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only "following constitutional government" and did not order 
the Pacific War. Webb disagreed strongly. He pointed out 
that if a cabinet recommends that a ruler commit a crime, 
"and the King directs that it be committed, there is no 
constitutional protection." On September 26, Webb disagreed 
with Chief Prosecutor Joseph Keenan's contention that 
Hirohito was not responsible for the Pacific War. Under 
cross-examination by Keen~n, £ormer Premier Keisuke Okada 
claimed that on the eve of Pearl Harbor Hirohito still 
opposed going to war. "Leaning far forward on the bench," 
President Webb took strong exception to Okada's statement. 
The chief judge stated that the ex-premier's testimony con-
cerning Hirohito's innocence was "contrary to the evidence 
of the prosecution." Keenan replied that all "the people 
responsible for this war" were in the prisoner's box, and that 
"if there had been anyone else, they would be in the dock 
t .,17 oo. 
On November 6 and 10, the defense team repeated its 
June request for Russian-held defense witnesses. President 
Webb asked Major General A. N. Vasilev, assistant to Soviet 
Associate Prosecutors. A. Golunsky, why it was not possible 
to produce the witnesses. Vasilev contended that it was 
17For Smith apology, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 27725-
27728, 29340-29342 and Pacific Stars a nd Stripes, September 9, 
1947, pp. 1, 4. For Webb on Hirohito, see Proceedings, pp. 
24882-24884; Stars and Stripes, September 26, 1947, pp. 1, 4; 
and Osaka Main.1.chi, September 26, 1947, p. 1. 
"a matter of state security." He explained to the chief 
judge that Russia was detaining those Japanese for future 
Soviet trial as war criminals. Although Webb disagreed 
with Vasilev and argued that the Tokyo trial exceeded a 
Russian trial in importance, he yielded. 
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On November 7, Webb announced his temporary withdrawal 
as court president. Australian Prime Minister Chiefley 
had ordered him to attend the November session of the High 
Court of Australia to alleviate a backlog of court cases. 
Owen Cunningham, counsel for Hiroshi Oshima, pointed out 
the repeated absences of several judges and protested that 
the privilege of trial absence had been "abused." He argued 
that the charter had "never contemplated a trial by absent 
judges." The Court rejected Cunningham's protest. American 
member Myron c. Cramer became acting-president during Webb's 
absence after British jurist Lord Patrick had declined to 
assume the high post for personal reasons. On December 16, 
President Webb returned to the bench. 18 
18For November 6 and 10, see IMTFE, Pr oceedings, pp. 
32566-32569, 32776-32784, 32907 and Osaka Ma1n1ch1, November 11, 
1947, p. 1. For Webb recall, see RG238, Court Papers, Box 
No. 99, item #1389; IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 32660-32672, 
32775-32776, Pacific Stars and Stripes, November 6, 1947, 
p. 1, November 8, p. 1 and November 9, p. l; and Osaka 
Mainichi, November 8, 1947, p. 2, November 9, p. 1, November 10, 
p. 1, November 11, p. 1 and December 16, p. 2. While in 
Brisbane, Australia, Webb expressed his reasons for the long 
trial. Sir William claimed that the scope of the case, 
covering the years 1928-1945, consumed much time. When 
questioned about the rules governing trial procedure, Webb 
declared one must allow for a certain amount of "elasticity" 
with eleven different nations on the bench. See Osaka 
Mainichi, November 16, 1947, p. 1. 
After the completion of the Pacific War phase of the 
defense case, the individual defendants presented their 
cases. Between December 26, 1947 and January 7, 1948, 
Hideki Tojo's defense counsel presented his case. The 
expectation that Tojo would testify on his own behalf drew 
overflow crowds to the Tokyo courtroom. By 6:00 a.m. 
on December 26, over five hundred Japanese had lined up at 
the gates of the War Ministry Building and ticket scalper~ 
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dJ.d a brir.k business. Opportunistic Japanese sold compli-
mentary visitor passes for five hundred yen each. The gallery, 
which had been empty for months, was soon packed with specta-
tors. One Japanese reporter claimed that the World War II 
leader was a "better drawing card" than Dorothy Lamour. 
Dr. Kiyose outlined the ex-premier's defense. He 
reiterated the defense arugment that the Japanese involvement 
in t~e Pacific War was one of self-defense forced upon Japan 
by Allied economic sanctions. Kiyose challenged the prosecu-
tion arguments that a "criminal militaristic clique" had 
controlled Japan from 1928-1945, and pronounced the prosecu-
tion charge "a fallacy of the highest degree." He noted 
that only duly constituted government officials, not a 
criminal militaristic clique, had ruled Japan. He insisted 
that Tojo had never authorized the atrocities committed 
upon Allied prisoners or civilian internees and had never 
given "orders for, tolerated nor connived at any inhuman 
acts." Tojo, "unrepetant" in a khakhi Japanese army uniform, 
according to the Stars and Stripes, "smiled broadly" when 
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Dr. Kiyose completed his opening address. 
On the afternoon of the twenty-sixth, before a 
courtroom bathed in searing white Klieg lights and whirling 
newsreel cameras, the bald, bespectacled Tojo blew his 
nose energetically and, as noted by some observers, walked 
to the witness stand "with the correct aplomb of a model 
prisoner" and the "earthly smugness of the samurai." 
With "contemptuous assurance" according to Life magazine, 
the only Axis dictator to go on trial faced his accusers. 
For three days, George Blewett, the court-appointed 
American attorney for Tojo, read the war leader's 245 page, 
64,000 word defense affidavit. The former war minister 
had rewritten the three pound document four times. In 
it, the former general declared his innocence of all 
Allied charges. He claimed that the war was one of 
self-defense decided upon "as a last resort,and by reason 
of urgent necessity.!! He ridiculed the prosecution 
contention that Japan had pursued an organized, consistent 
plan of aggression culminating in the Pacific War. He 
challenged the nature of Allied war crime charges, and 
assailed the conspiracy charge. Tojo claimed that 
the .idea that a conspiracy could continue, despite repeated 
cabinet changes, over seventeen years, was "unthinkable to 
persons of reason and intelligence." Tojo denounced the 
Allied position that duly constituted government officers 
of a vanquished country could be individually charged as 
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war criminals. He admitted full responsibility for Japan's 
defeat in World War II and accepted full blame for the war-
time loss. He also admitted his accountability in the trial 
and death of five Doolittle B-25 fliers but claimed that the 
American pilots had violated international law by bombing 
civilian populations. Throughout his affidavit testimony, 
Tojo resolutely defended Emperor Hirohito. 19 
On December 31, Blewett completed reading the long 
affidavit and the prosecution's cross-examination of Hideki 
Tojo began. For the next four court days, Chief Prosecutor 
Keenan and the former prime minister "chewed over historical 
facts." The "florid-faced" prosecutor relentlessly pressed 
the "hard-jawed dictator." The Japanese leader held his 
own on the witness stand. According to the Stars and Stripes 
he testified with the "cold assurance of a conquering 
samurai" and "shot back" his answers to Keenan "in a high-
pitched military tone." Tojo would not let the chief 
t t h . 20 prosecu or rap im. 
19 IMTFE, Proceedings , pp. 36146-36163, 36171-36488; 
Osaka Mainichi, December 26, 1947, pp. 1, 2; Pacific Stars 
and Stripes, December 27, 1947, p. 1, December 28, pp. 1, 4, 
7; Time, January 5, 1948, pp. 24-25; Newsweek, January 5, 1948, 
p. 39; Nippon Times, January 7, 1948, p. l; and Life, 
January 26, 1948, pp. 87-91 
20 IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 36535-36804; Pacific Stars 
and Stripes, January 2, 1948, p. l; and Nippon Times, January 1, 
1948, p. 1, January 7, p. 1. Prior to Keenan's cross-examina-
tion of Tojo, Keenan edged out IPS attorney Jack Fihelly at 
the lectern. Fihelly, Assistant Attorney for the District 
of Columbia since 1924, had interrogated Tojo in Sugarno 
Prison months before the beginning of the Tokyo trial. 
Fihelly was best prepared to cross-examine Tojo and was 
Keenan's initial questioning of Tojo brought Webb's 
interposition. Keenan, refusing to address Tojo as 
General, since "there is no longer any Japanese Army," 
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asked the former war leader whether his affidavit was 
intended as a statement of his innocence or as a "continuation 
of imperialistic, militaristic propaganda" aimed at the 
Japanese people. The court president upheld Blewett's 
objection that the question was "not proper cross-examina-
tion." The flushed chief prosecutor unsuccessfully argued 
that the nature and content of Tojo's affidavit were an 
"insult to the intelligence of this Tribunal." Webb later 
challenged Keenan's comparison of the power of the U.S. 
president and Japan's emperor. Keenan 11 snapped back" that 
if it was "offensive" to discuss the authority of the 
American executive, then he would proceed to something else. 
Irritated, Webb leaned over the bench and shouted "Go 
immediately to something else!" Tojo snickered as the 
remaining Japanese accused smiled. Life magazine quipped 
that Keenan and Webb "seemed more concerned with perpetuating 
a courtroom feud" than completing in an orderly manner the 
1 th d . 21 eng y procee ings. 
scheduled to do so. President Webb denied Keenan's request 
that Fihelly "assist" the chief prosecutor in the IPS cross-
examination of the world War II leader. To the chagrin of 
Fihelly, Keenan proceeded alone. See Proceedings, pp. 36533-
36535; Robert M. Donihi, interview at Andrew's Afr Force 
Base, Camp Springs, Maryland, October 14, 1978; Nipp·on Times, 
January 1, 1948, p. l; and Life, January 26, 1948, pp. 88-89. 
21 IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 36535-36555; Nippon Times, 
January 1, 1948, pp. 1, 2, January 3, 1948, pp. 1, 2; and 
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Under Keenan ' s cross-examination, Tojo failed to stray 
from his affidavit testimony. The World War II leader 
disagreed with the chief prosecutor's claim that wars were 
crimes of the highest degree. Tojo noted that all wars 
had a deleterious effect upon the people that was "the same 
for the victor as for the vanquished." Citing American 
economic pressure upon Japan, he insisted the Pacific War 
was one of self-defense. The 1940-1944 premier stated that 
the Emperor reluctantly consented to war because of his 
advice and that of the High Command. Tojo maintained that 
Hirohito's strong desire for peace "remained the same" on 
the eve of Pearl Harbor and throughout World War II. He 
repeated his contention that prisoner of war responsibility 
rested with the local theatre commanders and not the Japanese 
High Command. 22 
The defense section rested its cases on January 12, 
1948. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial had now been in session for 
twenty-one months. In contrast, the Nuremberg War Crimes 
Trial had lasted only eleven months. 
Life, January 26, 1948, pp. 87-91. 
22
rMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 36535-36804, 37175; Pacific 
Stars and Stripes, January 2, 1948, p. 1, January 5, p. 1, 
January 6, p. 1 and January 7, p. 1; and Nippon Times, 
January 3, 1948, pp. 1, 2, January 7, pp. 1, 2 and January 8, 
pp. 1, 2. On January 11, the Stars and Stripes (p. 4) 
reported tha1 Yeenan was "recuperating" from his cross-
examination llbout" with Tojo at a "luxurious" Japanese 
villa near Atami, 80 miles south of Tokyo. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST: 
JUDGMENT AND VERDICTS 
Future generations of Oriental peoples--indeed the 
whole of mankind--who look back on this epochal 
judgment in a broad historical perspective might 
come to feel that a gross injustice had been done 
through ex post facto penalization of the leaders 
of an East Asian nation, remembering that Western 
statesmen and generals had never been penalized 
during the preceding three centuries for their 
aggression on Eastern lands. 
-Defense attorney Professor Kenzo Takayanagi 
March 1948 
On January 12, 1948, President Webb announced that 
the Tribunal would receive prosecution rebuttal evidence. 
Major George A. Furness, counsel for Mamoru Shigemitsu, 
unsuccessfully objected to the admission of prosecution 
rebuttal testimony as unfair and not provided for in the 
Charter. He contended that the prosecution should have 
delivered all its data during the initial case. Furness, 
who had also defended Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma 
on war crimes charges during 1946, reminded the court that 
the Tribunal had denied similar attempts to introduce new 
defense evidence during the individual phase of the defense 
case. The American attorney concluded that the "same 
standards should be applied to the prosecution" and that 
the court should reject prosecution rebuttal evidence. 
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On Janu:a:ry: 14,the Australian chief judge finalized 
the decision that the Tribunal would receive International 
Prosecution Section (IPS) evidence in rebuttal. Webb 
also declared that the court would accept new defense 
testimony in surrebuttal. Captain Alfred w. Brooks, counsel 
for both Kuniaki Koiso and Jiro Minami, argued that the 
court ruling amounted to a virtual "reopening" of the 
entire prosecution's case. William Logan, Jr., counsel for 
Koichi Kido, asserted that the Tribunal verdict departed 
from the charter. Webb refused to allow Logan to discuss 
the merits of the decision. Logan replied that "this is 
the first court I have practiced in" where a bench judgment 
wad rendered and a detense counsel "was not permitted to 
state his views on it." The Tribunal president argued that 
the charter permitted the court to adopt any necessary 
measure. He remarked that rules of evidence and procedure 
would be "set aside if we see fit." Owen Cunningham, 
counsel for Hiroshi Oshima, labeled the Tribunal acceptance 
of IPS rebuttal evidence as illegal. Webb chastised 
1 Cunningham for indulging in "sheer offensive propaganda." 
On January 16, the trial proceedings were highlighted 
by the spectacle of two attorneys battling for possession 
1For rebuttal acceptance, see International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo War Crimes Trial, ·Pro-
ceedings (Tokyo: The Tribunal, 3 May 1946-16 April 1948), 
pp. 37178-37187, 37330-37336, 37367-37369; U.S. Army Pacific 
Stars and Stripes (Tokyo), January 13, 1948, pp. 1, 4; and 
Nippon Times (Tokyo), January 15, 1948, p. 1. 
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of the lectern microphone. Defense lawyer Alfred Brooks and 
Associate Prosecutor A. s. Comyns Carr engaged in a sharp 
debate over a language translation. The two attorneys then 
attempted to use the lectern microphone simultaneously. 
Webb threatened to adjourn if "this disorderly procedure 
continued," and commented that he had never witnessed such 
a scene in "over twenty years on the bench." 
The difficulty with language translations culminated on 
January 28 in an opera bouffe episode. Puntsugin Chogdan, 
the chief of the investigations division of the State 
Security Department from the Mongolian People's Republic's 
Ministry of Home Affairs, appeared as a Soviet prosecution 
witness. Chogdan, described by the Pacific Stars and Stripes 
as "a slant-eyed son of the steppes," looked "resplendent" 
in a new Red Army uniform with a row of large, glittering 
medals on his left breast. The 1939 Soviet border guard, 
who according to Stars and Stripes, was a "living replica of 
illustrations usually found in books about the famed Mongol 
warlord Genghis Khan," spoke only modern Mongolian. No one 
in the court translation section understood any Mongolian 
at all. President Webb finally decided to tape a sound 
2 track of Chogdan's testimony for a later check. 
That same day, the defense section requested its fifth 
2For lectern exhibition, see IMTFE, Proc·eedings, pp. 
37519-37520 and Pacific Star·s and Stripes, January 16, 1948, 
p. 1. For Chogan episode, see Pro·c·eedings, pp. 38394-
38401 and 'Stars a·na Stripes, January 28, 1948, p. 4. 
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trial recess. Dr. Somei Uzawa requested a ten day adjourn-
ment in order to prepare surrebuttal evidence. Owen 
Cunningham supported the chief of Japanese counsel's plea. 
Cunningham pointed out that it would take a reasonable 
period of time to prepare surrebuttal testimony. Webb 
declarei that the Tribunal would announce later its decision 
on a ten day intermission. On January 30, the defense 
section opened its surrebuttal evidence. 
On February 3, the court granted the defense team a 
five day recess. OWen Cunningham, counsel for Hiroshi 
Oshima, stated that the defense section was awaiting the 
arrival of new evidence from Washington, D.C. William 
Logan, Jr. alleged that the defense panel was approaching 
a "breakdown." After withdrawing to consider the defense 
request, the Tribunal consented to a recess until February 9. 
President Webb reminded the defense team that "no Court 
has ever heard a defense more fully." 3 
On February 10, the defense team completed its sur-
rebuttal evidence. George Yamaoka, counsel for Hirota 
Koki and Shigenori Togo, read a defense supplement t~ the 
January 1947 general motion to dismiss all IPS charges. 
The Yamaoka addendum reiterated the contention that the 
terms of the Potsdam Declaration and the IMTFE Charter 
failed to provide the Tribunal with jurisdiction over 
Crimes against Peace and Crimes against Humanity. Chief 
3For recess request, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 38386-
38387, 38435-38443, 38729-38731, 38745. 
Prosecutor Joseph Keenan termed the defense motion 
"frivolous and offensive," but Webb permitted Yamaoka 
to file the motion as a matter of record. 4 
Between February 11 and March 2, the prosecution 
delivered its final summation and closing arguments. 
On February 11, Keenan delivered a seventy-five hundred 
word IPS summary. The chief prosecutor asked the court 
to impose the "sternest punishment known to the law" 
on the defendants. Labeling the Japanese accused as 
outlaws, Keenan alleged that the prisoners in the dock 
had conducted wars of aggression that resulted in the 
premeditated murder of millions of people. He added 
that the defendants had made a divine "figurehead of 
124 
their ruler, [using him] as the occasion required for their 
evil purposes," and argued that the defense team had failed 
to produce one scrap of evidence to justify any actions 
as self-defense. Keenan alleged that the Tribunal had 
been "exacting in its own requirements" in insuring the 
Japanese defendents a fair trial and contended that the 
court had expressed great tolerance "in permitting 
vituperation and insolent comments." Outside the courtroom 
the chief prosecutor told reporters he was asking the 
Tribunal "for a liberal employment of manila rope. 115 
4 IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 38942-38947. 
5 IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 38948-42076 and Pacific Stars 
On March 2, the defense team began its final summary 
and closing arguments. Dr. Somei Uzawa, six time member 
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of the House of Representatives since 1908 and former member 
of the House of Peers from 1928-1937, delivered the intro-
ductory statement. The chief of all Japanese defense 
counsel began by thanking the Tribunal for the invaluable 
assistance of the American defense lawyers. Dr. Uzawa 
then again challenged the prosecution contention that 
aggressive war was a crime under international law. He 
alleged that no world law could be found which defined 
. 6 
aggressive war. 
On March 3 and 4 the defense attorneys delivered 
their principal closing argument. Professor Kenzo Takayanagi, 
English Law Professor at Tokyo University, read the summation. 
Takayangi, counsel for Teiichi Suzuki, alleged that the 
defendants had committed no criminal offense "known to 
the established law of nations." He pointed out that the 
Tribunal charter and the court's definition of war crimes 
differed markedly from international law. Takayanagi 
argued that war crimes were violations of recognized rules 
of military conduct committed during wartime. He reiterated 
that Crimes against Peace and Crimes against Humanity were 
not conventional war crimes but Allied ex post facto 
legislation. The Japanese attorney declared that the British 
and Stripes, February 12, 1948, pp. 1, 4. 
6
rMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 42076-42110. 
Parliament and American constitution had banned retroactive 
legislation. He alleged that ex post facto legislation 
was "sheer lynch law in the guise of justice." He emphasized 
the difference between the German and the Japanese sur-
renders and pointed out that the Allies had controlled 
Germany at the time of the May 7, 1945 capitulation. Japan, 
however, had remained unoccupied prior to its surrender 
on August 14 and had been quite capable of offering 
"strenuous armed resistance for some time to come." 
Takayanagi insisted that the Japanese government had 
surrendered to the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration 
and that the terms of that declaration contained no mention 
of war crimes such as Crimes against Peace and Humanity. 
As for the charge of conspiracy, said Takayanagi, 
no international law listed conspiracy as an international 
crime and the concept of criminal conspiracy was a "peculiar 
product of English legal history." Unlike the accused at 
Nuremberg, he argued, the Japanese defendants were not a 
united, concerted band because fifteen different cabinets 
had ruled Japan from 1928-1945 and a serious division of 
opinion, not a common plan of conspiracy, had marked those 
ministries. The Japanese lawyer ~oted further that if the 
prosecution could prove a conspiracy in Japan then the 
"gradual expansion of the original thirteen American states 
into the great American Republic" could be considered the 
result of a common plan of conspiracy. He asked the court 
to consider its verdict within the confines of established 
international law and argued that the death penalty would 
convert "a plain son of Yamato" into a national martyr 
and dampen Japanese enthusiasm for the new constitution. 
Also, he warned, a death verdict on the basis of ex 
post facto charges would leave the Japanese with a negative 
impression of western justice: "one law for the victors 
and another law for the vanquished. 117 
The issue of Emperor Hirohito surfaced again on 
March 12. Aristides G. Lazarus, counsel for Shunroku 
Hata, attacked the prosecution for its failure to produce 
Hirohito as a court witness. The former Marine lieutenant 
alleged that IPS lacked the "moral courage" and the 
"requisite respect for the Tribunal" to place the emperor 
on the witness stand and contended that it would forever 
be "a source of wonder" that the "one man who could have 
told us so much so succinctly" had failed to make an appear-
ance. The court president later demanded an apology from 
Lazarus. Webb felt that Lazarus had been impolite to the pros-
ecution attorneys. Lazarus countered that he had not been in-
sulting at all. The chief judge accused him of indulging in "pure 
propaganda" and trying to antagonize the Tribunal." Lazarus 
apologized but requested that Webb also withdraw his comment 
7For Takayanagi speech, see pp. 42111-4285, IMTFE, 
Proceedings. Also see Nippon Times, March 30, 1946, p. 4, 
March 31, p. 4 and June 16, p. 4, for Takayanagi's comments 
on conspiracy and international law. For eventual enshrine-
ment of the "plain son[s] of Yamato," see Washington Post, 
April 21, 1979, p. 3. 
that Lazarus had acted in a treasonous manner. When 
Webb declined to apologize, Lazarus promised that when the 
trial was over, "I shall seek remedy. 118 
On April 16, after being in session for two years, 
the Tribunal recessed to consider the evidence. The 
defense lawyers contended that the veritable mountain of 
evidence made it physically impossible to read all the 
testimony" even in leisure or spare time." The Court had 
heard nine million words of evidence. The transcript of 
the proceedings alone exceeded 48,400 pages. The Tribunal 
had also admitted 4,336 exhibits, received the testimony 
of 779 witnesses by affidavit, and heard the evidence of 
419 courtroom witnesses. Nevertheless, Webb assured 
reporters that each judge would "personally consider 
every word of evidence. 119 
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On May 25, SCAP's personnel section abruptly dismissed 
nine American defense lawyers. Brigadier General w. A. 
8IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 43459-43464, 43469-43471 and 
Pacific Stars and Stripes, March 13, 1948, p. 1. 
9For trial statistics, see International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo: The Tribunal, 
November 12, 1948), p. 13. For defense comments on amount 
of evidence, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 7836-7837, 29732-
29733, 34361. For Webb comment, see New York Times, 
July 3, 1948, p. 5. An officer in the IPS documents 
division stated he needed "bulldozers rather than filing 
clerks" to handle the immense number of prosecution 
documents. He noted: "At first I listed all incoming 
documents. Then they came in so fast that I listed only 
incoming bags. Then crates of bags; now I just list the 
rooms they're in." Time, February 3, 1947, p. 25. 
Beiderlinden, Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, GHQ, SCAP, 
stated that the defense attorneys were being released 
because their mission had been completed. Terming it 
strictly a "personnel matter," Beiderlinden pointed out 
that the defendants were "adequately represented." Ben 
Bruce Blakeney, chief of the American defense counsel, was 
not consulted in advance before receiving his "blue slip." 
The fired defense counsel met with Colonel Larry Bunker, 
Douglas MacArthur's aide, to protest their expulsion, 
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and charged SCAP with "improper interference." The defense 
committee alleged that each defendant was entitled to 
American legal counsel until the Tribunal's final judgment. 
On May 26, SCAP reversed itself and reinstated the dis-
charged lawyers. "In order that there may be not the 
slightest charge of injustice to the accused," Brigadier 
General Beiderlinden announced that all American attorneys 
la · ' f. 1 d. d. . lO wou remain until the Courts 1na a JU 1cat1on. 
By late summer, the Tribunal reached a verdict. 
On July 27, the IMTFE General Secretary announced that the 
translation of the first chapter of the court's judgment 
would begin on August 2. Twenty-six Japanese civilians 
and nine American Department of the Army civilians volunteered 
to translate the epochal judgment. The Tribunal confined 
the thirty-five translators in the luxurious home of Kenzo 
10 New York Times, May 25, 1948, p. 16; Pacific Stars 
and Stripes, May 26, 1948, p. 4, May 27, p. lr N.Y.· Times, 
May 27, 1948, p. 13 and Nippon Times, May 28, 1948, p. 2. 
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Hattori, eminent Japanese watch and clock manufacturer. 
American military police maintained a twenty-four hour guard 
around the barbed-wire enclosed house. The Tokyo provost 
marshal explained the strict security regulations as 
. l 11 designed to prevent disc osures. 
During the fall of 1948, three Tokyo trial attorneys 
delivered speeches about the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East (IMTFE). On September 6, IPS lawyer H. A. 
Hauxhurst and defense counsel Owen Cunningham gave addresses 
before the Seattle, Washington meeting of the American Bar 
Association. Hauxhurst's talk favorably compared the Tokyo 
War Crimes Trial with the Nuremberg trial. Cunningham 
delivered a blistering speech condemning the trial's 
unfairness. He pointed out that the Tribunal had admitted 
hearsay evidence "to the fourth degree," eliminated all 
"affirmative defenses," and abused defense lawyers while 
favoring the prosecution. Cunningham contended that the 
court had applied t wo rules of evidence--a generous set 
for the prosecution and a very strict set of rules for the 
defense. The American attorney alleged that the prosecution 
could bring witnesses from all parts of the world while the 
defense "could not bring a German ambassador across the 
China Sea." On October 13, as a result of this devastating 
critique, the Tribunal barred Cunningham from further trial 
11 London Times, July 28, 1948, p. 3; Nippon Times, 
July 28, 1948, p. 2; and N.Y. Times, July 28, 1948, p. 19. 
proceedings. On November 3, British Associate Prosecutor 
A. s. Comyns Carr delivered a basically favorable address 
on the IMTFE before the London Grotius Society. Carr, 
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in one subtle jab at President Webb, asked why the Emperor's 
absence could possibly "have any bearing" on the IPS case. 12 
Between November 4 and 12, the Tribunal delivered 
its majority judgment .. Eight of the eleven justices 
approved. Two of the eight assenting judges filed separate 
but concurring opinions. Three jurists filed dissenting 
opinions. The defense counsel unsuccessfully petitioned 
the Tribunal to read the dissenting judgments in open 
court. President Webb, following the Nuremberg precedent, 
. d. ' d. t . 13 barred any reading of issenting ver ic sin open court. 
For seven straight days Webb read the twelve hundred 
page majority in open court. Speaking in a firm and steady 
voice, President Webb, according to the Stars and Stripes, 
12For Hauxhurst and Cunningham addresses, see "Forum 
on War Crime Trials," Proceedings of the Section of Inter-
national and Comparative Law, American Bar Association 
(Chicago, 1949), pp. 30-38. A slightly different version 
of Cunningham's speech appears in Modern Military Branch, 
World War II War Crimes (IMTFE), Fecord Group 238, Court 
Papers, Box No. 102, item #1714, National Archives (Washington, 
D.C.). For Cunningham exclusion, see Nippon Times, October 16, 
1948, p. 1 and November 7, p. 1. For Carr address, see "The 
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East," Transactions of the Grotius Society 34 (1948) :141-151. 
13 RG238, Court Papers, Box No. 102, item #1723; 
Nippon Times, November 9, 1948, pp. 1, 2, November 11, 
p. l; Pacific Stars and Stripes, November 11, 1948, p. l; 
and the London Times, November 13, 1948, p. 4. 
sounded like a "History professor with an Oxonian accent" 
delivering a classroom lecture. The Japanese accused 
132 
truly resembled tired old men. The appearance of the elderly 
defendants belied the common but erroneous western belief 
that 11 all Japanese look alike." Lieutenant General Jiro 
Minami, with a long, white "straggly goat-beard," sat 
impassively. Lieutenant General Kenji Dohihara, according 
to the Nippon Times, resembled a "frightened rabbit." 
Former Premier Hideki Tojo, as described by the Nippon 
Times, looked like the atypical picture of a sly Japanese 
warlord." Baron Sadao Araki, "an unreliable general despite 
his mustache" quipped the Tokyo Shimbun, maintained his rigid 
14 
courtroom posture. 
In its majority judgment, the Tribunal offered several 
explanations for the length of the two and one half year, 
ten million dollar trial. In addition to mentioning the 
scope of the case, covering the years 1928-1945, and delays 
involved with language translation, the court cited the 
tendency of counsel and witnesses to be "prolix and irrelevant." 
The Tribunal noted that the defense section repeatedly 
challenged the meaning of events, "often to the extent of 
contesting the seemingly incontestable." The court termed 
14Nippon Times, November 5, 1948, pp. 1, 2; 
London Times, November 5, 1948, p. 3; Tokyo Shimbun, 
November 7, 1948, GHQ, SCAP, Allied Translator and Inter-
preter Section (ATIS}, Press Translations and Summaries, 
Numbers 761-777, Reel 13, November 12, 1948; and Stars and 
Stripes, November 12, 1948, p. 1, November 14, p. 10. 
defense e . 
VJ.dence a "disappointment." The bench refused 
Inuch of the defense evidence because it contained "little 
or 
no Probative value." 
The majority judgment rejected all the defense 
content· ions. It questioned the defense claim that Japan 
acted • 
J.n self-defense, and ruled that Allied economic 
trade re . strictions were "an entirely justifiable attempt" 
to curb 
Japanese expansion. The Tribunal pointed out 
that Ja 
Pan's Plan for conquest was made "long before" 
the All· 
. ies enacted economic sanctions against Japan. The 
JUdgzne 
nt repudiated the defense claim that the IMTFE 
Charter v· 
f l.Olated international law and codified ex post 
~eta l 
--....;;;. egislat· ion. The majority stated that the charter 
l>las "n ot 
an arbitrary exercise of power" but the "expression 
Of · internat· 
"' ional law existing at the time of its creation." 
..,he 
court 
c. asserted that aggressive war was an international 
r1.rne ev . 15 
en before the release of the Potsdam Declaration. 
The court held the leaders of Japan criminally 
resp 
onsible for i f the welfare of Allied pr soners o war 
a..nd . 
CJ."ilian internees and ruled that official responsibility 
beyond "mere maintenance" to the "prevention of 
eletenas 
lttistl" 
eatment." Claimed ignorance of wartime atrocities 
cou.1d 
not b i A a solve an accused from criminal liabil ty. 
15 ~ ~or cost estimates of trial, see Christian Science 
!~48, P. Boston), November 12, 1948, P· l; ~, N~vember 22, 
q 'l'rE J 36 • For majority opinion on length of trial, see 
efen~e~d9'1Dent of the IMTFE, pp. 13-20. For majority on 
ontentions, see pp. 23-28, 990-992. 
133 
cabinet 
member h 
the W o learned of atrocities yet remained in 
gove 
rnme.nt h inh ' w ether he tried or failed to correct 
uma..ne t 
reatment " · 11. any . , wi ingly as sumed responsibility for 
J..lJ 
· treatment in the future ." ninet The Tribunal named 
een of th 
Of th e twenty-five defendants for various violations 
e Ci • 
noted "llized treatment of allied prisoners. The judgment 
that 
Pl:'act, from 1937-1945 the Japanese armed forces "freely 
lced" 
desp· rape, torture, murder and cruelties of the most 
lea.bl 
of~ e and savage character. The widespread amount 
al:' c .... · 
... imes 
ol:'d Proved that atrocities "were either secretly 
8 l:'ed 
or w·11 l'he l fully permitted" by the Japanese leaders. 
l'l:'. lbu.na1 Jap emphasized that more Allied soldiers died in 
anese 
~il Prison camps than in German or Italian camps. 
e o.n1 
i y 4 Percent of American and United Kingdom soldiers 
ntel:'.ned b 
27 Y Germany and Italy had died during the war, 
Pel:'ce.nt 
in of the American and United Kingdom troops held Jct,._ 
.t"'anese 
camps had died. 
l'he m . 
CJ:-· aJority judgment catalogued the Japanese war 
lines 
Of a..n
d atrocities. 
tol:'t 
Ul:' i.ng All · ' f " as ied prisoners of war were "so uni orm 
to • 
t l.,ndicate a common policy "both in training and execu-
1o.n " 
. p ' 
~i~• Unishments inflicted on prisoners had included 
lsection 
~ and cannibalism. For example, a Japanese 
E!d.ica1 
Stude t ft 
~e . n had described the dissection o wo 
l:' l.ca.n 
Jap Prisoners while they were still alive. After a 
anese 
medical officer extracted the two men's livers 
It asserted that Japanese methods 
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the student recorded in his diary that it was "very informa-
tive." The consumption of prisoner's flesh had been 
made into a "festive occasion." Japanese soldiers had 
consumed the flesh of Allied prisoners or "soup from such 
flesh," even when other food was available. "Even officers 
of the rank of General and Rear-Admiral took part. 11 The 
sickening, detailed examples caused many Americans to 
16 leave the courtroom. 
The court dropped thirty-eight of the fifty-five 
Allied charges in the IPS Indictment. The Tribunal dropped 
all allegations dealing with conspiracy to commit murder 
against individually specified Allied states. The majority 
judgment stated that the rejected charges were either 
repetitious or outside the jurisdiction of the IMTFE. 
The court decided that the Charter conferred jurisdiction 
only for a conspiracy to commit Crimes against Peace. 17 
On November 12, there was an "air of unreality" 
as the Tokyo War Crimes Trial began its final day. The 
visitor's gallery was only partially filled. The defendants 
appeared oblivious to their surroundings. Marquis Koichi 
16For view on individual responsibility, see IMTFE, 
Judgment of the IMTFE, pp. 28-32. For conclusion on war crimes, 
see pp. 1001-1003, 1065-1067. See also Honolulu Advertiser 
November 11, 1943, p. 8; Pacific Sta·rs and Stripes, Nov . 12: 
1948, p. l; and London Times, November 12, 1948, p. 4. 
17 IMTFE, Judgment of the IMTFE, pp. 32-37. 
Kido, "looking older than his 59 years," slumped , into 
his accustomed seat. The former Lord Keeper of the Privy 
Seal, who, according to the Nippon Times, resembled a 
"dyspeptic Mickey Mouse," closed his eyes "with that same 
expression of boredom" which had characterized all the 
accused throughout the long proceedings. Eighty-four year 
old former Premier Kiichiro Hiranurna appeared "to slumber 
peacefully." General Seishiro Itagaki seemed "no more 
concerned than if he were in a movie theater," according 
to the Pacific Stars and Stripes. General Hideki Tojo 
picked his nose while 75 year old former War Minister Jiro 
Minami dozed. 18 
At 1:30 p.m., President Webb began reading the 
court's finding on the indictment counts. The Tribunal 
found twenty-three of the twenty-five defendants guilty 
on Count One of the Indictment. Count One charged the 
accused with a criminal conspiracy to plan and wage 
aggressive wars. The goal of that conspiracy was the 
military, economic and political control of "east Asia, 
the Western and Southwestern Pacific Oceans and the Indian 
Ocean." The conspirators utilized "unconstitutional" 
and "ruthless" methods to seize control of the Japanese 
Government. The accused then used the Japanese state to 
18Honolulu Advertiser, November 12, 1948, p. 4; 
Pacific Stars· and Stripes, November 12, 1948, pp. 1, 4; 
and Nippon Times, November 13, 1948, p. 3. 
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carry out their plans for control of East and Southeast 
Asia. The majority judgment termed that conspiracy to wage 
wars of aggression the most grave crime conceivable and 
11 • • 1 · . ..19 crimina in the highest degree. 
The court found most of the defendants guilty of 
waging aggressive war and found twenty-two guilty of waging 
aggressive war and war in violation of international 
treaties against the Republic of China from 1931-1945. The 
Tribunal decreed that eighteen defendants, from 1941-1945, 
had waged aggressive war and war in violation of international 
agreements against Britain, the Netherlands, and the United 
States. The majority judgment stated that two of the 
defendants, Kenji Dohihara and Seishiro Itagaki, were guilty 
of waging aggressive war against the Soviet Union at Lake 
Khassan in July 1938 and at Nomonhan from May to September 
1939. The IMTFE found two of the accused, Mamoru Shigemitsu 
and Hideki Tojo, guilty of waging aggressive war against 
France in September 1940. 
The Court ruled nine defendants guilty of war crimes 
and atrocities. count 54 of the indictment charged the 
accused with authorizing and permitting war crimes. Count 
55 held the defendants liable for failing to take sufficient 
measures to prevent the violation of the laws of war 
regarding treatment of prisoners. The majority judgment 
recited the repeated Japanese failure to uphold inter-
nationally recognized minimum standards for the treatment 
19 IMTFE, Judgment of the IMTFE, pp. 1137-1142. 
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of prisoners of war. For example, in May 1942 Premier Tojo 
instructed prison camp officials to forbid prisoners "to 
lie idle doing nothing but eating freely for even a single 
day." He urged camp commanders to make sure that Allied 
prisoners were "usefully employed." At 4:30 p.m., the 
court took a brief recess. 20 
At 4:55 p.m., the Tribunal resumed to pronounce the 
verdicts. One by one, the individual Japanese defendants 
stood alone in the dock awaiting final sentence. After 
a two and one-half year trial, it took President Webb only 
twenty-one minutes to read the court's final judgment. The 
Australian jurist's voice was firm and steady as he pro-
nounced the Tribunal's first death verdict on Kenji 
Dohihara. Kenji Dohihara, Koki Hirota, Seishiro Itagaki ✓ 
Heitaro Kimura, Iwane Matsui, Akira Muto and Hideki 
Tojo were sentenced to death by hanging. Mamoru Shigemitsu 
received the lightest verdict of seven years imprisonment. 
The Tribunal sentenced Shigenori Togo to twenty years 
imprisonment and sentenced the remaining sixteen defendants 
to terms of life imprisonment. Most of the accused received 
their sentences calmly. After hearing the individual 
verdicts, each prisoner except Hiroshi Oshima bowed 
rigidly to either the court or gallery. only Lieutenant 
General Akira Muto showed a visible reaction to the Tribunal's 
2 0F · d' t or aggressive war ver 1c s, 
of the 'IMTFE, pp. 992-1000. For war 
pp. 1076-1078, 1086-1092, 1096-1097, 
see IMTFE, Judgment 
crit(\.es verdicts, see 
1105-1106, 1127-1211. 
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finding. Muto, according to Life magazine,"ground his 
teeth and gulped. 11 Afterwards, Hideki Tojo told reporters, 
through his attorney Dr. Kiyose, that the World War II 
leader considered the proceedings a "victor's trial." 
The sentences were somewhat inconsistent. The court 
found all defendants guilty on Count One except Mamoru 
Shegemitsu and Iwane Matsui. Every accused guilty on 
Count One except Shigenori Togo received at least a life 
imprisonment term. The Tribunal found Hiroshi Oshima and 
Toshia Shiratori guilty only on Count One but sentenced 
them both to life imprisonment. The majority Judgment 
declared Iwane Matsui guilty only on Count 55 yet condemned 
him to death. The bench voting on the seven death verdicts 
was close. The death penalty for Hirota Koki passed on 
a six to five vote. The Court voted seven to four on the 
. . . t. 21 remaining six execu ions. 
Two justices filed separate but concurring opinions. 
Philippine judge Delfin Jaranilla, survivor of the Bataan 
"death march," agreed with the verdicts but found them "too 
lenient, not exemplary and deterrent." In a thirty-five 
page opinion, Jaranilla stated that Supreme Commander MacArthur 
21 For sentences, see IMTFE, Judgment of the IMTFE, pp. 
1145-1218; Honolulu Advertiser, November 12, 1948, p. l ; Los 
Angeles Times, November 13, 1948, pp. 1,2,3; London Times-;--
November 13, 1948, p. 4; Pacific Stars and Stripes, November 14, 
1948, pp. 1,4; Washin·gton Star, November 14, 1948, p. 1; and 
Life, November 29, 1948, pp. 40-41. For Court voting, see 
New York Times, December 9, 1948, p. 9; Stars and Stripes, 
December Io, 1948, p. 1; and Nippon Times, December Io, 1948 
p. 1. For a detailed summary of the IMTFE verdicts, see ' 
Appendix D of this thesis. 
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had carefully chosen the eleven jurists for their qualifica-
tions, fairness and impartiality." The former Japanese 
prisoner alleged that the court exercised too much "leniency 
in favor of the accused" by granting the defendants every 
opportunity to present their case," thus protracting the 
trial." President Webb also submitted a separate but 
concurring motion, concluding that the Nazi war crimes had 
been "far more heinous, varied and extensive" than the 
Japanese atrocities. The chief judge, citing the advanced 
age of the war criminals, revealed his belief that no 
defendant should have been sentenced to death and stated 
that it might prove "revolting to hang or shoot such old 
men." A second reason for mitigation of the judgment, Webb 
believed, was the immunity of the Emperor, and he repeated 
his firm conviction of Hirohito's "outstanding part" in 
World War II. Webb noted that the court should have taken 
notice of the fact "that the leader of the crime, though 
available for trial, had been granted immunity by the 
prosecution. 1122 
22For Jaranilla opinion, see RG238, Court Journal, 
Box No. 84, pp. 4041-4076; Pacific Stars and Stripes, 
November 12, 1948, p. l; Nippon Times, November 13, 1948, 
p. l; and Stars and Stripes, November 14, 1948, p. 1. For 
Webb opinion, see Box No. 84, pp. 4077-4093; N.Y. Times, 
November 13, 1948, p. 9; L.A. Times, November 13, 1948, 
pp. 1,2; London Times, November 13, 1948, ~- 4; Nippon Times, 
November 13, 1948, pp. 1, 3; Stars and Stripes, November 14, 
1948, p. l; N.Y. Times, November 30, 1948, p. 16; L.A. Times 
December 20, 1948, p. 7; and N .Y. Times, January 15, 1949, ' 
p. 4. According to William Sebald, SCAP's political advisor, 
MacArthur considered Webb's separate but concurring opinion 
"cheap politics," aimed at pleasing Australians who had 
demanded the trial of Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal. 
Three · d Ju ges held dissenting opinions. Justice 
B. V. A R 
· 
O1ing of the Netherlands contested many findings 
of the rn . 
aJority J'udgment. i · Rol ng agreed with the defense 
team 
that the 
wording of the Potsdam Declaration and 
Instrument 
of Surrender made no reference to Crimes against 
Peace and 
Crimes against Humanity. He concluded that the 
Allied 
countries had never made any declaration regarding 
War c . 
ana 
the 
rimes " 
other than those committed in the last wars," 
asserted 
that it was "well-nigh impossible" to define 
concept 
of planning or waging an aggressive war. 
French justice Henri Bernard also disagreed with 
the 
ll'lajority. Bernard attacked the "defective procedure" 
Of th 
e trial Proceedings. He concluded that the court had 
failed to 
respect essential legal principles, "a violation 
Of Whi 
Ch Would result in most civilized nations in the 
nullity 
of the entire procedure." The French judge also 
noted that th 
e Tribunal had failed to establish direct proof Of a 
conspiracy 
airoh· • l.to 
He asserted that the immunity of Emperor 
Was "certainly detrimental to the defense of the 
accu 
sed. " Bernard also revealed that the Tokyo jurists 
ne"e 
r met to d. . d t 23 iscuss the court's final JU gmen • 
Justice Radha Binod Pal of India, the only judge 
a background in international law, issued a scathing 
8ee 
<~e Seba1a wi·th . J W York Russell Brines, · With Mac-Arthur ·in· apan 
2 3 
' 
19 6 S } , pp . 16 4 , 16 8 . 
~o. 84 For Roling dissent, see RG238, · court Journal, Box 
'PP. 3747-4015. For Bernard dissent, see PP· 4016-4040. 
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dissent 
b ' one longer than the entire majority judgment. Pal 
egan Writing 
n· his 250,000 word dissent in January 1947, 
J.ne months 
after the opening of the trial, and completed it . 
ln Ju1y 1948. 
Proceed. 
J.ngs as an 
a defea 
ted enemy. 
The Indian jurist repudiated the entire 
illegal,"vindictive retaliation" against 
He asserted that Japan's activities in E:ast Asia 
had a precedent in the Monroe Doctrine of the 
United States. 
The former member of the Calcutta High Court 
Challen 
gea the basis of the IMTFE war crimes charges. Pal a11e 
gea that the accused could not be held individually 
.tesPons·b 
J. le for acts of state. He stressed that Crimes 
against l? 
. eace and Crimes against Humanity had no basis J.n int 
ernationa1 law, and argued that the Charter could not gra 
nt the Tribunal jurisdiction over those two ex post 
~ch 
arges. The Indian justice emphasized that no /\lliea d 
eclaration or wartime pronouncement could invest any 
court · 
. WJ.th authority that did not already exist under J.nte.t 
t national law. He concluded that any international 
.tia1 b 
asea on the definition of law as described by the 
'.roJcy 
~Charter amounted to the "sham employment of legal P.toce 
ss for the satisfaction of a thirst for revenge." E'ina11 
Y, Judge Pal repudiated the prosecution contention Of a 
Japanese conspiracy to launch aggressive war. He 
a '-'el:' .tea 
that the alleged conspiracy 11 had not been attested to by 
t}i any Witness, thing or documents. 11 The jurist claimed 
at e"' 
en if a conspiracy could be proved, conspiracy by 
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itself was not a crime under international law. 
Pal also attacked the entire rules of procedure and 
evidence of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial and concluded that 
the court had abandoned all known procedural rules designed 
"to guard a Tribunal against erroneous persuasion." He 
pointed out that the court had accepted much evidence 
"which normally would have been discarded as hearsay 
evidence." The IMTFE had enacted restrictive rules of 
evidence for the defense while allowing more lax rules for 
h . 24 t e prosecution. 
The Japanese press reaction favored the verdicts. Most 
newspapers lauded the judgment as a milestone for justice 
and peace. The Jiji Shimpo, for example, declared that it 
was hard to imagine a more fair decision. The Asahi 
termed the verdicts a declaration of future peace. The 
Tokyo Shimbun, the Mainichi, Shin Yukan and the Sekai 
Keizai reminded their readers of the collective guilt 
of all Japanese people for allowing the "military clique" 
to "plague us for so long a time." Virtually all papers, 
however, were surprised by the court's harsh verdict for 
former Premier Koki Hirota. The Kochi Nippo quipped that 
24 Radha Binod Pal, International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East: Dissentient Jud ment of Justice R. B. 
Ca cutta, India, 953 , pp. - , 9- , 37, 48, 
83, 86-87, 104-105, 139-141, 148-161, 291, 557-567, 572-574, 
577, 698-701; Nippon Times, November 13, 1948, pp. 1,2; 
and Stars and Stripes, November 14, 1948, p. 1, November 15, 
p. 1. Pal dissent is also located in RG238, Court Journal, 
Box No. 85, pp. 4100-4782 and Box No. 86, pp. 4783-5463. 
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if the twenty-five defendants alone were responsible for 
15 years of war then "they are supermen" and "their excellent 
ability should be praised. 1125 
Japanese political activities ceased during the reading 
of the Tribunal's final verdicts. Diet members hovered 
around the radio to hear the judgment. All refused to 
comment. Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako heard the 
radio sentences at the Imperial Palace. Hirohito, dressed 
in a business suit, sat erectly in his chair but appeared 
downcast as he listened intently to the sentences. According 
to the Stars and Stripes, the Emperor looked "somewhat 
shocked" over the Tribunal's death verdict for Koki Hirota 
dl 'f f ih' 'd 26 an i e term or Koci Kio. 
The Japanese popular reaction to the verdicts was 
mixed. Large crowds gathered in the Ginza to hear the 
judgments over the radio. Many Japanese "copied down the 
sentences in their notebooks." Some Japanese interviewed 
felt the findings were "entirely proper." Others felt the 
Tokyo decisions were an arbitrary punishment rendered by 
the victor nations. Petition drives for the mitigation 
of sentences began "gradually cropping up." The entreaty 
on behalf of Hirota Koki was always 11 the starter." Japanese 
25ATIS, Press Trans·1·ation and Summaries, Numbers 761-
777, Reel 160; Numbers . 770-793, Reel 61; Numbers 794-808, 
Reel 62; and Nippon Times, Nove~ber 13, 1948, p. 1, 
November 14, pp. 1, 4, November 26, p. 4. 
26
'Nippon Times, November 13, 1948, p. 1, and Pacific 
Stars and Stripes, November 14, 1948, p. 1. 
repatriated soldiers from Manchuria and Russia felt the 
verdicts were too lenient. 27 
After the trial, Chief Prosecutor Keenan explained 
the prosecution's viewpoint on the Emperor. He disagreed 
strongly with President Webb's claim that Emperor Hirohito 
was the 11 leader of the crime." Keenan revealed that the 
January 1946 11 high level 11 decision not to indict Hirohito 
was made by the Allies "for political reasons." The IPS 
position stated that the emperor had been under the power 
of "gangsters." Keenan believed that the prosecution 
testimony showed Hirohito "to be a weak character" but "on 
the side of peace. 11 The head of IPS had attempted to have 
the emperor testify as a witness,but Britain had vetoed 
that attempt. He alleged that the courtroom appearance 
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of Hirohito would have been unbearable for England since 
"they have a King of their own." Keenan alleged that Britain 
opposed "from the very beginning" the legal idea that "the 
initiation of wars is a crime." Finally, the chief prosecutor 
stated that he was ashamed of the seven year sentence for 
former Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, who had been 
included as a defendant only at the insistence of the Soviet 
27For Japanese popular reaction, see Reels 60, 61 
and 62 of ATIS; Christian Science Monitor , November 12, 1948, 
p. l; Nippon Times, November 13, 1948, p. l; N.Y. Times, 
November 13, 1948, pp. 1, 9; Washington Post, December 23, 
1948, p. 10; and Sebald, With Ma·cArthur 1.n Japan, pp. 160-
161. The American Bataan Veteran's Organization (BVO) 
attacked "the outrageous miscarriages of justice" at the 
Tokyo War Crimes Trial. The BVO felt that the 11 Japs" 
were "getting off too lightly." See Nippon Times, December 4, 
1948, p. 2. 
. 28 Union. 
Article 17 of the Charter granted Supreme Commander 
MacArthur a final review of the verdicts. On November 21, 
the defense lawyers petitioned SCAP for a reversal or for 
mitigation. Ben Bruce Blakeney argued that the Court did 
not provide the defendants an unbiased trial. He noted 
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that three of the Tribunal's own judges contested the fair-
ness of the proceedings. Blakeney stressed that the verdicts 
looked "too much like an act of vengeance to impress the 
29 
world with our love of justice and fair play." 
On November 21, at 11:35 a.m., General MacArthur 
and Allied members of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) met 
at the Dai Ichi Building to discuss the sentences. MacArthur 
asked for the FEC recommendations on the verdicts and 
for ninety minutes the eleven FEC members expressed their 
views. Seven advised no change in the sentences. Four 
advised a reduction in the sentences. French member Lieutenant 
28Nippon Times, November 21, 1948, pp. 1, 2; London 
Times, November 22, 1948, p. 3; Pacific Stars and Stripes, 
December 4, 1948, p. 4, December 6, p. 4; Washington Post, 
December 23, 1948, p. 16; and N.Y. Times, Januar y 14, 1949, 
p. 11. In 1950, Keenan alleged that Stalin could have 
been indicted for planning and initiating wars of aggression, 
the same charge levied against the Japanese at the Tokyo 
War Crimes Trial. See "Joseph Keenan Meets the Press," 
American Mercury, April 1950, pp. 456-460. 
29For defense petitions to SCAP, see RG238 ,· Miscellaneous 
Records, Box No. 350. Blakeney's plea is in Box No. 352. 
See also Pacific Stars and Stripes, November 16, 1948, p. 4 
and Nippon Times, November 21, 1948, p. 1, November 23, p. 1. 
.L4' 
General Z. Pechkoff, though officially polled as advocating 
no changes in sentences, issued a personal appeal for 
clemency. Pechkoff noted that future generations might 
conclude that the Tokyo War Crimes Trial's objectivity was 
"influenced by and subjected to the political requirements 
of the moment. 1130 
On November 24, MacArthur revealed his review 
decision. Stating that he could find "nothing of technical 
commission or omission" in the trial proceedings "to warrant 
my investigation," he upheld the sentences. The supreme 
commander concluded that he could conceive of "no judicial 
process where greater safeguard was made to evolve justice." 
He directed Eighth Army Commander Lieutenant General Walton 
Walker to execute the sentences one week after November 25. 
The date and time remained a secret. The bodies of the 
condemned war criminals would not be returned to their 
f · 1 · 31 ami ies. 
3
°For FEC voting, see RG238, MacArthur's Review of 
the Judgment, Box No. 351; Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, 
pp. 168-169; and Nippon Times, November 23, 1948, p. 1. 
For Pechkoff clemency plea, see RG238, Box No. 351. 
31For MacArthur review, see Box No. 351; United 
States Department of State, Diplomatic Papers, Forei~n 
Relations of the United States, 1948, volume 6 (Washington, 
D.C., 1974), p. 908; Stars and Stripes, November 24, 1948, 
p. l; Nippon Times, November 25, 1948, pp. 1, 2; Douglas 
MacArthur, Reminiscences (N.Y., 1964), p. 318; Sebald, pp. 
169-170; and Courtney Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous 
with Destiny (N.Y., 1965), pp. 281-282. 
On November 29, the sa~e day that MacArthur's Press 
Office established a twenty-four "Tojo death watch," four 
American defense lawyers appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. On November 30, SCAP postponed the executions 
pending the Supreme Court's decision. In their petition, 
defense attorneys again challenged the legality of the 
trial. On December 6, the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the appeals. On the sixteenth and seventeenth, four 
counsel for the Japanese defendants argued their case 
before the High Court. George Yamaoka, George Furness, 
John Brannon and William Logan, Jr., claimed that the 
Tokyo Court was not a true international tribunal but a 
"rare creation" of the U.S. executive branch and "the 
military authority thereunder." Logan contended that SCAP 
had created new definitions of international law and Crimes 
against Peace and Humanity that retroactively violated the 
American Constitution. On December 21, by a vote of 
six to one, the Supreme Court ruled that it had no juris-
diction over an international body such as the Tokyo 
Tribunal. At 9:00 p.m., SCAP gave official notifications 
to the seven condemned men that their sentences would be 
. d 32 carrie out. 
32 For twenty-four hour "death watch," see Honolulu 
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Advertiser, November 29, 1948, pp. 1,2; Pacific Stars and 
Stripes, November 29, 1948, p. 4;· Nippon Times, November 
29, 1948, p. l; N.Y.· Times, November 29, 1948, p. 17; and 
Washington Post, December 22, 1948, p. 4. For Supreme Court 
defense petitions and arguments, see Stars and Stripes, 
December 1, 1948, p. 4; Nippon Times, December 17, 1948, 
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The Tokyo night of December 23 was cold and crisp. 
At 1:40 a.m., Kenji Dohihara, Iwane Matsui, Akira Muto, 
and Hideki Tojo gathered in a specially constructed cell 
block shrine at Sugamo Prison. The four condemned men wore 
plain, green U.S. Army salvage work clothing "completely 
devoid of insigna of any kind." Shinsho Hanayama, Buddhist 
priest and professor of Indian philosophy at Tokyo University, 
conducted final rites in the improvised chapel. As a final 
goodbye, the defendants drank grape juice and then water 
with Dr. Hanayama. After the ceremony, two U.S. guards 
escorted each condemned man towards the death house. 
At 11:55 p.m., four members of the Tokyo Far Eastern 
Commission entered the death house. General Douglas 
MacArthur had ordered American representative William J. 
Sebald, Chinese General Shang Chen, British member Patrick 
Shaw and Russian Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko 
to be present as official witnesses in order to verify the 
execution of the judgment of the IMTFE. Despite the Nuremberg 
precedent and "worldwide protest," MacArthur forbade the 
press from viewing the executions. 
There was absolute silence in the death house. The 
four Allied representatives stood on a low, narrow platform 
against one side of the brightly lit room. Before 
pp. 1, 2; Washington Post, December 17, 1948, pp. 1, 19, 
December 18, 1948, p. 3; Nippon Times, December 18, 1948, 
pp. 1, 2, December 19, pp. 1, 2; Washington Post, December 
21, 1948, pp. 1, 3; Nippon Times, December 22, 1948, pp. 1, 
2; and Stars and Stripes, December 22, 1948, pp. 1, 4. 
those Alli . 
ed witnesses stood a long, wooden stage with 
n'lllnbered 
ropes, from one to five. American Army doctors, 
grave 
re · gistration personnel and soldiers stood by in the 
toillblike 
Silence. 
Second Muto s after midnight, Dohihara, Matsui, Tojo and 
enter d 
e the death house. The entrance to the chamber 
Opened d. 
d irectly in front of the dais on which the Allied 
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e1egates 
stood. 
as he Each condemned was "individually identified" 
entered 
the f the room. After the identification process, 
our d 
gall oomed men climbed the thirteen steps to the 
o-ws• d 
eek. 
eJCecut· ion 
:four 
men. 
Another identification was made. The 
detail placed black hoods over the heads of the 
Lt. Charles c. Rexroad adjusted the ropes and 
noos es 
''cl One and a half minutes after midnight, with 
Ock-1· ike" . . Si~ military precision, Rexroad sprang the traps 
Ultan 
eous1y, resulting in "a sound like a rifle volley." 
d At 12:lg a.m. . . . f th eath following medical verification o e 
S Of 
b.tought 
Donihara, Matsui, Muto and Tojo, U.S. soldiers 
Seish' int iro Itagaki, Koki Hirota and Heitaro Kimura 
o the d 
and eath chamber. The same identification process 
eJCec,.t· 
"'4 ion Was repeated. By 12:35 a.m., the seven 
sente 
declth 
nces had been carried out. 
At 12 hou =36 a.m., the four FEC members left the death 
se ana 
Co hastened back to the main prison building. 
lone1 
American commandant of S~gamo, provided 
to ease the tension. The four observers each 
8 tra· k ight whiskey. Lieutenant General Derevyan o 
rode home with American FEC Chairman Sebald because the 
Republic of China and the Soviet Union were at odds. On 
the way home, Derevyanko accepted Sebald's invitation for 
a nightcap. Around 2:00 a.m., Sebald drove Derevyanko 
home, "slightly worse for the evening's experience." 33 
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A light rain fell on Sugamo Prison during the early 
hours of December 24. American soldiers with fixed bayonets 
stood guard, barring the way to Allied newsmen. At 2:05 
a.m., under the "strictest security regulations," two 
large U.S. Army trucks sped through the gates of Sugamo 
Prison in Tokyo's Ikebukuro Ward. Four military police 
jeeps, two in front and two in the rear, flanked the Army 
trucks. "Under the cloak of utmost secrecy," the convoy 
disappeared into the night. 
At 7:45 a.m., the military convoy, bearing the bodies 
of seven war criminals, arrived at a square stucco structure 
in Yokohama. The building, dominated by a 200 foot stack 
rising above it, stood in a bombed out hollow in an area 
33For descriptions of the seven hangings, see Los 
Angeles Times, December 21, 1948, p. 1, December 23, pp. 
1, 6, December 24, p. 7; Baltimore Evening Sun, December 22, 
1948, pp. 1, 4; Seattle Daily Times, December 22, 1948, 
pp. 1, 4; Washington Star, December 22, 1948, pp. 1, 4; 
New York Times, December 23, 1948, pp. 1, 6; Washington Post, 
December 23, 1948, pp. 1, 10; Nippon Times, December 24, 
1948, pp. 1,2; and Pacific Stars and Stripes, December 24, 
1948, pp. 1, 4. For MacArthur's refusal to permit newsmen 
and photographers, see Nipp-on· Times, November 25, 1948, 
pp. 1, 2, November 28, pp. 1, 2; and Stars and· Stripes, 
December 22, 1948, pp. 1, 4. For the Nuremberg precedent 
of allowing two newsmen from each occupying power to witness 
the Nazi executions, see stars and Stripes, October 2, 1946, 
p. 1. 
I 
known 
as l<uboyama. 
Propr· Inside, Hiyoshi Tobita, ten year l.etor f 
to O the Yokohama Municipal Crematorium, rushed 
complete 
his preparations. The customary day's advance 
notice had 
not been given, but Tobita had been prepared to 
carry out 
the cremations on short notice. 
At 8:10 
no a.m., amidst bleak surroundings that offered 
rnore d' 1gnity th l:'Ust an a "common garbage incinerator," seven 
y ovens 
1 consumed the seven bodies. u. s. Army personnel · C Osel,r 
~ superv-· 
ernpr ised the entire proceedings. Cremation 
0 Yees 
the U Placed the remains into ash boxes furnished by 
.s. Arrn l y. 
Unch The small black boxes resembled "Japanese 
boxes" 
l.. · Army personnel then loaded the seven boxes nt0 
American . 
a11 Jeeps. "Well," said Hiyoshi Tobi ta, "it's 0
"er. 
se"en 
It is just what we expected for Tojo." The 
Artny . 
ind' Jeeps left the Yokohama Municipal Crematorium 
l.fferent . 
b~ directions ~ rn. . To prevent possible enshrinement 
l.litar· 
the 1sts, U.S. Army officials scattered to the winds 
ashes 
of the seven men. 34 
s 34 
:,J_ln .F'or · M · be-' Dece b cremation descriptions, see Baltimore orni ng 
Ppcernber ; 3 er 23, 1948, pp. 1, 6; Honolulu Advertiser, ~a~~, 6; w' 1~48, pp. 1, 7; N.Y. Times, December 23, 1948, 
~gt~h~ngton Post, December 23, 1948, PP· 1~ 10; 
, December 23, 1948, pp. 1, 3; and Nippon 
Unt~atoriu ember 24, 1948, pp. 1, 2. several Jap~nese 
t 0 l.l the rn Workers salvaged a few ashes and buried them 
St~~he farn?c~upation ended. The remains were then returned 
l.l~es of the condemned. See Pacific Stars and 
6, p~ ~Pr11 23, 1955, p. 13 and 'Nippon Times, May 7, 
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IN RETROSPECT 
A . Verdict Procedure reached by a Tribunal after a defective 
Which deli~anno~ be a valid one ... the manner in 
as to havi erations were conducted may be contested 
Which th fg assured the defendants all the guarantees 
-Fe aw of nations grants them .... 
rench Justice Henri Bernard, November 1948. 
Between 1945 and 1951, Allied military tribunals 
throughout 
t.ty Jap 
anese 
war criminals. 
East Asia, Southeast Asia and Russia to 
War crimes trials convened in 
Canberra 
tab ' Batavia, Guam, Khabarousk, Kuala Lumpur, 
Uan 
ho 'Manila, Canton, h 11 l d · ~· the Mars a Is ans, Morotai, 
.tt n 
arwin 
~ei . ' Rabaul, Shanghai, Singapore, Hong Kong, Nanking, 
Pl.ng f. 
Ali· ' 1anus Island, Macassar, Yokohama and Tokyo. Those 
l.ed t . 
P.tiso ribunals handed down 920 death verdicts and 5,472 
n terms.I 
The m . i.tozn aJor Asian war crimes trials convened in Tokyo 
April 2 Int 9 , 1946 to November 12, 1948. That Court, the 
e.tnat· l.ona1 M' . . 
~hat . ilitary Tribunal for the Far East, tried 
l.s C p onsidered to be the twenty-eight principal Japanese 
.te""a.t 
ana w artirne leaders. The Tokyo trial proceedings 
~a_.td1,,. 
.. ~ a model of fairness. The rules of trial 
!>· l l.cc• tocat. in l.ga11 ion and statistics quoted from Philip Rocco 
Pp the Eao, "In the Shadow of Nuremberg: Trials of Japanese 
't.t:La l, 3. st1 ~945-1951" (Ph.D. dissertation, CCNY, 1977), 
~8i ls of !his thorough study describes the numerous 
O.t a. Th minor war criminals (Class "B" and "C") throughout 
Inajor ~ Tokyo Tribunal tried a small group of class "A" 
war C . ' riminals. 
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procedure, the nature of the evidence, the attitude of 
the Tribunal, the questionable legality of the Allied 
indictment, the problems with language translations and 
the Court's bias in favor of the prosecution precluded a 
fair trial by any national or international standard. 
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was 
convinced long before it first assembled that only one 
verdict could be delivered. 
American and Japanese defense lawyers labored at a 
disadvantage throughout the trial. Attorneys for the 
defense operated under several handicaps. The defense 
section lacked the necessary funds, facilities, lawyers, 
translators and time to insure a proper defense for 
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Japanese accused of war crimes. For example, on December 30, 
1946, the prosecution had 150 translators to the defense 
team's 50. Three Japanese defense lawyers later claimed 
that no defendant would have been hanged had the defense 
section possessed more money. The prosecution had more 
time to prepare its case. Supreme Commander MacArthur 
established the International Prosecution Section on 
December 8, 1945, while the International Defense Panel 
was not formed until April 5, 1946, only three weeks 
before the trial b~gan. 
American attorneys for both the prosecution and the 
defense were singularly ill-equipped for an international 
trial of Japanese. Only five of the nearly one hundred 
American lawyers spoke Japanese. Few counsel on either side 
had any 
P knowledge of Japan, its culture, or its politics. 
l:"osecut· 
ion attorneys seldom used the names of the 
Japanese 
b defendants but instead identified the accused 
Y an off· • 
ic1.a1 court seating diagram. 2 
Both th 
i e Prosecution and defense suffered from 
nterna1 . 
• bickerings and di' sputes. Th t · · 1 e prosecu ion split nto c1· iques . 
Pi:- ' Occasioned by the mixed feelings that chief 
osecutoi:-
Joseph B. Keenan evoked amongst them. Keenan, 
2 
lett For def . Vai er to th ense disadvantages, see Valentine B. Deale, 
n centine Be !iew York Times, December 19, 1948, p. 8E; 
the·' Febru~ Deale, interview at his office, Washington, 
cO1 MetropO1:f 5 , 1979; Beverly M. Coleman, interview at Cu e~an, tell. an Club, Washington, D.C., April 22, 1979; 
thnninghain ;Phone conversation, July 31, 1979; and owen 
1'1e e ~ectio~ Forum on War Crimes Trials, " Proceedings of 
(Ch~ing, Se if International and Comparative Law, Seattle 
lnt 1 cago 1 ~ ember 6-7, 1948, American Bar Association 
~ai:-ei:-nation 49 )~ ~P- 34-38. For December 30 figure, see 
19 Ci:-imes al_Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo 
cO~'Api:-11 ir1.a1, Proceedings (Tokyo: The Tribunal, May 3, ~~y se1 and 61 9 8 , pp. 13878-13891. For three Japanese 
sp 7, 1956 extra money, see The Nippon Times (Tokyo), 
~i~k7 Japan~ p. 3. Only three American defense counsel 
se ei Geoi:- se: John G. Brannon, Ben Bruce Blakeney and 
ca: Robertg: Yamaoka. For IPS lack of background on Japan, 
'''.l'h P Spi:-in · Donihi, interview at Andrews Air Force Base, 
19s e Toky0 g s , _Maryland, October 14, 1978; Solis Horowitz, l'he O): 49 4 ; Tri~1," International Conciliation 465 (No~ember 
.\s biost I Davia Nelson Sutton, Jr., "The Trial of TOJO: 
''p~Ociatio mportant Trial in All History?" American Bar 
'''.l'h rllni on ~ Journal 36 (February 1950): 95; H. A. H~uxhurst, 
(Jue Tokyo ar_cr1.mes Trials," p. 32; James T. c. Liu, 
J:.i.f ly 28, 1 Trial: Source Materials, 
11 Far Eastern ?u7vey 17 !~se and D 94 8) :170; and Saburo Shiroyama, War Criminal: The 
!~• an s eath of Hirota Koki (Tokyo, 1977), p. 230. For 
4 Justice ~a ting c art, see George F. Blewett, "Victor's . 
( Surnmei:- · 1 The Tokyo war crimes Trial, " Amer'ican P-erspecti ve 
950):287. 
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although considered a courtroom genius, was a poor 
administrator, drank excessively, and suffered from high 
blood pressure. Several associate prosecutors tried to 
have Keenan removed as chief of the International Prosecu-
tion Section (IPS). A. s. Comyns Carr, Associate Prosecutor 
from Britain, thought the prosecution case proceeded "more 
smoothly when Keenan was not in Tokyo. 113 
The defense team failed to present a united front. 
Several of the accused disliked each other. Those defendants 
often worked at cross-purposes and introduced contradictory 
evidence. Japanese and American attorneys had different 
ideas on how to conduct the case. Legal training and 
court procedure differed. What might have been important 
and relevant to a Japanese counsel seemed trivial or 
superfluous to an American lawyer. Divisions such as these 
only strengthened the prosecution's case. In fact, much of 
the defense evidence, as prosecution attorney Solis Horowitz 
wrote, "supported ra.ther than rebutted the prosecution case." 4 
3For Keenan disputes, see Robert M. Donihi interview; 
U.S. Army Pacific Stars and Stripes (Tokyo), June 19, 1946, 
p. l; June 28, p. 1 and June 30, p. l; and United States 
Department of State, Diplomatic Papers, Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1947, volume VI (Washington, D.C., 1971), 
pp. 269-270. For Keenan's occasional flushed courtroom 
condition, see Donihi inverview; Courtney Browne, Tojo: The 
Last Banzai (New York, 1967), p. 225; Robert J.C. Butow, 
ToJo and the Coming ·of the· War (Stanford, 1969), p. 496; and 
Richard H. Minear, victor I s Justic•e·;- The· Tokyo· War Crimes 
Trial (Princeton, 1971), p. 211. 
4For defense divisions, see Walter Lee Riley, "The 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East and the Law 
of the Tribunal as Revealed by the Judgment and the Concurring 
and Dissenting Opinions" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
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The quality of the American defense lawyers varied. 
While a few were undoubtedly excellent, most were mediocre. 
A Catholic University Law School Dean described the defense 
team as a conglomeration of 11 political hacks" whose legal 
experience, professional standards and moral values were 
"extremely slight." The June 1946 resignation of Chief 
of Defense Counsel Beverly M. Coleman and the other five 
original American defense attorneys hampered defense 
efforts. During the course of the trial, other counsel 
resigned because of Court abuse, inadequate clerical aid, 
and poor translation facilities. 5 
Washington at Seattle, 1957), pp. 102-103 and Lawrence W. 
Wadsworth, Jr., "A Short History of the Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial with Special Reference to Some Aspects of Procedure" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1955), pp. 165-
166, 226. For defense evidence actually aiding the prosecu-
tion, see Osaka Mainichi, January 17, 1947, p. 2; 
Nippon Times (Tokyo), November 6, 1948, p. l; U.S. Army 
Pacific Stars and Stripes (Tokyo), November 7, 1948, p. l; 
and Solis Horowitz, "The Tokyo Trial," pp. 525-526, 536. 
5 
Catholic University Law Dean Gordon Ireland, 
;,Uncommon Law in Martial Tokyo," Year Book of World 
Affairs {London, 1950), p. 72; "Ex Post Facto From Rome 
to Tokyo," Temple Law Quarterly 21 (July 1947), pp. 49-50, 
footnote #91; Valentine B. Deale interview; Beverly M. 
Coleman interview; Deale letter to N.Y. Times, December 
19, 1948, p. 8E; Newsweek, July 1, 1946, p. 38; and Saburo 
Shiroyama, War Criminal: The Life and Death of Hirota 
Koki, pp. 244-245, 250-251. Many counsel expected 
"sumptuous quarters, good publicity and the admiration 
of the Japanese." Some defense lawyers lingered in 
"geisha houses and other places of amusement" instead 
of in court. A few attorneys were intoxicated during 
interrogations,and one American counsel expected to 
sleep with the wife of his Japanese defendant. 
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There existed no fixed standards on the admissibility 
of courtroom evidence. The rules of evidence rested upon 
the Tribunal's discretion. For example, a vote of the 
bench determined what evidence would be admissible. This 
uncertainty as to what evidence was acceptable placed the 
defense team at a disadvantage. Article 13 of the 
Tribunal Charter permitted the Court to admit any type of 
evidence which it deemed to have probative value. The 
Court accepted hearsay evidence, permitted leading questions 
and allowed the use of affidavits in lieu of courtroom 
examination of witnesses. Article 9d, however, stated 
that each accused had the right "to conduct his defense, 
including the right to examine any witness." That acceptance 
of testimony by deposition precluded any cross-examination 
by the defendant or his counsel. 
Tribunal rulings favored the prosecution. Defense 
attorneys repeatedly argued that court rulings were 
biased against their case. In fact, 90 percent of all 
Tribunal decisions proved unfavorable to the defense. 
Tribunal President Sir William Flood Webb of Australia 
turned down defense attempts to quote Winston Churchill or 
Harry s. Truman,but yet allowed the prosecution to cite 
Josef Stalin. Evidence of Japanese atrocities in China 
formed a major part of the prosecution's case;yet President 
Webb refused to permit the defense to quote a statement 
of Chiang Kai-shek approving Japanese treatment of Chinese 
prisoners of war. The Court excluded all defense evidence 
relating to the existence of Communism in China or Russia. 
The Tribunal discounted evidence of Allied prewar economic 
legislation aimed at Japan. In sum, the Tokyo War Crimes 
bench rejected 50 percent of the defense evidence as 
lacking probative value. The Australian chief judge 
dismissed attempts to introduce evidence of good Japanese 
behavior. Sir William reminded the defense team that the 
Tokyo Tribunal had assembled to try Japanese on war crimes 
6 
and ''not to ascertain what virtues they possessed." 
President Webb's courtroom manners exercised a 
disquieting effect on the proceedings. His clashes with 
6 For Court Charter, see Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers, International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East Established at Tokyo January 19, 1946 (Washington, 
D.C., 1947), pp. 3-16. For fundamental right to cross-
examine witnesses, see Paul Chung-tseng Tsai, ~Judicial 
Administration of the Laws of War: Procedures in War 
Crimes Trials'' (LLD. dissertation, Yale University, 
1957), 2 volumes, Volume I, Chapter V, pp. 60-66. For 
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90% figure, see Lawrence w. Wadsworth, Jr., "A Short History 
of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial with Special Reference to 
Some Aspects of Procedure," p. 163. For the quoting of 
Truman, Churchill and Stalin, see International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Pro-
ceedings (Tokyo: The Tribunal, 3 May 1946-16 April 1948), 
pp. 188-195, 23759-23761. For Chiang Kai-shek statement, 
see IMTFE, Proceedings, p. 21806. For Court rulings on 
Communism, see pp. 21081, 22412-22413, 23759--23761. For 
a summary of the defense economic argument, see pp. 17088-
17089, 24764-24765, 24787-24792. For 50% figure, see 
Lawrence w. Wadsworth, Jr., "A Short History of the Tokyo 
War Crimes Trials with Special Reference to Some Aspects 
of Procedures," p. 179. For Webb comments on the good 
conduct of individual Japanese, see IMTFE, Proceedings, 
pp. 12325, 4473-4474, 27474. For more on Court bias in 
favor of the prosecution, see Wadsworth dissertation, 
pp. 139, 165-166, 173, 175-176, 215-216, 219-220, 224-
225. 
defense counsel and 
regular o 
Chief Prosecutor Keenan became a 
The court president frequently up-
b ccurrence. 
raided the defense lawyers. H d eneiny e accuse some of spreading 
cona a, using gratuitious insults and exercising propagand . 
. Uct unbecoming ruling an attorney. some of Webb's courtroom 
s were late f questionable. When a defense witness arrived 
or ord court due to a transpcrtation mix-up, sir William 
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erea a 
fix 
full investigation. He remarked that "we must 
resp onsibil't Ju-A i Y in these matters." Webb charged Justice 
o M . ei's d. to . river with contempt of court for failing 
Pl.ck u t· P the Chinese J'udge on time• After or. Ichiro 
1Yose •Peec se for Hideki Tojo, delivered a trenchant 
'coun 1 
hon th . coui, e trial proceedings, captain George Furness, 
Pre or Mamoru Shigemitsu, praised the •brilliant se1 f 
sent ation 11 
lllent s. It · ta,-,, is quite unnecessary-" After defense counsel 
ence M te cManus objected to the prosecution's use of the 
Webb replied: • •.• you can omit the compli-
~ "m h assacre 
aa n Ot 
at Naha,• citing the fact that a massacre 
been proved, the Tribunal president told McJlanus 
that he was II d 7 
------ un uly sensitive." 
Toke, foot ebb insults to defense counsel, see Chapter 7 
'l'hre For W trn
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Trialnote 23 of this thesisr Austin J. Gerber, "The 
•tn"ersity of General Jtagaki" (II.A• thesis, stanford 
~astthe S~dl959), PP· 71, 73r philip ROCCO piccigallO, ink' l94
5
_
1
°w of Nuremberg: Trials of Japanese in the 
l>or artial 951, • pp. 4 3-44 r and Ireland , "Uncommon Law Pp Webb Tokyo," Year aook of world Affairs, PP· 66-67 • 
196 1803
2 
~n~ transportation delays, see JMTFE• ~ceedings, 
<ief. For W 8131, 24503- For Webb and pu,:ness, see P· llit:nse wit ebb and 14c11anus, see PP· 2289-22~0- Webb.called 
U!nasa Ynes~ former premier and Navy 11inister Adlll1ral 
onai the "most stupid witness I have ever seen•' 
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The composition of the Tokyo Tribunal adversely 
affected the outcome of the trial. All eleven judges 
represented the victorious powers. No judge from a neutral 
nation sat on the bench. Furthermore, Russian justice 
Major General Ivan Micheyevich Zaryanov and French judge 
Henri Bernard understood neither English nor Japanese, the 
two official languages of the trial. Ju-Ao Mei, the 
Chinese jurist, was not a judge in his homeland. Only 
Indian justice Radha Binod Pal had a background in inter-
national law. Three judges joined the trial after pro-
ceedings began on April 29, 1946. On May 17, Indian 
member Pal joined the bench. A month later, Philippine 
judge Delfin Jaranilla first sat on the Tribunal. It 
was not until July 15 that U.S. justice Major General 
Myron C. Cramer assumed his seat on the bench. The 
defense lawyers contested the impartiality of three 
judges. They pointed out that President Webb had served 
as Australian war crimes commissioner during World War II. 
Delfin Jaranilla had spent World War II as a Japanese 
prisoner of war after surviving the infamous Bataan 
"death march." Myron Cramer had written a legal opinion 
while he was Judge Advocate General for President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt on the responsibility for Pearl Harbor. 
The admissibility of court evidence hinged on the 
daily composition of the Tribunal. A majority vote of 
all judges present determined Court decisions. Absenteeism 
See Osaka Mainichi, September 23, 1947, pp. 1, 4. 
162 
among the judges increased sharply as trial dragged on. un-
1 ike the Nuremburg war crimes trial, the Tokyo Trial failed 
to provide for alternate judges. Some jurists missed 
months at a time. Defense lawyers protested their repeated 
absences and argued that court decisions, whether favorable 
or unfavorable to their clients, depended solely on the 
daily constitution of the bench. President Webb more than 
once admitted that a full bench might be inclined to vote 
8 differently than a bench of six to eight members. 
The defense repeatedly challenged the Court's novel 
definitions of types of war crimes. Crimes against Peace 
and Crimes against Humanity, first proclaimed at the 
August 1945 London Conference for postwar planning for the 
trial of Nazi war criminals, possessed no basis in inter-
national law. Since both charges were created retroactively, 
the defense argued that an individual should not be held 
liable for an offense which was not criminal at the time of 
its commission. Moreover, it was unnecessary to indict 
Japanese defendants on those two counts. Conventional war 
crimes charges, as recognized by international law, would 
certainly have sufficed. Why, asked the defense, "stack 
the deck" further against the accused? 
8For Bernard and zaryanov lack of language background, 
see Chapter 3, footnote 4 of this thesis. For Webb quote 
on composition of Tribunal, see IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 
24816-24817, 25190-25191 and Modern Military Branch, 
World War II War Crimes (IMTFE), Record Group 238, Proceedings 
in Chambers, Box No. 78, p. 25, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
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see Por 
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Of t0 na1 Mil~ PP. 109-135; Walter Lee Riley, "The Inter-
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~i~ring anaun~1 as Revealed by the Judgment and.the Con-
Pp ear, Vi Dissenting Opinion, 11 pp. 121-151; Richard 
Pp
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42-73.ctor's Justice: The Tok o . war Crimes Trial, 
C. · 49-59: ~or on Ire an , 'Ex Post Facto From Rome to Tokyo," 
lia ~. l?ozn' Uncommon Law in Martial Tokyo," pp. 80-88; 
J.7flle, :t-.1ef:, Aggres•sive· War An International· crime (The 
.t2·a·t :--lao, 2 errands, 1933), pp. 24-33, 53-54, 116-117, 13r0 l..ona1 C 21 -227; Julius Stone, · Legal' Controis· of Inter-(o:>c ~n.I-1.e, onfl•ict (New York, 1954}, pp. 324-334; Ian . . 
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~lll:' llzne rr' ~national L·aw A Treatise (New York, 1944), 
elllberg' P~. 252-253, 450:459; and George Finch, "The 
Trial and International Law," American Journal of 
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Japanese atrocities formed a large part of the Allied 
case. Horrible barbarisms certainly took place. But 
wartime cruelties took place on both sides. American 
wartime hatred of Japanese soldiers often reached extreme 
racial proportions. After one Pacific tour, Colonel 
Charles A. Lindbergh recorded tales of American 
troops making pen knives from the bones of Japanese 
soldiers, shooting parachuting Japanese airmen and gleefully 
slitting the "yellow sons of bitches" throats. Lindbergh 
reported that Japanese troops who fought unfairly were 
International Law 41 (January 1947):20-37. For the view on 
the legality of the charge of aggressive war, see Joseph B. 
Keenan and Brendan F. Brown, Crimes Against International Law 
(Washington, D.c., 1950), pp. 4, 16-22, 24-27, 40, 43-62, 
73-74, 88-93, 108-110, 113-129, 176-177; Sheldon Glueck, 
"The Nuernberg Trial and Aggressive War," Harvard Law Review 
59 (February 1946) :396-456; The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive 
War (New York, 1946), pp. vii, xi, 4-5, 7 (Glueck's 1944 book 
War Criminals: Their Prosecution and Punishment (New York) 
differs in interpretation, see pp. 37-38, 41, 93-94, 118, 
171) ; Hans Kelsen, Peace. Through Law (Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina, 1944), pp. 91-103; Quincy Wright, "War Criminals," 
American Journal of International Law 39 (April 1945) :257-
285; "War Crimes Under International Law," Law Quarterly 
Review 62 (January 1946) :40-52; and "The Law of the Nuremberg 
Trial," American Journal of International Law 41 (January 1947): 
38-72. For arguments on conspiracy, see R. B. Pal, 
Dissentient Judgment, pp. 177-189; Walter Lee Riley disserta-
tion, pp. 152-167; Minear, Victor's Justice, pp. 34-42; 
Kenzo Takayanagi article on conspiracy in the Nip~on Times, 
June 16, 1946, p. 4; George Blewett, "Victor's InJustice," 
pp. 284-287; Ireland, "Uncommon Law in Martial Tokyo," 
pp. 80-88; and "Ex Post Facto from Rome to Tokyo," pp. 49-
59. For arguments on legality of the charge of criminal 
conspiracy, see Keenan and Brown, Crimes Against International 
La~, pp. 88-112; Brendan F. Brown, The Criminal Conspiracy 
in the Japanese War Crime Trials (Washington, D.C, 1950); 
aricr Solis Horowitz, "The Tokyo Trial," pp. 499, 543-557. 
For Pal quote, see p. 558 of his Diss·entient Judgment. 
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~al ~aao, 8 gh (New York, 1970), pp. 853-854, 857, 859-860, 
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A central question remains: was justice done at the 
Tokyo War Crimes Trial? Despite the biased trial, did 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
render just verdicts? The Japanese people certainly 
applauded the sentences. Few lamented the "demise of 
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the militarists. 11 The trial apparently created no American 
ill-feeling in Japan. For many Japanese, the trial 
symbolized the elimination of the military influence on 
Japanese society. The long-range impact of the Tokyo 
Tribunal appears negligible. Even though the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East proceedings were unfair, 
most of the defendants, at least in the eyes of their 
countrymen, received their just deserts. 
But was this American justice? Would defeated 
American war leaders want to be judged on the Tokyo standard? 
Would the United States tolerate a decision delivered by 
such a court? Perhaps Indian justice Radha Binod Pal 
was correct when he wrote: 
When the conduct of the nations is taken into account, 
the ~aw wil~ pe1~aps be found to be that only a lost war is a crime. 
For May 1946 poll, see Hadley Cantril (ed.), Public Opinion 
1935-1946 (Princeton, 1951), p. 381, poll #17. 
12 Radha Binod Pal, International Militar¥ Tribunal 
for the Far East: Dissentient Judgment of Just ice R. B. 
Pal, p. 59. 
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war Crimes· Chr·on·ology 
January 13 , 1942 
No\re ..... 1... 
.. u...1er 1 n , 1943 
ecemb er 1 J , 1943 
anuary 
May l 18 , 1944 
:p o, 1944 
ebru May 2ary 5-11, 1945 
I 1945 
May 7 J I 1945 
Une 2 1945 6 - August 8, 
Ju1y 
A 261 1945 
Ugust 
Aug 61 1945 
Ust 8 A ' 1945 
Ugust 9 , 1945 
August 
Au 9 , 1945 
gust A l0, 1945 
ugust 14 
Sept ' 1945 
ember 2 , 1945 
Sept ember ll, 1945 
Sept ember 27 , 1945 
Oct b 0 er a, 1945 
l:) 
ecemb 
20 , 1945 
29 , 1945 
er 7 I 1945 
Declaration of st. James Palace, Lendon, 
on war er imes . 
Moscow Declaration. 
Cairo Declaration. 
UNWCC bolds inaugural meeting. 
UNWCC establishes Pacific Subcomroission. 
Yalta conference. 
Truman appoints Jackson u.s. Chief of 
counsel for the Prosecution of Nazi war 
criminals. 
Germany surrenders. 
London International conference on 
Military Trials. 
Potsdam Declaration. 
Hiroshima. 
London ~greement and IMT charter. 
USSR declares war on Japan (August 9, 
Tokyo time). 
Nagasaki. 
Japan sues for peace. 
Truman announces Japanese surrender. 
Instrument of surrender signed in 
Tokyo Bay. 
scAP begins round-UP of war crimes 
suspects; Tojo suicide attempt. 
Emperor Hirohito visits supreme 
commander MacArthur. 
Arraignment of General Tomoyuki 
Yamashita• International MilitarY Tribunal (IMT) 
at Nuremburg begins. 
Truman appoints Joseph ~eenan u.S: 
Chief of counsel for the prosecution 
of Japanese war criminals-
yarnashita sentenced to death• 
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December 8, 1945 SCAP establishes International 
Prosecution Section (IPS). 
December 16, 1945 Prince Konoye Fumimaro suicide. 
December 16-26, 1945 Moscow conference. 
December 27, 1945 Far Eastern Commission (FEC) established. 
January 1, 1946 
January 3, 1946 
January 19, 1946 
February 11, 1946 
February 15, 1946 
February 23, 1946 
February 26, 1946 
March 3' 1946 
April 5' 1946 
April 22, 1946 
April 26, 1946 
April 29, 1946 
May 3, 1946 
May 17, 1946 
May 31, 1946 
June 3, 1946 
June 4' 1946 
June 13, 1946 
1946 
Hirohito's Imperial Rescript denying 
divinity. 
Lt. General Masaharu Homma trial begins. 
SCAP establishes the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE) in Tokyo. 
Homma trial concludes. 
SCAP appoints judges for IMTFE Tribunal. 
Yamashita hanged. 
FEC meets for first time. 
Homma shot. 
IMTFE General Secretary establishes the 
International Defense Panel (IDP); French 
judge M. Henri Reimburger resigns--M. 
Henri Bernard replaces him on Tribunal. 
IMTFE General Secretary appoints 
Beverly M. Coleman as Chief of Defense 
Counsel . 
Russian delegation joins IMTFE; SCAP 
ammends January 19 IMTFE Charter. 
IMTFE opens; Ind ictment lodged. 
Arraignment of the 28 class "A" war 
criminals. 
Indian Justice R. B. Pa l joins Tribunal 
bench. 
Original six American defense counsel 
issue their resignations to SCAP. 
Defense extension granted. 
Keenan delivers IPS opening statement; 
recess begins . 
Philippine Justice Delfin Jaranilla 
joins Court bench; Shumei Okawa trans-
ferred to hospital. 
June 17, 1946 
June 24, 1946 
June 28, 1946 
July 10, 1946 
July 12, 1946 
July 15, 1946 
July 22, 1946 
October 1, 1946 
October 16, 1946 
November 14, 1946 
December 30, 1946 
January 3, 1947 
January 5, 1947 
January 24, 1947 
January 27, 1947 
February 3, 1947 
February 24, 1947 
March 5, 1947 
March 24, 1947 
March 25, 1947 
April 2, 1947 
April 9, 1947 
May 8, 1947 
May 10, 1947 
June 10, 1947 
June 11, 1947 
SCAP relieves six American lawyers 
including Chief of Defense Counsel 
Beverly M: Coleman. 
Justice John P. Higgins announces 
imminent resignation. 
Yosuke Matsuoka dies of tuberculosis. 
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Webb adjourns Court until air-conditioning 
installed. 
Judge Higgins resigns from Tribunal 
bench. 
Court resumes briefly; American Justice 
Myron C. Cramer replaces Higgins on 
IMTFE bench. 
IMTFE proceedings resume. 
IMT judgment read--Nuremburg ends. 
Nuremburg executions. 
IMTFE establishes Language Arbitration 
Board. 
Defense requests thirty day recess. 
1947 
Japanese defense counsel radio appeal. 
Admiral Nagano dies. 
Prosecution rests. 
Defense opens their case. 
Twenty day defense recess granted. 
Court resumes; opening address on joint 
portion of defense case. 
Webb expels defense counsel David Smith. 
Defense applies for recess. 
Seven day recess granted. 
Court resumes. 
Tribunal declares Okawa unfit for trial 
and places him in psychiatric institu-
tion. 
Webb declares one day court recess. 
Court resumes. 
Defense applies for recess. 
Webb grants lengthy recess. 
June 19 , 
August 4 
s , 
eptember 
Novemb er 
1947 
1947 
s, 1947 
7 , 194 7 
December 
Decemb 15, 1947 
December 26-30, 1947 
Januar;r631, 1947-
, 1948 
Janu ary 12, 1948 
Janu ary 14, 1948 
Jan uary 28 1948 
Peb , 
ruar 3, 
Peb y 1948 
ruar 9, 
F'eb y 1948 
ruar 10, 
Peb y 1948 
ruar 11, 1948 
Mar h Y C 2 , 1948 
~Pri1 ls 1948 
~Pr· ' l.l 16 1948 Ju1 , 
Y 27 1948 , 
~u 9Ust 2 Se , 
.Ptemb er 
1948 
7 , 1948 
Octob \., er 15 
•~O'1ernb , 19 4 8 
er 3 , 1948 
~Qh vemb ~ er 4 O'1emb , 19 4 8 
~ er 4 1 
O"emb -
2
, 1948 
~ er 24 O'1ernb ' 1948 
er 29 
De , 1948 
cemb 
er 6 , 1948 
Defense recess begins. 
Court resumes. 
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David Smith apology attempt. 
Webb announces his temporary recall to 
Australia; SCAP names Cramer acting 
president. 
Webb returns to IMTFE bench. 
Tojo affidavit read in court. 
Keenan cross-examines Tojo. 
T948 
-
Defense rests. 
Prosecution begins rebuttal evidence. 
Defense requests recess. 
Recess granted--effective inunediately. 
court resumes. 
Defense ends surrebuttal. 
Prosecution begins closing arguments. 
Prosecution finishes, defense begins 
closing arguments. 
Defense finishes--case submitted. 
court adjourns to consider evidence. 
IMTFE General secretarY announces court 
has reached a decision. 
Translation of IMTFE Judgroent begins-
owen cunningham address before J\Illerican 
Bar association meeting in Seattle •. 
IMTFE bars cunningham from court. 
a. s. comyns Carr address before London 
Grotius societY• 
court resumes-
Tribunal reads Judgroent and verdicts. 
Macarthur upholds IMTFE verdicts-
Defense files motions with u.s. supreme 
court-supreme court agrees to hear defense 
motions-
I 
I>eceinb 
er l6-17 1948 
I>ecelnber , 20, 1948 I>ece,,.,1,. 
••Ll.Jer 21 , 1 9 4 8 
I>eceznb 
er 23-24, 1948 I>ece ..... 1... 
••Ll.Jer 2 4 , 19 4 8 
Arguments heard before Supreme Court 
Supreme Court denies petitions. 
SCAP notifies condemned war criminals 
of their imminent executions. 
SCAP carries out seven executions. 
Last remaining 17 Class "A" war 
criminals granted amnesty. 
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APPENDIX B 
The Accused* 
1) Sadao Araki - former general, Inspector General of Military 
Training during Mukden Incident (September 1931), Minister 
of War (December 1931-January 1934), Education Minister 
(May 1938-August 1939) and member of Supreme War Council. 
2) Kenji Dohihara - former general, Commander of the Special 
Service Section in Manchuria in 1931, Commander-in-Chief 
Eastern Army in Japan (1941-1945), Command of the 7th 
Area Army at Singapore (1941-1945) and member of Supreme 
War Council. 
3) Kingoro Hashimoto - former colonel, participated in the 
"rape"of Nanking (1937), commanded the forces which shelled 
the Ladybird and Panay (1937). Hashimoto helped establish 
the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. 
4) Shunroku Hata - former general, member of Supreme War 
Council, War Minister (1939-40) and Commander-in-Chief 
of the Expeditionary Force in China (March 1941-June 1944). 
5) Kiichiro Hiranuma - former Chief Justice of Japan, founder 
and president of the Kokuhonsha patriotic society (1926-
1938), member of Privy Council (1924-1939) and Prime 
Minister (January-August 1938). 
6) Koki Hirota - civilian, Foreign Minister (September 1933-
March 1936, June 1937-May 1938) and Prime Minister 
(March 1936-February 1937). 
7) Naoki Hoshino - civilian, a chief Japanese official in 
Manchuria (1932-July 1940), President of the Planning 
Board (July 1940-April 1941), and Chief Cabinet Secretary 
(October 1941-July 1944). 
8) Seishiro Itagaki - former general, Chief of Staff in 
Kwantung Army and Japanese forces in China (1929-1937), 
War Minister (June 1938-August 1939), Chief of Staff of 
the Japanese Army in China (September 1939-July 1941), 
Commander of the Japanese in Korea (July 1941-March 1945) 
and Commander of the 7th Area Army in Singapore (April-
August 1945). 
*Sources: Solis Horowitz, "The Tokyo Trial," International 
Conciliation (November 1950), pp. 578-583; U.S. Dept. of 
State, Bulletin, May 19, 1946, pp. 848, 853; U.S. Strategic 
Bombing Survey. Japan's Struggle to End the War. (Washington, 
D.C.:1946), pp. 23-36; Tokyo War Crimes Trial, volume I, The 
Oriental Economist (1946), pp. 84-115 and Osaka Mainichi, 
April 30, 1946, pp. 1, 2. 
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- ivi ian, Minister of Finance (June 1937-
North Chi October 1941-February 1944) and President of the 
lO) na Development company (1939-1941)-
Ko1· eeper 
0
~ ~ - ci~ilian, Chief secretary to the r,ord 
- chi K "d 1elfare M' ~e Privy seal (1930-1937), Education Minister, 
937-1
939
tnister and Home Minister (held successively 
11) H. • and r.ord Keeper of the privy seal (1940-1945). 
_eitaro K' ~rmy (Octi~ura - former general, Chief of staff of Kwantung April 
19
° er 1940-April 1941), vice Minister of war 
Japanese !l-Ma:ch 1943) and commander-in-Chief of the 
12) rmy in Burma (August 1944-August 1945). 
1932, Ch~oiso - former general, Vice Minister of war in Ku . 
- n1.aki . 1934) Cief of Staff of Kwantung ArrrtY (August 1932-March 
Overs~aso~a~der of the Japanese ArmY in Korea (1934-1936), 
iMay 1
942
~inister (1939-1940), Governor-General of Korea 
Pri1 
1945
July 1944) and Prime Minister (July 1944-
13) ) · at Genev Sui - former general, Japanese p,rmy representative Iwa 
-=ne Mat . ;he Jap a Conference (1931-1933), commander-in-Chief of 
ebruaranese Forces in central China (october 1937-
Developy l938), president of the Greater East Asia 
14) ment Society and member of supreme war council-
~Uke M . Assel11bl a~suoka - chief delegate to the r,eague of Nations Yos 
llailwa Yin 1933, President of the south Manchurian 
July 
1
~
4 
(l935-1939) and Foreign Minister (JulY 1940-
15) 1 ) · ~ - former general, war Minister (1931), J' 1 ro M' Generaler-in-Chief Kwantung ArmY and Kwantung Governor-
l942) (l934-1936) Governor-General of Korea (1936-
1 
and ' 6) Member of the Privy council (1942-1945). ~ - former general, chief of the Military Affairs Akir 
the 1
4
t (October 1939-April 1942) and Chief of staff of 
August h Area Army in the Philippines (October 
19
4
4
-
17) 1945). ~ - former admiral, delegate to Geneva Naval Osam· 
Naval nee (1931-1933), chief Delegate to the LO
nd
on 
Febru Conference (1935) Navy Minister (March 193
6
-
0f Na!ry 1937), member ~f the supreme war council, Chief 
Supremal General staff (April 1941-FebruarY 1944) a
nd 
Auguste Naval Adviser to the Emperor (February 1
944
-
18) 'l' 1945). 
akasum· 
~ - former admiral, section Chief of the Gen7ral 
Of th litary Affairs Bureau of the Navy (193B-1
94
o), chief 
(Octo~eGeneral and Military Affairs sure~u.
0
f the Navy 
r 1940-July 1944) and vice NavY Minister (1944), 
19) Shumei Okawa - officer of the South Manchurian Railway, 
alleged organizer of the Mukden Incident (18 September 
1931) and principal propagandist. 
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20) Hiroshi Oshima - former general, Military Attache to the 
Japanese Embassy in Berlin (March 1934-October 1938), 
and Ambassador to Germany (October 1938-December 1939, 
December 1940-April 1945). 
21) Kenryo Sato - former general, Chief of the Military Affairs 
Section of the War Ministry (February 1941-April 1942), 
Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry 
(April 1942-December 1944), Assistant Chief of Staff of 
China Expeditionary Forces (December 1944-April 1945) and 
Commander of the 37th Division in Indo-China (April-
August 1945). 
22) Mamoru Shigemitsu - civilian, Ambassador to China (1931-
1932), Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. (August 1936 - September 
1938), Ambassador to Great Britain (September 1938-
February 1941), Ambassador to Nanking Puppet Government 
(February 1941-April 1943) and Foreign Minister (April 
1943-April 1945). 
2 3) Shigetaro Shimada -· former admiral, Vice Chief of Naval 
General Staff (1935-1937), Navy Minister (1941-July 
1944), Chief of the Naval General Staff (February-July 
1944), and member of the Supreme War Council. 
24) Toshio Shiratori - civilian, Chief of the Information 
Bureau of the Foreign Office (1929-June 1933), Minister 
to the Scandinavian countries (June 1933-1937), Ambassador 
to Italy (1938-1940), and Adviser to the Japanese Foreign 
Office (1940-1945). 
25) Teiichi Suzuki - former general, Chief of the Political 
Affairs Division of the China Affairs Board (December 
1938-April 1941), President of the Cabinet Planning 
Board (April 1941-October 1943), and Cabinet Adviser 
(November 1943-September 1944). 
26) Shigenori Togo - civilian, Ambassador to Germany (1937), 
Ambassador to u.s.s.R. (October 1938-October 1941), 
and Foreign Minister (October 1941-September 1942, 
April 1945-August 1945). 
27) Hideki Tojo - former general, Command of the Military 
Police of the Kwantung Army (1935-1937), Chief of the 
Staff of Kwantung Army (1937-1938), Vice Minister of War 
(May-December 1938), War Minister (July 1940-July 1944), 
Prime Minister (October 1941-July 1944), and Chief of 
the Army General Staff (February-July 1944). 
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Yoshi'· ~ - former general, Chief of the General 
Comrnan~ Department of the Army General Staff (1931-1934), 
Vice W er of the Japanese forces in China (1934-1936), 
R~antu ar Minister (March 1936-May 1938), Commander of 
ana Ch~g Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo (1939-1944), 
ief of Army General Staff (July 1944-August 1945). 
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APPENDIX C 
De'fendant:s and Counsel 
* Defense Counsel as of May 3, 1946 
Chief of Defense Counsel: Beverly M. Coleman 
Associate Counsel: Valentine B. Deale 
George A. Furness 
Aristides G. Lazarus 
Franklin E. N. Warren 
George Yamaoka 
.I. 
Defendant Chief Counsel As.soc.iat.e Co.unsel 1 
1) Sadao Araki 
2) Kenji Dohihara 
3) Kingore Hashimota 
4) Shunroku Hata 
5) Kiichiro Hiranuma 
6) Koki Hirota 
7) Naoki Hashino 
8) Seishiro Itagaki 
9) Okinar i Kaya 
10) Koichi Kido 
11) Heitaro Kimura 
12) Kuniaki Koiso 
13) Iwane Matsui 
14) Yosuke Matsuoka 
15) Jiro Minami 
16) Akira Muto 
Yutaka Sugawara 
Naoyoshi Tsukazaki 
Itsuro Hayashi 
Masayoshi Kanzaki 
Rukuro Usami 
Tadashi Hanai 
Goichiro Fujii 
Tsuruo Takano 
Shigetaka Hozumi 
Somei Uzawa 
Shunzo Kobayashi 
Kintaro Takeuchi 
17) Osami Nagano Hachiro Okuyama 
18) Takasumi Oka Shinji Somiya 
19) Shumei Okawa Shinichi Ohara 
20) Hiroshi Oshima Naoyoshi Tsukazaki 
American Counsel 
I-' 
'1 
*IMTFE, Proceedings of the IMTFE (Tokyo: The 
tNo information available 
Tribunal, 1948), May 3, 1946, between pp. 21-22. ~ 
~ 
Defendant 
21) Kenryo Sato 
22) Mamoru Shigemitsu 
23) Shigetaro Shimada 
24) Toshio Shiratori 
25) Teiichi Suzuki 
26) Shigenori Togo 
27) Hideki Tojo 
28) Yoshijiro Umezu 
Chief Counsel 
Kenzo Takayanagi 
Yoshitsugu Takahashi 
Somei Uzawa 
Moto Kichi Hasegawa 
Shigetaka Hozumi 
Ichiro Kiyose 
. lt Associate Counse American Counsel 
I-' 
--.J 
--.J 
* Defense Counsel as of June 3, 1946 
Chief of Defense Counsel: Beverly M. Coleman 
Associate Counsel: Norris H. Allen 
Valentine B. Deale 
Joseph F. Hynes 
Defendant Chief Counsel 
1) Sadao Araki Yutaka Sugawara 
2) Kenji Dohihara Naoyoshi Tsukazaki 
3) Kingoro Hashimoto Itsuro Hayashi 
4) Shunroku Hata Masayoshi Kanzaki 
5) Kiichiro Hiranuma Rukuro Usami 
6) Koki Hirota Tadashi Hanai 
7) Naoki Hoshino Goichiro Fujii 
8) Seishiro Itagaki Hanzo Yamada 
9) Okinori Kaya Tsuruo Takano 
10} Koichi Kido Shigetaka Hozumi 
11} Heitaro Kimura Toksaburo Shiohara 
12} Kuniaki Koiso Shohei Sammonji 
13} !wane Matsui Kiyoshi Ito 
14} Yosuke Matsuoka Shunzo Kobayashi 
15} Jiro Minami Kintaro Takeuchi 
16} Akira Muto Shoichi Okamoto 
17} Osami Nagano Hachiro Okuyama 
18} Takasumi Oka Shinji Somiya 
19} Shumei Okawa Shinichi Ohara 
20} Hiroshi Oshima Naoyoshi Tsukazaki 
21} Kenryo Sato Ichiro Kiyose 
22} Mamoru Shigemitsu Kenzo Takayanagi 
23} Shigetaro Shimada Yoshitsugu Takahashi 
24} Toshia Shiratori Somei Ozawa 
25} Teiichi Suzuki Motokichi Hasegawa 
26} Shigenori Togo Shigetaka Hozumi 
27} Hideki Tojo Ichiro Kiyose 
28} Yoshijiro Umezu Shotaro Miyake 
. lt Associate Counse American Counsel 
Lawrence J. McManus 
Franklin E. N. Warren 
Aristides G. Lazarus 
Samuel J. Kleiman 
David F. Smith 
George C. Williams 
George Yamaoka 
William Logan, Jr. 
Collins Edward 
Alfred w. Brooks 
Floyd J. Mattice 
Franklin E. N. Warren 
Wm. J. McCormack 
Roger F. Cole 
John E. Brannon 
Alfred w. Brooks 
OWen Cunningham 
James E. Freeman 
George A. Furness 
Edward P. McDermott 
Charles B. Caudle 
Michael Levin 
C. Talbot Young 
John w. Guider 
Ben Bruce Blakeney 
*rMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 323-324 and Osaka Mainichi, June 2, 
tNo information available 
19 4 6 , pp . 1 , 2 . 
I-' 
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CX) 
Defendant 
1) Sadao Araki 
2) Kenji Dohihara 
3) Kingore Hashimoto 
4) Shunroku Hata 
5) Kiichiro Hiranuma 
6) Koki Hirota 
7) Naoki Hoshino 
8) Seishiro Itagaki 
9) Okinori Kaya 
10) Koichi Kido 
11) Heitaro Kimura 
12) Kuniaki Koiso 
13) Iwane Matsui 
14) Jiro Minami 
15) Akira Muto 
16) Osami Nagano 
17) Takasumi Oka 
18) Shumei Okawa 
19) Hiroshi Oshima 
20) Kenryo Sato 
21) Mamoru Shigemitsu 
22) Shigetaro Shimada 
23) Toshio Shiratori 
24) Teiichi Suzuki 
25) Shigenori Togo 
* Defense Counsel as of July 9, 1946 
Chief Counsel 
Yutaka Sugawara 
Naoyoshi Tsukasaki 
Itsuro Hayashi 
Nasayoshi Kanzaki 
Rokuro Usami 
Tadashi Hanai 
Goichiro Fujii 
Hanzo Yamada 
Tsuro Takano 
Shigetaka Hozumi 
Tokisaburo Ehiohara 
Shahei Sammonji 
Kiyoshi Ito 
Toshio Okamoto 
Shoichi Okamoto 
Hachiro Okuyama 
Shinji Somiya 
Shinichi Ohara 
Naoyoshi Tsukazaki 
Hyoichiro Kusano 
Kenzo Takayanagi 
Yoshitsugu Takahashi 
Nobuo Naritomi 
Motokichi Hasegawa 
Shigetaka Hozumi 
Associate Counsel 
Sakae Ichikawa 
Takahisa Kato 
Kunji Kanase 
Kohei Iwama 
Hisao Yanai 
Masao Migita 
Sasagawa Tomoji 
Yasurnichi Tonaka 
Takutaro Sakuta 
Tatsumi Koretsune 
Ryozo Makino 
Takao Iwamatsu 
Tatsuo Matsuzawa 
Fujio Uchida 
Nobuhiko Ushiba 
Isaburo Kazurna 
Hisao Yanai 
Rokuro Usami 
Juzo Yamana 
Yoji Hirota 
Shin Sakuma 
Michitaka Kaino 
Kenzo Takayanagi 
Taganobu Yoshinaga 
American Counsel 
Lawrence McManus 
Franklin E. N. Warren 
Aristides G. Lazarus 
Samuel J. Kleiman 
David F. Smith 
George C. Williams 
Floyd J. Mattice 
Rogers. Rutchick 
William Logan, Jr. 
Joseph C. Howard 
Alfred W. Brooks 
Floyd J. Mattice 
William J. McCormack 
Roger F. Cole 
John G. Brannon 
Franklin E. N. Warren 
Alfred w. Brooks 
Owen Cunningham 
James N. Freeman 
George A. Furness 
Edward P. McDermott 
Charles B. Caudle 
Michael Levin 
George Yamaoka 
*Modern Military Branch, WWII War Crimes, IMTFE, RG238, Miscellaneous Records, Box No. 
352, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
I-' 
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lO 
Defendant Chief Counsel As sociate Counsel American Counsel 
26) Hideki Tojo Ichiro Kiyose Toki s aburo Shiohara 
*21) 
Masat oshi Makushita 
Yoshijiro Umezu Shotaro Miyake Kisaku Ono Ben Bruce Blakeney 
*The twenty-eighth defendant, Yosuke Matsuoka, died on June 28, 1946. 
I-' 
00 
0 
Defendant 
1) Sadao Araki 
2) Kenji Dohihara 
3) Kingore Hashimoto 
4) Shunroku Hata 
5) Kiichiro Hiranuma 
6) Koki Hirota 
7) Naoki Hoshino 
8) Seishiro Itagaki 
9) Okinori Kaya 
10) Koichi Kido 
11) Heitaro Kimura 
12) Kuniaki Koiso 
13) Iwane Matsui 
14) Jiro Minami 
15) Akira Muto 
* RG238, Box No. 352. 
* Defense Counsel as of October 31, 1946 
Chief Counsel 
Yutaka Sugawara 
Kinjiro Ohta 
Itsuro Hayashi 
Masayoshi Kanzaki 
Rokuro Usami 
Tadashi Hanai 
Goichiro Fujii 
Hanzo Yamada 
Tsuruo Takano 
Shigetaka Hozumi 
Tokisaburo Shiohara 
Shohei Samrnonji 
Kiyoshi Ito 
Toshia Okamoto 
Shoichi Okamoto 
Associate Counsel 
Sakae Ichikawa 
Takahisa Kato 
Shigeharu Kimura 
Kohei Iwama 
Kokubu Tomoharu 
Taitaro Iwanari 
Hisao Yanai 
Sawa Kunio 
Yoichi Mori 
Yoshiro Ando 
Goro Morishima 
Masao Migita 
Reisuke Matsuda 
Sasagawa Tomoji 
Junkichi Banno 
Yasumichi Tanaka 
Kenji Fujiwara 
Masamichi Yamagiwa 
Takahiko Kido 
Tatsumi Koretsune 
Abe Akira 
Kazuya Takagi 
Tsunehisa Mimachi 
Tokihiko Matsusaka 
Kyoichi Kobayashi 
Takayoshi Jodai 
Ryoichi Omuro 
Tatsuo Matsuzawa 
Giichi Kondo 
Seiji Hara 
Keizo Ohsumi 
American Counsel 
Lawrence McManus 
Franklin E. N. Warren 
E. R. Harris 
Aristides G. Lazarus 
Franklin E. N. Warren 
David F. Smith 
Joseph C. Howard 
Floyd J. Mattice 
Michael Levin 
William Logan, Jr. 
Joseph C. Howard 
Alfred W. Brooks 
Floyd J. Mattice 
Alfred w. Brooks 
Roger F. Cole 
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Defendant Chief Counsel Associate Counsel 
16} Osami Nagano Hachiro Okuyama Shimao Iwai 
Kunji Kanase 
17} Takasumi Oka Shinji Sorniya Tetsuichi Kurashige 
Seiichiro Ona 
18} Shumei Okawa Shinichi Ohara Ryosuke Kanauchi 
Fumiko Fukuoka 
19} Hiroshi Oshima Tatsuki Shimanouchi Fujio Uchida 
Nobuhiko Ushiba 
20} Kenryo Sato Isaburo Kazuma 
Chikao Fujisawa 
21} Mamoru Shigemitsu Hisao Yanai Rokuro Usami 
Kazuichi Miura 
Shizue Kanaya 
22} Shigetaro Shimada Yoshitsugu Takahashi Juza Yamana 
Isamu Suzuki 
23} Toshia Shiratori Nobuo Naritomi Yoji Hirota 
Shin Sakuma 
24} Teiichi Suzuki Kenzo Takayanagi Michitaka Kaina 
Otiochi Okamoto 
25} Shigenori Togo Haruhiko Nishi Tadashi Sakaya 
Katsumi Nihro 
Shigetaka Hozumi 
Denjiro Kato 
26} Hideki Tojo Ichiro Kiyose Tokisaburo Shiobara 
Masatoshi Makushita 
27} Yoshijiro Umezu Mitsuo Miyata Kisaku Ono 
Ikeda Sumihisa 
Yoshikazu Umezu 
American Counsel 
John G. Brannon 
Franklin E. N. Warren 
Alfred w. Brooks 
Owen Cunningham 
James N. Freeman 
George A. Furness 
E. R. Harris 
Charles B. Caudle 
Michael Levin 
George Yamaoka 
Ben Bruce Blakeney 
George F. Blewett 
Ben Bruce Blakeney 
I-' 
00 
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Defendant 
1) Sadao Araki 
2) Kenji Dohihara 
3) Kingoro Hashimoto 
4) Shunroku Hata 
5) Kiichiro Hiranuma 
6) Koki Hirota 
7) Naoki Hoshino 
8) Seishiro Itagaki 
9) Okinori Kaya 
10) Koichi Kido 
11) Heitaro Kimura 
12) Kuniaki Koiso 
13) Iwane Matsui 
14) Jiro Minami 
* RG238, Box No. 352. 
* Defense Counsel as of October 18, 1948 
Chief Counsel 
Yutaka Sugahara 
Kinjiro Ohta 
Itsuro Hayashi 
Masayoshi Kanzaki 
Rokuro Usami 
Tadashi Hanai 
Geichiro Fujii 
Hanzo Yamada 
Tsuruo Tanaka 
Shigetaka Hozumi 
Tokisaburo Shiohara 
Shohei Sarnmonji 
Kiyoshi Ito 
Toshio Okamoto 
Associate Counsel 
Takaaki Hasuoka 
Jiro Tokuoka 
Takahisa Kato 
Shigehara Kimura 
Tomeo Hongo 
Kunji Kanase 
Hachiro Okuyama 
Tomoharu Kokubu 
Taitaro Imanari 
Kunio Sawa 
Yoichi Mori 
Masao Hirota 
Shinichi Shibusawa 
Masao Migita 
Reisuke Matsuda 
Tomaji Sasagana 
Junkichi Banno 
Kenji Ohkoshi 
Ryosuke Kanauchi 
Yasumichi Tanaka 
Kenji Fujiwara 
Masamichi Yamagiwa 
Wataru Narahashi 
Takahiko Kido 
Tatsumi Koretsune 
Akira Abe 
Kazuya Takagi 
Tokihiko Matsuzaka 
Kyoichi Kobayashi 
Seiichi Saito 
Takayoshi Jodai 
Tatsuo Matsuzawa 
Giichi Kondo 
Yasuma Oda 
American Counsel 
Lawrence J. McManus 
Franklin E. Warren 
E. Richard Harris 
James N. Freeman 
Franklin E. Warren 
George Yamaoka 
Joseph C. Howard 
Floyd J. Mattice 
E. R. Harris 
William Logan, Jr. 
Joseph C. Howard 
Alfred w. Brooks 
Floyd J . .Mattice 
Alfred w. Brooks I--' 
(X) 
w 
Defendant 
15) Akira Muto 
16) Takazumi Oka 
17) Hiroshi Oshima 
18) Kenryo Sato 
19) Mamoru Shigemitsu 
20) Shigetaro Shimada 
21) Toshia Shiratori 
22) Teiichi Suzuki 
23) Shigenori Togo 
24) Hideki Tojo 
*25) Yoshijiro Umezu 
* 
Chief Counsel 
Shoichi Okamoto 
Shinji Somiya 
Ryuki Shimanouchi 
Hyoichiro Kusano 
Hisao Yanai 
Yoshitsugu Takahashi 
Shin Sakuma 
Kenzo Takayanagi 
Haruhiko Mishi 
Ichiro Kiyose 
Mitsuo Miyata 
Associate Counsel 
Seiji Hara 
Chihiro Saeki 
Seiichiro Ono 
Kenji Enomoto 
Fujio Uchida 
Nobuhiko Ushira 
Jugo Saigo 
Isaburo Kazuma 
Matsataro Inoue 
Kazuichi Miura 
Shizuo Kanaya 
Isamu Suzuki 
Masajiro Takigawa 
Shimao Inai 
Shigeo Yasuda 
Yogi Hirota 
Michitaka Kaino 
Ippei Kato 
Hisashi Fukushima 
Denjiro Kato 
Motoharu Shichida 
Kenjiro Kawakita 
Hiroshi Uchiyama 
Kisaku Ono 
Surnihisa Ikeda 
Yoshikazu Umezu 
American Counsel 
Roger F. Cole 
John G. Brannon 
James N. Freeman 
John G. Brannon 
George A. Furness 
E. R. Harris 
John G. Brannon 
Charles B. Caudle· 
Ben Bruce Blakeney 
George F. Blewett 
Ben Bruce Blakeney 
Osami Nagano died on January 5, 1947; Okawa was declared unfit for trial on April 9, 1947. 
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APPENDIX D 
Indictment and verdicts 
A.) Ina· 
- ictment 
Count 1: 
C(r
1
iminal conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, 
928-45) Aggressive war against China, (1931-45) 
Aggressive war against the united states, (1941-45) Count 27: 
Count 29: 
Count 31: 
Aggressive war against the British conunonwealth, 
(1941-45) Aggressive war against the Netherlands, (1941-45) 
gaunt 32· 
count 33: 
ount 35; 
Aggressive war against France, (1940) 
Aggressive war against the u.s.S-R• at Lake 
Khas san. ( 19 38) Aggressive war against the u.s.s.R, at Nomonhan, 
Count 36: 
Count 54: 
Ordering, authorizing and permitting violations (1939) 
of laws and customs of war against armed forces, 
prisoners, and civilian internees, (1941-45) 
Reckless disregard of legal duty to secure 
observance of the laws and customs of war, Count 55: 
(1941-45) 
l3) Vera· 
- l.cts n , November 1948 
efena ant 
l) saa ~---------~G~u.:,i!:_1=.ty~c~o~u~n~t~s~ ____ _::...V;:e::.r~d;::ic~t=--
2) I< ao Arak' 
3) I< ~nj i Dohih1 
1,27 1,27,29,31,32,35,36,54 
Life 
Hanging 
Life 
Life 
4
) 1.ngo ara 
S) S~unr~~ Hashimoto 
6) I<iich' u Hata 
7) Roki ~:0 Hiranuma 
8 Naok . . irota 
9~ Seis~·Hoshino 
lQ) Okino~:0 Itagaki 
11) I<oichil. ~aya 
l.2) Rei t Ki.do I< aro K' l.3) uniaki i~ura 
l.4) I~an Kol.SO 
l.S) Yosu~ Matsui 
16) Jiro :.Matsuoka 
l. 7) Akiro ~nami 
18) Osami uto 
19) 'I'akas N':1-gano 
Shume1;1m1 Oka 
2Q) l. Okawa 
2 lI. l.) lroshi 
22) I<enryo 
Mamo ru 
Oshima 
Sato 
Shigemitsu 
1,27 1,27,29,31,32,55 
1,27,29,31,32,36 
Life 
Hanging 
Life 1,27,55 
1,27,29,31,32 1,27,29,31,32,35,36,54 
1,27,29,31,32 
1,27,29,31,32 
1,27,29,31,32,54,55 
Hanging 
Life 
Life 
Hanging 
1,27,29,31,32,55 
Life 
Hanging 
55 oied during trial on 
28 June 1946 
Life 
Hanging 
January 1947 1,27 1,27,29,31,32,54,55 
oied during trial on 5 
1,27,29,31,32 
oeclared unfit for 
Life 
trial 9 April 
1947 
1 1,21,29,31,32 
21,29,31,32,33,55 
Life 
Life 
7 years 
Defendant 
23) Shigetaro Shimada 
24) Toshio Shiratori 
25) Teiichi Suzuki 
26) Shigenori Togo 
27) Hideki Tojo 
28) Yoshijiro Umezu 
Guilty Counts 
1,27,29,31,32 
1 
1,27,29,31,32 
1,27,29,31,32 
1,27,29,31,32,33,54 
1,27,29,31,32 
Verdict 
Life 
Life 
Life 
186 
20 years 
Hanging 
Life 
APPENDIX E 
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
1) Henri Bernard of the Republic of France - Advocate General 
Prenu.ere Classe. 
2) Major General Myron C. Cramer of the United States -
Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army. On 15 July 1946, 
Judge Cramer assumed the vacant seat of John P. Higgins 
who had resigned on 24 June 1946. Justice Cramer became 
Acting-President during the absence of W. F. Webb. 
3) John P. Higgins of the United States - Chief Justice of 
the Superior Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Justice 
Higgins resigned on 24 June 1946. 
4) Delf i n Jaranilla of the Commonwealth of the Philippines -
member of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Commonwealth. 
Jaranilla joined the Tribunal 13 June 1946. 
5) Edward Stuart McDougall of Canada - Court of King's Bench, 
Montreal, Quebec. 
6) Ju Ao-mei of the Republic of China - Acting Chairman of 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Legislative Yuan. 
7) Erima Harvey Northcroft of New Zealand - Supreme Court 
of New Zealand. 
8) Radha Binod Pal of India - Calcutta High Court. Justice 
Pal Joined the Tribunal on 17 May 1946. 
9) Lord Patrick of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland - Senator of His Majesty's College in 
Scotland and Judge of Court of Session in Edinburgh. 
10) Bernard Victor A. Roling of the Kingdom of the Netherlands -
Judge in Utrecht Court and Law Professor at Utrecht Univer-
sity. 
ll) Sir William Flood Webb of the Commonwealth of Australia -
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland. Sir William 
was President of the Tribunal. 
12) Major General Ivan Micheyevich Zaryanov of the U.S.S.R. -
Military Collegium of Supreme Court of the Soviet Union. 
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-APPENDIX F 
Tribunal Absenteeism 
1) Justice Henri Bernard of France 
1. Absent 9 January 1947. 
2. Not sitting 12 March 1947, 0930-1200. 
3. Not sitting 19 May 1947, 1500-1600. 
4. Not sitting 9 June 1947, 1500-1600. 
5. Not sitting 18 June 1947, 1120-1600. 
6. Not sitting 2 September 1947, 1130-1600. 
7. Absent 16 September 1947. 
8. Absent 19 September 1947. 
9. Not sitting 24 September 1947, 1335-1445. 
10. Not sitting 1 October 1947, 1500-1600. 
11. Absent 2 October 1947. 
12. Absent 3 October 1947. 
13. Absent 6 October 1947. 
14. Absent 7 October 1947. 
15. Absent 8 October 1947. 
16. Not sitting 10 October 1947, 1330-1600. 
17. Not sitting 16 October 1947, 1500-1600. 
18. Not sitting 17 October 1947, 1500-1600. 
19. Not sitting 24 October 1947, 1500-1600. 
20. Not sitting 5 November 1947, 1100-1600. 
21. Not sitting 20 November 1947, 1330-1430. 
22. Not sitting 9 January 1948, 1330-1600. 
23. Absent 16 January 1948. 
24. Not sitting 28 January 1948, 1330-1600. 
25. Not sitting 9 February 1948, 0930-1200. 
26. Not sitting 10 February 1948, 1330-1445. 
27. Not sitting 19 February 1948, 1500-1600. 
28. Not sitting 1 March 1948, 1330-1600. 
29. Not sitting 5 March 1948, 1330-1600. 
30. Not sitting 8 March 1948, 1330-1445. 
31. Not sitting 15 March 1948, 1500-1600. 
32. Not sitting 22 March 1948, 1500-1600. 
33. Not sitting 30 March 1948, 1330-1600. 
34. Not sitting 2 April 1948, 1500-1600. 
35. Not sitting 12 April 1948, 1330-1600. 
36. Absent 15 April 1948. 
2) Justice Myron c. Cramer of the United States* 
1. Not sitting 4 March 1947, 1330-1600. 
2. Not sitting 10 June 1947, 1330-1500. 
*On 15 July 1946, Judge Cramer took over the vacant seat of 
John Higgins of Massachusetts who had resigned on July 12, 1946. 
Higgins missed only one session--May 17, 1946. 
, QQ 
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3. Not sitting 8 October 1947, 1500-1600. 
4. Absent 22 March 1948. 
3) Delfin Jaranilla of the Philippines 
1. Absent 3 July 1946. 
2. Absent 5 July 1946. 
3. Absent 6 July 1946. 
4. Absent 8 July 1946. 
5. Not sitting 9 July 1946, 1330-1600. 
6. Absent 10 December 1946. 
7. Absent 11 December 1946. 
8. Absent 12 December 1946. 
9. Absent 13 December 1946. 
10. Absent 16 December 1946. 
11. Absent 17 December 1946. 
12. Absent 18 December 1946. 
13. Absent 19 December 1946. 
14. Absent 20 December 1946. 
15. Absent 23 December 1946. 
16. Absent 24 December 1946. 
17. Absent 26 December 1946. 
18. Absent 27 December 1946. 
19. Absent 30 December 1946. 
20. Absent 31 December 1946. 
21. Absent 2 January 1947. 
22. Absent 3 January 1947. 
23. Absent 6 January 1947. 
24. Not sitting 5 March 1947, 1330-1600. 
25. Not sitting 21 March 1947, 1330-1600. 
26. Absent 24 March 1947. 
27. Absent 25 March 1947. 
28. Not sitting 4 August 1947, 1335-1348. 
29. Not sitting 8 January 1948, 1330-1600. 
30. Absent 9 January 1948. 
31. Absent 22 January 1948. 
32. Not sitting 26 January 1948, 1330-1600. 
33. Absent 3 February 1948. 
34. Absent 16 February 1948. 
35. Not sitting 3 March 1948, 1330-1600. 
36. Not sitting 15 March 1948, 0930-1200. 
37. Not sitting 9 April 1948, 1330-1600. 
4) Justice Edward Stuart McDOugall of Canada 
1. Not sitting 11 June 1947, 1100-1200. 
2. Not sitting 19 June 1947, 1100-1530. 
3. Absent 4 August 1947. 
4. Absent 5 August 1947. 
5. Absent 6 August 1947. 
6. Absent 7 August 1947. 
7. Absent 8 August 1947. 
8. Absent 11 August 1947. 
9. Absent 12 August 1947. 
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10. Absent 13 August 1947. 
11. Absent 14 August 1947. 
12. Absent 15 August 1947. 
13. Absent 18 August 1947. 
14. Absent 19 August 1947. 
15. Absent 20 August 1947. 
16. Not sitting 5 December 1947, 0930-1200. 
17. Not sitting 11 December 1947, 1330-1600. 
18. Absent 19 December 1947. 
19. Absent 12 January 1948. 
20. Absent 13 January 1948. 
21. Not sitting 21 January 1948, 1100-1600. 
22. Absent 22 January 1948. 
23. Absent 23 January 1948. 
24. Not sitting 18 February 1948, 1330-1600. 
25. Absent 18 February 1948. 
26. Absent 19 February 1948. 
27. Absent 20 February 1948. 
28. Not sitting 25 February 1948, 1330-1600. 
29. Absent 27 February 1948. 
30. Not sitting 10 March 1948, 0930-1200. 
31. Not sitting 11 March 1948, 0930-1200. 
32. Not sitting 17 March 1948, 0930-1200. 
33. Not sitting 19 March 1948, 1330-1600. 
34. Not sitting 26 March 1948, 1330-1445. 
35. Not sitting 12 April 1948, 1330-1445. 
5) Justice Ju Ao-Mei of the Republic of China 
1. Absent 17 May 1946. 
2. Not sitting 12 November 1946, 1340-1600. 
3. Absent 27 December 1946. 
4. Absent 30 December 1946. 
5. Absent 31 December 1946. 
6. Absent 2 January 1947 . 
7. Absent 3 January 1 94 7. 
8. Absent 6 January 1947. 
9. Absent 7 January 1947 . 
10. Absent 8 January 1947 . 
11. Absent 9 January 1947. 
12. Absent 10 January 1947. 
13. Absent 13 January 1947. 
14. Absent 14 January 1947. 
15. Absent 15 January 1947. 
16. Absent 19 March 1947. 
17. Absent 23 May 1947. 
18. Not sitting 26 May 1947, 1330-1600. 
19. Not sitting 27 May 1947, 1330-1600. 
20. Absent 12 June 1947. 
21. Not sitting 17 June 1947, 0930-1045. 
22. Not sitting 19 June 1947, 1500-1530. 
23. Absent 4 August 1947. 
24. Not sitting 26 September 1947, 1330-1600. 
25. Absent 21 October 1947. 
26. Not sitting 2 December 1947, 1330-1600. 
Not sitting 8 December 1947, 1500-1600. 
Not sitting 19 oecember 1947, 1330-1600. 
Not sitting 22 December 1947, 1330-1600. 
Not sitting 29 December 1947, 1500-1600. 
Not sitting 15 January 1948, 1330-1600. 
Absent 20 January 1948. 
Not sitting 16 January 1948, 1100-1600. 
Absent 19 January 1948. 
Absent 21 January 1948. 
Absent 22 January 1948. 
Absent 23 January 1948. 
Absent 26 January 1948. 
Not sitting 27 January 1948, 1330-1600. 
Not sitting 13 February 1948, 0930-1200, 1500-1600. 
Not sitting 25 February 1948, 1500-1600-
Not sitting 5 March 1948, 1500-1600. 
Not sitting 24 March 1948, 1500-1600-
Absent 26 March 1948. 
Not sitting 2 April 1948, 1500-1600. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
Not sitting 13 April 1948, 0930-1045-
Not sitting 14 April 1948, 1500-1600. 
6) J ustice Er.ima. Harvey Nortbcroft of New Zealand 
~- Absent 27 January 1947-
3· Absent 28 January 1947-
4· Absent 29 January 1947-
5· Absent 30 January 1947. 
6
· Absent 31 January 1947-
. Absent 3 February 1947-
~- Absent 27 February 1947. 
· Absent 13 March 1947. 
1
~· Absent 29 April 1947-
1· Absent 30 April 1947. 
12
• Absent 1 May 1947-
. Absent 2 May 1947-i~- Absent 22 May 1947. 
· Absent 23 MaY 1947-i~· Not sitting 11 June 1947, 1330-1600. 
17
· Absent 12 June 1947-
8· Absent 13 June 1947. 
19
· Absent 16 June 1947-
20· Absent 17 June 1947. 
21
· Absent 18 June 1947-
 · Absent 19 June 1947. 
2
~· Absent 4 August 1947-
. Absent 5 August 1947-
~:- Absent 6 August 1947-
26· Absent 7 August 1947-
2 • Absent 8 August 1947-27. Not sitting 15 August 1947, 1330-1600-
28· Not sitting 19 August 1947, 1330-1600-
3~· Not sitting 22 August 1947, 1330-1600-
. Not sitting 29 August 1947, 1330-1600-
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31. Not sitting 5 September 1947, 1330-1600. 
3 2. Not sitting 18 September 1947, 1330-1600. 
33. Not sitting 26 September 1947, 1330-1600. 
3 4. Not sitting 3 October 1947, 1330-1600. 
35. Not sitting 10 October 1947, 1330-1600. 
36. Not sitting 23 October 1947, 1330-1600. 
37. Not sitting 31 October 1947, 1500-1600. 
38. Not sitting 6 November 1947, 1330-1600. 
39. Not sitting 21 November 1947, 1445-1600. 
40. Absent 6 January 1948. 
41. Not sitting 12 February 1948, 0930-1200. 
4 2. Not sitting 20 February 1948, 1330-1600. 
43. Absent 22 March 1948. 
4 4. Absent 23 March 1948. 
45. Absent 24 March 1948. 
46. Absent 25 March 1948. 
47. Absent 26 March 1948. 
7) J ustice Radha Binod Pal of India 
1. Absent 8 August 1946. 
2 . Absent 10 September 1946. 
3 . Absent 28 October 1946. 
4 . Absent 29 October 1946. 
5. Absent 30 October 1946. 
6 . Absent 31 October 1946. 
7. Absent 1 November 1946. 
8. Absent 4 November 1946. 
9 . Absent 5 November 1946. 
10. Absent 6 November 1946. 
11. Absent 7 November 1946. 
12. Absent 8 November 1946. 
13. Absent 12 November 1946. 
14. Absent 13 November 1946. 
15. Absent 14 November 1946. 
16. Absent 15 November 1946. 
17. Absent 18 November 1946. 
18. Absent 19 November 1946. 
19. Absent 20 November 1946. 
20. Absent 21 November 1946. 
21. Absent 22 November 1946. 
2 2. Absent 25 November 1946. 
23. Absent 26 November 1946. 
24. Absent 27 November 1946. 
25. Absent 29 November 1946. 
26. Not sitting 22 May 1947, 1330-1600. 
27. Not sitting 6 June 1947, 1330-1600. 
28. Not sitting 2 September 1947, 1330-1600. 
29. Absent 3 September 1947. 
30. Absent 4 September 1947. 
31. Absent 5 September 1947. 
32. Absent 8 September 1947. 
33. Absent 9 September 1947. 
34. Absent 10 September 1947. 
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35. Absent 11 September 1947. 
36. Absent 12 September 1947. 
37. Absent 15 September 1947. 
38. Absent 16 September 1947. 
39. Absent 17 September 1947. 
40. Absent 18 September 1947. 
41. Absent 19 September 1947. 
42. Absent 22 September 1947. 
43. Absent 23 September 1947. 
44. Absent 24 September 1947. 
45. Absent 25 September 1947. 
46. Absent 26 September 1947. 
47. Not sitting 2 October 1947, 1100-1200. 
48. Absent 6 October 1947. 
49. Absent 7 October 1947. 
so. Absent 8 October 1947. 
51. Absent 9 October 1947. 
52. Absent 10 October 1947. 
53. Absent 13 October 1947. 
54. Absent 14 October 1947. 
55. Absent 15 October 1947. 
56. Absent 16 October 1947. 
57. Absent 17 October 1947. 
58. Absent 21 October 1947. 
59. Absent 22 October 1947. 
60. Absent 23 October 1947. 
61. Absent 24 October 1947. 
62. Absent 27 October 1947. 
63. Absent 28 October 1947. 
64. Absent 29 October 1947. 
65. Absent 30 October 1947. 
66. Absent 31 October 1947. 
67. Absent 3 November 1947. 
68. Absent 4 November 1947. 
69. Absent 5 November 1947. 
70. Absent 6 November 1947. 
71. Absent 7 November 1947. 
72. Absent 10 November 1947. 
73. Absent 12 November 1947. 
74. Absent 13 November 1947. 
75. Absent 14 November 1947. 
76. Absent 17 November 1947. 
77. Absent 18 November 1947. 
78. Absent 19 November 1947. 
79. Absent 20 November 1947. 
80. Absent 21 November 1947. 
81. Absent 24 November 1947. 
82. Absent 25 November 1947. 
83. Absent 26 November 1947. 
84. Not sitting 14 January 1948, 1500-1600. 
85. Not sitting 23 January 1948, 1500-1600. 
86. Absent 13 February 1948. 
87. Not sitting 25 February 1948, 0930-1045. 
88. Absent 19 March 1948. 
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89. Not sitting 24 March 1948, 1500-1600. 
90. Absent 25 March 1948. 
91. Absent 29 March 1948. 
92. Absent 30 March 1948. 
93. Absent 8 April 1948. 
8) Justice Lord Patr•ick o·f Great B'ritain and Northern· Ireland 
1. Absent 2 January 1947. 
2. Absent 27 January 1947. 
3. Absent 14 March 1947. 
4. Absent 17 March 1947. 
5. Absent 18 March 1947. 
6. Not sitting 6 June 1947, 1500-1600. 
7. Not sitting 15 August 1947, 1300-1600. 
8. Not sitting 22 August 1947, 1330-1600. 
9. Not sitting 29 August 1947, 1330-1600. 
10. Not sitting 5 September 1947, 1330-1600. 
11. Not sitting 12 September 1947, 1330-1600. 
12. Not sitting 10 October 1947, 1330-1600. 
13. Not sitting 23 October 1947, 1330-1600. 
14. Not sitting 21 November 1947, 1330-1600. 
15. Absent 8 December 1947. 
16. Not sitting 9 December 1947, 1330-1600. 
17. Not sitting 16 December 1947, 1330-1600. 
18. Not sitting 26 January 1948, 1330-1600. 
19. Absent 28 January 1948. 
20. Absent 29 January 1948. 
21. Absent 30 January 1948. 
22. Absent 3 February 1948. 
23. Absent 9 February 1948. 
24. Absent 10 February 1948. 
25. Absent 11 February 1948. 
26. Absent 12 February 1948. 
27. Absent 13 February 1948. 
28. Absent 16 February 1948. 
29. Absent 18 February 1948. 
30. Absent 19 February 1948. 
31. Absent 20 February 1948. 
32. Absent 24 February 1948. 
33. Absent 25 February 1948. 
34. Absent 26 February 1948. 
35. Absent 27 February 1948. 
36. Absent 1 March 1948. 
37. Absent 2 March 1948. 
38. Absent 3 March 1948. 
39. Absent 4 March 1948. 
40. Absent 5 March 1948. 
41. Absent 8 March 1948. 
42. Absent 8 April 1948. 
43. Absent 9 April 1948. 
44. Absent 12 April 1948. 
45. Absent 13 April 1948. 
46. Absent 14 April 1948. 
47. 48. !bbsent 15 April 1948. 
sent 16 April 1948. 
- ce B.V.A. Roling of the Netherlands 9> Justi 
~- Not sitting 2 January 1947, 1330-i:Goo. 
3: Absen~ 3 January 1947. 4. Not s7tting 14 May 1947, 1330-1600, 
s. Not s 7tting 19 May 1947, 1330-1600-6. Not s 7tting 20 May 1947, 1330-1600-7 Not sitting 24 October 1947, 1500-1600, 
a· Not sitting 29 October 1947, 1330-1600. 
• Ab 9 sent 31 October 1947-10: Not s~tting 15 January 1948, 1soo-1600, 
11 Not sitting 12 February 1948, 1330-1600-
12: :ot sitting 24 FebruarY 1948, lS00-1600, 
13. bsent 26 February 1948-14 Not sitting 17 March 1948, 1100-1200. 
15° Not sitting 18 March 1948, lS00-1600, 
16° Not sitting 19 March 1948, 1330-l600-
170 Not sitting 23 March 1948, 1500-1600, 
18° Not sitting 25 March 1948, 0930-10
45
. 
19° Absent 26 March 1948-
20· Absent 29 March 1948-
21: Absent 30 March 1948-Not sitting 7 April 1948, I330-1600-
---:...=,ice Sir William Flood Webb of Au
5t
ral~ l.O) Just· 
l. Ab 2.  sent 10 November 1947-
3. A~sent 12 November 1947• 
4. A sent 13 November 1947-
5. A~sent 14 November 1947• 
6. Absent 17 November 1947-
7. Absent 18 November 1947• 
8. Absent-19 November 1947-
9. Absent 20 November 1947-
lo sent 21 November 1947-
11· Absent 24 November 1947-
12· Absent 25 November 1947-
130 Absent 26 November 1947-
140 Absent 28 November 1947-
ls· !~sent 1 December 1947-
160 Absent 2 December 1947-
17 sent 3 December 1947-
180 Absent 4 December 1947-
190 Absent 5 December 1947• 
20· Absent 8 December 1947-
~1: Absent 9 December 1947, 
2. !~sent 10 December 1947-
23_ sent 11 December 1947-
Absent 12 December 194 7 • 
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196 
11) Justice I. M. Zaryanov of the Soviet Union 
1. Absent 4 August 1947. 
2. Absent 5 August 1947. 
3. Absent 6 August 1947. 
4. Absent 7 August 1947. 
5. Absent 8 August 1947. 
6. Absent 11 August 1947. 
7. Absent 12 August 1947. 
8. Absent 13 August 1947. 
9. Absent 14 August 1947. 
10. Absent 15 August 1947. 
11. Absent 18 August 1947. 
12. Absent 19 August 1947. 
13. Absent 20 August 1947. 
14. Absent 21 August 1947. 
15. Absent 22 August 1947. 
16. Absent 25 August 1947. 
17. Absent 26 August 1947. 
18. Absent 27 August 1947. 
19. Absent 28 August 1947. 
20. Absent 29 August 1947. 
21. Absent 2 September 1947. 
22. Absent 17 September 1947. 
23. Absent 18 September 1947. 
24. Absent 19 September 1947. 
25. Not sitting 30 September 1947, 1500-1600. 
26. Absent 3 February 1948. 
27. Not sitting 12 February 1948, 0930-1200. 
28. Not sitting 13 February 1948, 1330-1600. 
29. Absent 19 February 1948. 
30. Not sitting 20 February 1948, 1330-1600. 
31. Absent 25 February 1948. 
32. Not sitting 1 March 1948, 1330-1600. 
33. Not sitting 2 March 1948, 0930-1200. 
34. Not sitting 17 March 1948, 0930-1200. 
35. Not sitting 24 March 1948, 1330-1600. 
36. Not sitting 1 April 1948, 0930-1200. 
37. Not sitting 9 April 1948, 0930-1445. 
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